

**NEGOTIATING WITH THE SANDINISTAS**

Bernard Nietschmann

Department of Geography

University of California, Berkeley

Peace negotiations between representatives of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama nations and the Nicaraguan state have been taking place quietly since December, 1984. These are the only face-to-face negotiations with the Sandinistas and the only talks in the Americas between armed Indian nations and a state government. The military success of the Indians' defensive war against the invasion by Nicaraguan army and security forces--Central America's largest, and Misurasata's peace initiative have made Indian Nicaragua an international issue of considerable significance. Russell Means of the American Indian Movement (AIM) said of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama nations' military and political struggle: "I believe this to be the most important thing happening to Indian peoples at this time anywhere. It is beyond the colonizers' comprehension." Means and some 30 other leaders of Indian nations and organizations have been observers during the Misurasata-Sandinista negotiations.\* The outcome of the Indian-Sandinista war and negotiations is already having a major influence on behind-the-scenes political support, and could have even more impact on the Contadora process, the contra war, and indigenous Fourth World conflicts against other expanding colonialist states. The negotiations also provide some insight into Sandinista strategies, goals and

---

\*See end footnote for a list of delegation members, advisors, observers, and ambassadors.

reliability which may have relevance in any negotiations over Nicaragua's other war with the contras.

#### FIRST NATIONS DEFEND AGAINST SANDINISTA STATE INVASION

Two wars are being fought in Nicaragua: the "contra war" (the FDN and ARDE) that seeks to remove the Sandinistas from power, and the Indian war (Misurasata and Misura) that seeks to remove the Sandinista state from Indian lands and communities. To the Indian nations, the Nicaraguan state is a superpower that is intervening to deny their self-determination and to impose Sandinista determination. All Indian lands and resources have been expropriated by the state, almost one-half (50,000) of the Indian people have been forced into state camps or are refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica, and all Indian nations are under Sandinista military, political and economic rule. At the March 1985 negotiations, John Mohawk from the Six Nations Confederacy (Haudenosaunee) and former editor of Akwesasne Notes observed "The Nicaraguans go through all sorts of gyrations to hide the facts that their people have invaded the east coast, and that they look different, talk different, are in a different place--not their home, and are there with guns. I call that imperialism. What do you call it?"

Although the Nicaraguan state claims sovereignty over the three east coast indigenous nations, the Miskito, Sumo and Rama have never lost their own sovereignty through any treaty of cession, by conquest, consent or vote, or by occupation and settlement of their lands. In order to confiscate Indian lands

and incorporate Indian peoples into the state, the Sandinistas claim that the Indians are Nicaraguan citizens of Miskito, Sumo and Rama origin, and that as such, they do not compromise "a people" or a nation with any distinct territories or rights to self-determination. Instead, the state asserts that the Indians are, in the words of Sandinista delegation head Luis Carrión, "ethnic groups, for which the Government of National Reconstruction is prepared to discuss special rights in our national integration." To this Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera retorted, "Ethnic groups run restaurants. We have an army. We are a people. We want self-determination."

The Indian-Sandinista war is over land and resources and whether Indian peoples and their nations will be free to determine their own existence or will be subjugated under Sandinista rule. The Indians believe that their capacity to resist in all ways and persist in any way will outlast the Sandinistas' political and economic ability to maintain their invasion and imposed controls. The Miskito, Sumo and Rama are the only peoples in the Americas to experience and reject both extremes of European economics and politics: capitalism and dictatorship under Somoza, and Marxism and dictatorship under the Sandinistas. Whereas Somoza exploited Indian resources, the Sandinistas expropriated all the resources and the land, and then used their military and security to install their programs of state control. Nicaragua represents a proving ground for Marxism in Latin America which is also Indian America. Cuba had no Indians, Nicaragua does.

It was the Indians who were the first to rise up in arms against the Sandinistas in 1981, one year before the Ladino FDN and two years before the Ladino ARDE. Misura and Misurasata armed forces united inside Nicaragua in August 1984, and, as the Frente Interno, Indian forces are the only anti-

Managua army that can fight on --as they have for one year--without outside assistance.

