

Fourth World Journal



Fall 2006

V7N1

Rudolph C. Rýser, Ph.D
LUKANKA

Marc A. Sills, Ph.D
Peer Reviewed
The GWOT and the Joker: Fourth World War in 2006

Navaya Ole Ndaskoi
The Root Causes of Maasai Predicament

Jay Taber
Institutional Memory as Community Safeguard

Oguchi Nkwocha, MD
Paradigm Shift: Saving Africa Listening and Answering the Call of Nature

Amy Eisenburg, Ph.D
Understanding Aymara Perspectives on Development

E. Richard Atleo, Ph.D
Research: A Nuu-chah-nulth Perspective

Ranjay K. Singh, Ph.D
Dheeraj Singh, Ph.D
Amish K. Sureja, Ph.D

Community knowledge and conservation of indigenous biodiversity: Exploration of hidden wisdom of Monpa tribe

Laura Killian
Book Review: The Power of Scale by John H Bodley

LUKANKA

by Rudolph C. Rýser, Ph.D.

© 2006 Center for World Indigenous Studies

LUKANKA

(Miskito for "Thoughts")

In this issue of Fourth World Journal we benefit from the work of CWIS Associate Scholars around the world undertaking independent research and applying the results in concrete a measurable ways for the benefit of Fourth World peoples. International, and nation and state conflicts have been an important focus in the Fourth World and evidenced by the contributed works of Associate Scholars conflicts and the resolution of conflicts involving Fourth World nations will remain a high priority for our attention.

The role that indigenous knowledge plays and will continue to play in local and global affairs will open new avenues to resolving conflicts in the world. Massive "Roman style" wars like World War I and WWII have essentially run their course as a result of the Globalization consciousness of the 21st century. Asymmetric relations between large and small states and nations have now come to the forefront of modern international experience. Fourth World nations have become front row players in the modern clashes and their knowledge has become an essential part of the solutions of local and global conflicts. States and state institutions are organized to undertake imperial relations with the world-demanding massive organization and large institutional structures.

"What is far more possible, however, in the coming decade, are an increasing number of "brush-fire" wars, counter-insurgency campaigns, hostage rescue operations, "drug wars," low intensity conflicts, urban combat, and "peacekeeping operations" that will require a vastly different set of tactics, equipment, training and skills than conventional military engagements of the past. Future conflicts, at least in the near term, may not involve commitments of massive numbers of

troops to fixed battle zones, but will likely involve combating small units of fanatical terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and other sophisticated tactics and technologies. As Commandant of the of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak, likes to say, the United States will often be fighting engagements that are more like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia than they are like Desert Storm.”

Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism;
The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces
By: Clark L. Staten, Executive Director & Sr. Analyst
Emergency Response & Research Institute
(04/27/98)

Since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, state government officials, scholars and commentators have concentrated on explaining what the "new world order" will be. Despite the fact that hundreds of low intensity conflicts had raged throughout the world from the early 1970s little attention was paid to them in favor of the sexier "Cold War." When that convenient war between two colossal strategic giants (so called "Great Powers") came to a fizzling anti-climactic end the "great warriors" were suddenly left without a "global war" to be fought. For ten years until September 11, 2001 managing small conflicts (Kosovo, Serbia, Somalia, etc) and counting up the peace dividend occupied the key leaders.

In 1982 I published an essay entitled "Fourth World Wars: the new emerging international political order" where I discussed and documented 128 wars (low intensity to be sure) ranging from the hot wars of Nicaragua vs. the Miskito, Sumo and Rama to the India vs. Naga, Burma vs. Karen and Mio to warm wars of Peoples' Republic of China vs. Tibet, Manchuria and Uygur, Mexico vs. Maya and Peru vs. Aymara and Quichua. **Bernard Q. Nietchmann** contributed to the further development of this literature with "The Fourth World Nations Without a

State - Fourth World Nations: Conflicts and Alternatives” in 1985 and his presentation on “The Militarization of the Third World, Regional Conflict Overview: The ‘Third World War;” The Fourth Dimension later published by Cultural Survival (1990). Now **Dr. Marc Sills**, who published his own contributions to this literature in the Fourth World Bulletin during the 1990s updates us on wars in the Fourth World with his peer reviewed essay entitled: *The GWOT and the Joker: Fourth World War in 2006*. Dr. Sills provides breathtaking descriptions of little known conflicts as well as well know conflicts. The Fourth World is very much in the middle of the “Global War on Terror” or the GWOT.