Thus, for East-West geopolitical interests, North-South economic conflicts, and Fourth World nations, Indian Nicaragua may be small in size and population, but it is at a fulcrum point in history and relations between First, Second and Third worlds, and Fourth World indigenous peoples and their First Nations. It is against this backdrop that the negotiations have taken place.

#### BEHIND THE NEGOTIATIONS

Agreement to negotiate came about through a secret October, 1984 meeting between Senator Ted Kennedy, Daniel Ortega and Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera in a New York City hotel room. As a precondition to formal negotiations, Ortega promised to release Indian political prisoners (not done), and Brooklyn Rivera was invited to return to Nicaragua with guaranteed safety with a Misurasata delegation. Rivera's group and accompanying foreign observers made a rousing 11-day visit to Indian Nicaragua. A prisoner exchange was made as a demonstration of good faith: Misurasata released Ray Hooker, Patricia Delgado, and Santiago Mayorga who had been held for two months; the Sandinistas released Ariel Zúniga, Dennis Castro and Anastacio Forbes who had been held for 3 1/2 years. The day of Rivera's departure from Managua, October 31, the Sandinistas launched an EPS (Ejército Popular Sandinista) assault from Puerto Cabezas on Haulover, a Miskito coastal village and center of Misurasata support. The Sandinistas suffered 26 dead, Misurasata 2. Misurasata has refused to return the remains of EPS troops because they claim the attack

broke agreements and understandings that were made as precursors to the negotiations. This pattern of agreement and then attack was to be repeated two more times, January and May, 1985.

Misurasata entered the negotiations with caution, suspecting that the Sandinistas might be using them only as a political platform to influence international opinion, and knowing that the only previous bilateral agreement with the Sandinistas lasted but 11 days in 1981. However, the FDN, ARDE and the Arturo Cruz-led coalition were not yet prepared to discuss Indian rights and they are not even in power. The Sandinistas are.

Misurasata negotiation objectives include, among others, 1) a Sandinista military pullback from Indian lands and communities which would effectively end the shooting war as the Indians are fighting a defensive war within their nations; 2) a withdrawal of state institutions and personnel from Indian nations, including state security (DGSE), state stores (ENABAS), labor unions (ATC), Ministry of Interior functions (MINT), neighborhood defense committees (CDS), and other state controls that Misurasata terms "institutional repression" (political arrests, denial of freedom of movement to hunt, plant, fish; forced recruitment into state military forces, etc.); 3) recognition of Miskito, Sumo and Rama with sovereign rights as peoples and inalienable rights to an indigenous territory; 4) breakup of the 13 state "resettlement camps" and release of the 20,000 to 25,000 Indian people being held in them; and 5) non-interference so the 25,000 refugees that are in Honduras and Costa Rica can return home and rebuild the more than 100 destroyed communities.

Brooklyn Rivera stated to the Sandinista delegation: "These are our lands, resources and peoples, not yours. We want to negotiate a bilateral treaty that will guarantee our rights so that Indians can exist as Indians

within the country you ask us to share."

The challenge for Misurasata was not just to negotiate their demands, but to educate the Sandinistas--who are mentally trapped by their "vanguard-of-people" rhetoric--that Indian rights are not counterrevolutionary, they are revolutionary, and that the future of Nicaragua and Latin-Indian America is to build accords of co-existence between Indian and non-Indian peoples and nations.

Somoza's oppression led to the Sandinista revolution, and the Sandinistas' oppression led to the Indian revolution. Nicaragua is a country with two revolutions, Ladino and Indian, Third World and Fourth World, each based on very different histories, peoples, and objectives. As Misurasata advisor Rudolph Ryser asked, "can two revolutions stand side by side and be complementary, rather than contradictory? In these negotiations, the answer to that will either make or repeat history."

As the negotiations progressed it became evident that the Sandinistas have no intention of withdrawing their military forces for reasons of "national security," or of removing their imposed political and economic controls because that would infringe upon their "national sovereignty." It was also clear that they interpret Indian autonomy as simply a "separatist movement" and a "plan for independence." Indian demands for natural resource rights are dismissed as impossible because all natural resources are deemed to be "national resources."

Despite these categorical denials of the rights of indigenous peoples, Misurasata continued to submit rights proposals for discussion, because aside from Sandinista assertions, the Nicaraguan state does not have effective

control of Indian peoples, or resources, or sovereignty, or security. If the state was in control they would not be negotiating with Misurasata.

Claims of sovereignty, military security and the political threat of separatism are the common justification used by politically divergent Third World states to incorporate indigenous nations: the Philippines against the Kalingas, Bontacs, Tau Sug, and Muslims; Burma against the Karens, Shans, Kachins, and others; Ethiopia against the Eritreans, Tigreans and others; Morocco against the Berbers and Saharawis; and Sri Lanka against the Tamils.

If the Sandinistas wanted to be really revolutionary they would abandon their occupation of Indian nations and reevaluate their assertions that all Indian rights, lands and resources are to be determined by the state that has the right to convert inalienable land to state property and indigenous peoples to minorities. The frontiers are starting to go the other way and the Sandinistas are not among the vanguard.

#### WHAT IS REVOLUTIONARY ABOUT TOTALITARIAN CONTROL?

"What is revolutionary about your position?" Brooklyn Rivera asked Luis Carrión. "Is allowing one Indian to sit on your commission on Indian autonomy revolutionary? We are proposing a revolutionary treaty and we are waiting for a revolutionary answer."

The heart of the Indian struggle has long been autonomy, self-determination, and land and resource rights. The Sandinistas to date are unwilling to negotiate any of these issues; instead they have set up their own national and regional commissions on Indian autonomy and have offered

Misurasata -- representing Indian Nicaragua -- but one seat on the eight-member national commission. Misurasata's reaction was that it is "paternalistic, contradictory and unnecessary for your government to determine our self-determination." Misurasata asked the Sandinistas if they would accept one-representative participation on a U.S. commission to determine their fate?

Autonomy for Indian Nicaragua is the freedom to exercise an indigenous way of life within Indian territory and communities, free from political, military or economic intervention by the Nicaraguan state. In 1981, when Misurasata promoted this, it led to the mass arrest of all Indian leaders as being "separatists," "counterrevolutionaries," and "CIA." Misurasata was outlawed, its leaders went into exile, and the war over Managua's occupation soon began. Now, four years later, it is the Sandinistas who claim that they have their own "revolutionary solution" to the crisis on the east coast. Refusing to explain their plan for "ethnic autonomy," or to negotiate Misurasata's regional autonomy plan, the Sandinistas also have rejected consideration of any existing autonomy accords between states and indigenous nations such as those involving the San Blas Kuna and Panama, the Naga and India, and the Inuit and Denmark.

Indian autonomy for the Sandinistas may mean imposition of a Russian model. In February 1985, two Sandinista Miskitos -- Armando Rojas and Fornes Rabonias -- were sent by Managua to Moscow and Lithuania to study the Soviet system of ethnic autonomy. The Misurasata leadership is concerned that Sandinista rhetoric and fabrications not only have become official truth, but beliefs of the officials. Lithuanian (and Estonian, etc.) autonomy from Russian control is fiction. "Russification" of everything Lithuanian is all pervasive -- language, history, culture. Local rights are determined in Moscow.

This is not a solution for Lithuania, much less for Indian Nicaragua. Misurasata suspects that the Sandinistas are but going through the motions of a negotiation on behalf of world opinion, presenting proposals that would guarantee Indian folklore but not land rights, while they redesign their own Indian policy based upon Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. However, Indian Nicaragua will never submit to a Lithuanian-style solution to the "Indian Problem."

Indian autonomy is Misurasata's proposal for recognition by the Nicaraguan state of Indian nations and their rights to internal government and self-determination. The Nicaraguan state has never controlled Indian lands and peoples on the east coast, the Sandinistas don't now, and it is unlikely that any future government would either. Misurasata is seeking a new relationship of co-existence with the state, not independence from the state.

Sandinista Comandante Luis Carrión was quoted in a New York Times interview (May 30, 1985:3) as saying, "This proposal is completely beyond any political or military reality. Besides being politically unacceptable because it would limit Government authority over national territory, militarily it would give every advantage to the groups fighting there." Actually, the only groups fighting on Indian lands are the all-Indian Frente Interno and the Sandinista army and militia. Withdraw the state's armed forces and the fighting would stop. Indian forces would continue to defend lands as necessary against any other would-be invaders.

The Nicaraguan state contends that Indian demands for autonomy and rights are recent issues, without an indigenous context, provoked by outsiders to create internal dissention, and simply pieced together from political window-shopping. According to Luis Carrión — who has been trying to contain "the

Indian Problem" since 1980, "What they are seeking is almost a state within a state. This is a concept they picked up from various international organizations." He further claims that the Miskito people never had a tradition of "legal autonomy" and that the word did not exist in their language (New York Times, May 30, 1985:3). Misurasata says that the Indian peoples have defended their land for 500 years against colonialists, imperialists, and now marxists — all of whom claimed some sort of "legal sovereignty," but ignored the existence of autonomous indigenous nations. And Misurasata has in a safe place the nineteenth century legal titles and cadastral maps for all Indian community lands. The Sandinistas have rejected Indian rights to land that are based on customary ownership from centuries of occupation, and European ownership based on British surveys and titles to Indian land. The Sandinistas should translate wan tasbaia (our land).

The Nicaraguan state's position on Indian demands for autonomy is very similar to how the United States reacted to the same issue in the mid-nineteenth century when the Miskito people sought international recognition of their nation. Writing in 1853 and 1856, U.S. Secretary of State Marcy also rejected wan tasbaia:

They have only possessory rights to the country they occupy, and not sovereignty of it.

The President cannot admit as true, and therefore cannot under any possible circumstances advise the Republic of Nicaragua to admit that the Mosquito Indians are a State or a Government any more than a band of Maroons in the island of Jamaica are a State or Government.

SOVEREIGNTY SEPARATES, IT DOES NOT JOIN FIRST NATIONS AND CURRENT STATES

One of the major barriers to a negotiated settlement is the Sandinista's claim of absolute sovereignty over Indian nations, peoples, and resources.

The Sandinistas clearly become agitated and intransigent when their claimed sovereign rights are disputed by Indians who claim other sovereign rights. Indian demands for local decentralization of state authority and respect of their territories, are interpreted as "threats to Nicaraguan sovereignty." (This is a fantasy for Managua which has little control outside of the cities and state forced-resettlement camps.)

At the March 1985 Bogotá negotiations, the Sandinista delegation stated that Nicaragua would not accept any third party government or organization to mediate, arbitrate or monitor negotiations or any agreements because the Indian conflict was a "domestic issue," not an international one, and they would "not permit any organization or country to control Nicaragua." Luis Carrión said that the presence of Indian observers (AIM, Six Nations, National Indian Youth Council, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia, etc.) is "a threat to the sovereignty of Nicaragua." To this Oren Lyons from the Six Nations Confederacy responded that "it is the Sandinista position that is a threat to the Indians," and Russell Means (AIM) remarked, "the Sandinistas say that we are a threat to their sovereignty; we have to carve that one in granite."

#### SANDINISTA ATTACKS BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS

The Sandinistas have launched several attacks against Indian villages and Indian armed units during the course of the negotiations. Although no cease-fire is in force, EPS and FAS (Fuerzas Aéreas Sandinistas) attacks against civilians have severely strained even minimal trust in Managua. Indian fighters and civilians have been informed that even though Misurasata is

negotiating with the Sandinistas, they should be ready for ground and air attacks at any time, as always.

Misurasata broke off the negotiations due to Sandinista air and ground attacks against civilian communities in January, 1985. Brooklyn Rivera witnessed the bombings when he went by outboard-powered canoe to Indian Nicaragua to spend Christmas with Misurasata fighters and Miskito villagers. He planned to tell the people about the stalemated outcome of the December negotiations and obtain their opinions for the next round scheduled for January 19-20. On January 1, the Sandinistas began a widespread, coordinated attack against Indian communities between Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas. An EPS force sent from Bluefields to the Pearl Lagoon area was guided by Santiago Mayorga, a member of Sandinista Security (DGSE) who had been a prisoner held by Misurasata and released by Rivera in October. During the backup air attack, Rivera was wounded by rocket shrapnel. Civilian communities suffered scattered bombing and rocket strikes and subsequent military occupation in Kara, Little Sandy Bay, Karawala, Río Grande Bar, Wounta, and Haulover. Several sources from Puerto Cabezas reported artillery fire from that city's Lamlaya river-landing directed toward the Miskito village of Karata. Misurasata informed the Sandinistas and Colombian President Betancur that they were breaking off negotiations due to the bombings and military occupation of Indian communities.

Talks resumed only through the personal intervention of President Betancur. During the March 1 inauguration of Uruguayan President Julio Sanguinetti, President Betancur met with Daniel Ortega to ask him to continue the talks. Betancur then met secretly with Brooklyn Rivera March 10 on San Andrés who also agreed to reestablish the talks in late March.

Misurasata invited many South American and North American leaders of Indian nations and organizations to observe the March Bogotá negotiations. This was done to directly inform indigenous peoples what was going on at the talks and to offset the Sandinistas' earlier tactic of media distortions. The presence of Indian leaders became the big story from this meeting, including the joint Rivera-Russell Means press statement announcing the first international Indian military alliance involving a plan to send Lakota and other warriors to fight alongside Misurasata against the Sandinista invaders.

#### INDIAN RIGHTS MUST BEGIN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE

During all four rounds of negotiations, a basic impasse between the two sides was agreement on a ceasefire. The Sandinista delegation clearly wanted a signed ceasefire (and little else) to solve their east coast military problem and to bring some relief to the international pressure over their handling of Indian peoples. As Omar Cabezas complained, clutching his throat, "We've had it up to here over you Indians." (Armstrong Wiggins asked him if he was accusing the Indians of creating the problem.)

Misurasata refused to agree to a ceasefire until substantial progress is made on the fundamental issues of Indian rights and only after the Sandinista state carries out some tangible demonstrations of good faith. Misurasata leaders acknowledge that they were not at the negotiating table because of any fundamental change in Sandinista policy or philosophy toward Indians. They were there because the Sandinistas are hurting from Indian attacks and international opinion. Misurasata's position is that neither a ceasefire or continued military actions are not in themselves solutions to the conflict

between Indian nations and the Sandinista state. However, a ceasefire coupled with a Sandinista military pullback from Indian lands would be an acceptable combination for an initial agreement.

At the April 20-22 Mexico City negotiations, the Sandinistas pushed to obtain a ceasefire to influence the April 23 contra aid vote in Washington. Whereas, continuation of the contra war indirectly benefits the Indians because it ties up many Sandinista military forces that otherwise might be directed to the east and Indian lands, no outside assistance would be directed to the Indians. And Indian civilian communities are suffering from little food and almost no medicine, forced government recruitment of Indian boys to go into the EPS to fight Indian boys in Misurasata and Misura, little or no freedom of movement permitted beyond the settlements, and counterinsurgency military occupations of villages.

A good faith accord was signed by the two delegation leaders on April 22. The Sandinistas agreed to release all Misurasata and Misura Indian and Creole political prisoners (something Daniel Ortega has already promised to do in October, 1984), to assist in providing food and medicine to Indian villages, and to allow freedom of movement to once more fish, hunt, and plant; Misurasata and the Sandinistas agreed to avoid offensive military actions. Managua immediately called the no-escalation accord a ceasefire and sent the news to their supporters in Washington, D.C. and Europe.

On April 28, 14 prisoners were released. Misurasata suspects that more are still in prison. If they are not, then additional names should be added to the list of 72 that "disappeared" while held in custody by the Nicaraguan state.

### SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS

In late April and May, the Sandinistas sent State Security into Indian villages posing as Nicaraguan Red Cross workers to ask civilians to help locate the Indian fighters so that "medicine" could be given to them. In many areas, the state also began to move military personnel from major garrisons into Indian communities. On May 9 the lower Rfo Grande region was attacked by the Sandinistas, with Kara again being bombed. Misurasata forces set ambushes against EPS troop movements on the Alamikamba-Limbaika road. Fighting broke out again around and in several Indian communities. On May 17 the Frente Interno attacked Bluefields. The attack set off considerable support from the largely Creole Sandinista militia against Ladino EPS units.

At the just completed May 25-26 Bogotá talks, the Sandinistas presented Misurasata with a list of "ceasefire violations" in which they accused Misurasata of carrying out attacks against their forces and Indian communities. The list was based on the same terminology Managua uses to discredit the FDN: kidnappings, assassinations, destruction of state property, and so on. Misurasata responded that the Sandinista delegation obviously is not interested in serious negotiations, never had been, and that their accusations are simply a very crude attempt to hold Misurasata accountable for what in fact were Sandinista military attacks. (Comprised of local village volunteers, Misurasata forces would hardly attack their own parents and families.) Misurasata came to Bogotá to discuss land rights to end the war; the Sandinistas came to denounce Misurasata for continuing the war.

Misurasata again stressed the need to have a Tripartite Commission formed to monitor implementation and violations of accords reached in the negotiations. The Sandinistas refused and continued to accuse Misurasata of

violating a fictional ceasefire. These accusations were made public before they were made known to Misurasata. It was clear that the Sandinista delegation had no intentions or instructions to negotiate. The new hard line from Managua was to use the Bogotá talks to break off the negotiations and open the way to proceed with their own plans which are to be administered by Tomás Borge. (It was Borge who once said of Misurasata fighters, "If those monkeys won't come down out of the trees, we'll shoot them down.")

Further negotiations have been suspended. Misurasata says it is willing to seek a peaceful settlement with the state, but at this time the Sandinistas are only posturing for propoganda and world opinion.

The Sandinista positions at the negotiations offer some insight into their position at home and within the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). For example, the uneasy compromise between the Daniel Ortega and Tomás Borge factions (tendencias) has been further stressed by contradictory approaches: the President's office sends signals for a negotiated settlement; the Minister of Interior's office sends troops and bombs to Indian villages. An internal agreement appears to have been made to proceed with negotiations in order to influence international and U.S. congressional opinion, but whatever accord was brought back by Luis Carrión would be administered by Tomás Borge.

The Sandinista leadership gave no indication that they are prepared to negotiate any of the centralized power they have imposed over all Nicaraguan society, economy and territory, Indian nations included. Their ideology begins with the assumption of an imperialist threat, and the need for a militarized society, which is then reinforced by U.S. backing of the FDN and the U.S. trade embargo. Because the Sandinistas confuse their ideology for

sovereignty, patrimony, and the will of the people, they are unlikely to demilitarize against what they see as an external (U.S. and FDN) or internal (Indian) threat.

Misurasata spent much time trying to educate the Sandinista delegation that to politically decentralize and militarily pull back from Indian nations would be a revolutionary advance in relations with Indian peoples in the Americas, not a retreat from historic responsibilities to what the state claims to be the "Fatherland." But Sandinista ideology is founded on an intolerance to diversity. For their state, diversity is a weakness, not a strength, and everything must be converted to state interests (all in the name of the people, of course).

A New York Times article (April 26, 1985:6) quoted Tomás Borge — who is now in charge of Indian policy and administration — as making this chilling statement in Bluefields: "Here there are no whites, blacks, Miskitos or Creoles. Here there are revolutionary and counterrevolutionary Nicaraguans, regardless of the color of their skin. The only thing that differentiates us is the attitude we assume toward the nation."

AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIGENOUS NATIONS HAS NO POLITICAL DIFFERENCE

Nicaragua is but another colonialist state seeking to justify its expansion into Indian nations by accusing them of not adhering to the invader's ideology. Sandinista claims to a right to control Indian peoples and nations rest on the self-serving assumption that only the enemy resists takeover and subjugation. Oren Lyons (Six Nations Confederacy) put it this way: "How can the Sandinistas justify being on Indian land? If they say they own it, they then declare themselves to be the aggressors. The only other way to be there is by invitation."

The essential question is how long can the Sandinistas sustain their invasion of Indian nations? After almost 500 years the Miskito, Sumo and Rama peoples have yet to be integrated by would-be invaders. To get the Sandinista state off their lands and out of their villages, the Indians were the first to take up arms and now they are the first to try to negotiate. The Nicaraguan state's decision to only pursue Sandinista rights at the expense of Indian rights will simply prolong, not end this war.

The Sandinista position on indigenous nations and rights is no different from that taken by Indonesia, India, Burma, France, the Philippines, Guatemala, and Ethiopia, to cite but a few of the states currently at war with indigenous nations. Fourth World wars are the most persisting of modern conflicts and they presently number more than one-half of the world's hot wars. The Nicaraguan state should look to these examples -- not to Moscow and Lithuania -- to better understand what they face.

-----

The author has worked for 17 years with Miskito, Sumo and Rama peoples and is an advisor with Misurasata.

FOOTNOTE

\*The Misurasata delegation is led by Brooklyn Rivera and includes Armstrong Wiggins, Marcos Hoppington, Julian Holmes, Max Zamora, David Rodríguez, Walter Ortíz, William Preston, Samuel Mercado, Delano Martin, and Ronas Dolores.

Misurasata advisors are Jim Anaya, Robert Coulter, Theodore Macdonald, Bernard Nietschmann, Rudolph Ryser, and Steve Tullberg.

The Sandinista delegation is led by Luis Carrión and has included Omar Cabezas, Lumberto Campbell, Mirna Cunningham, Augusto Zamora, Galio Guardián, Manuel Ortega, William Ramírez, and Antenor Rosales.

Participating as observers were representatives from indigenous nations and organizations including Russell Means (American Indian Movement -- AIM); Evaristo Nuquáq (Asociación Interétnica para el Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana -- AIDSESP); Salidonio Padilla (Capitanes, Sucre, Colombia); Benjamín Cortés (Comité Evangélica Por Ayuda al Desarrollo -- CEPAD); Manuel Eariquingo (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana -- CONFENIAE); Alejandro Swaby (Coordinadora Regional de Pueblos Indígenas -- CORPI); Asunción Ontiveros (Consejo Indio de Sud America -- CISA); Cristóbal Tapuy (Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador -- CONACNIE); Adolfo Triana (Fundación Comunidades Colombianas -- FUNCOL); Tom Lueben (Lueben, Hughes and Tomita, Attorneys); <sup>X</sup>Rubin Snake (Winnebago Nation); Harvey Arden and Steve Wall (National Geographic Society); Gerald Wilkinson (National Indian Youth Council); Hazel Law (Nicaraguan Assembly, Managua); Andy Shogreen (Moravian Church, Managua); Trino Morales, Aura Marina Guzmán, Benerexa Marquéz (Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia --

ONIC); Oren Lyons, John Mohawk, Mike Myers, Lawrence Nonticoke, Bernard Parker (Six Nations Confederacy -- Haudenosaunee); Hank Adams (Survival of American Indians Association); Clem Chartier, Hayden Burgess, Donald Rojas, Rodrigo Contreras, Doug Sanders, Louis Bruyere, Andrés López (World Council of Indigenous Peoples); and Raymond Yowell (Western Shoshone Nation).

Also participating were representatives from the governments of Canada, Colombia, France, Holland, Mexico and Sweden.