Breaking new ground in the field of social research and indigenous knowledge, **Dr. Richard Atleo** (Umeek) of the Nuu-Chah-nulth writes in *Research: the Nuu-chah-nulth Perspective* a new chapter in the development of indigenous knowledge . Umeek is deeply grounded in his own culture and draws from that culture an analysis of research and the application of Nuu-chah-nulth epistemology in modern research-an extraordinary discussion that takes steps beyond the thesis of his book *Tsawalk* (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press).

In *Understanding Aymara Perspectives on Development* **Dr. Amy Eisenburg** writes with personal scholarship about her participator action research in South America, and its conclusion. She writes skillfully to bring new insights to the need for fundamental changes in approaches to development in the Fourth World drawing on Aymara views and analysis.

In an FWJ reprise, **Navaya ole Ndaskoi** writes in *The Root Causes of Maasai Perdicament* but elaborates the sources of conflict between the Maasai and Kikuyu Farmers which centers on access to lands and resources.

Dr. Oguchi Nkwocha, a Biafran activist, offers a powerful analysis of the nascent Republic of Biafra’s role in restoring Africa to Africans after centuries of colonialism. He demonstrates how a Fourth World analysis rooted in indigenous

knowledge can reshape the political environment of the African continent.

Dr. Ranjay Singh and his colleagues **Dr. Dheeraj Singh** and **Dr. Amish Sureja** introduce our readers to Monpa tribal knowledge in connection with the use of plants in the preservation and extension of biodiversity. Community knowledge rooted in the ancient foundations of the Monpa has application well beyond the boundaries of northern India.

Traditional knowledge imbedded in community institutions is the focus of **Jay Taber's** discussion of conflicts in the experience of the former Yugoslavia and the contrasting experiences of modern Europe and American Indian cultures.

CWIS Forum for Global Exchange Program Coordinator **Laura Killian** offers an insightful review of **Dr. John Bodley's** important new book *The Power of Scale*. Killian notes the significance of Bodley's insights for contemporary analysis of modern social, economic and political events.

Indigenous knowledge perspectives from the Fourth World are an essential part of the global dialogue about the human condition. Conflicts between peoples need not dominate our experience. Indeed, as the contributors to this issue of FWJ demonstrate, there are powerful ideas in the Fourth World that can and must contribute to easing human tensions and ultimately uplifting of the human spirit.

The GWOT and the Joker: Fourth World War in 2006

by Marc A. Sills

Copyright 2006

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) identifies its enemy of record as “Islamic extremists,” and so it finds theaters presumably wherever Islam confronts other religions and ideologies. Islam confronts Western Christianity and Judaism in the West and Israel, Orthodox Christianity in Russia and Serbia, Hinduism in India, Buddhism in Thailand, Communism in China, etc. Pretty simple. The cause of war is obviously within Islam itself, the result of a dysfunctional religious paranoia that finds enemies everywhere it goes. In response and legitimate self-defense, the crusader spirit lives on, embodied by the leadership of the United States and its fearless, will-not-be-intimidated President, protecting all that is good and right from the hallucination of an evil caliphate empire which intends to “rule the world.”

But look. The darkest visions of international Islamism notwithstanding,¹ in fact, “the terrorists” have no state, no army, no navy, no air force, no regular soldiers, no heavy weapons, no conventional military capabilities at all to speak of, as well as no verified Weapons of Mass Destruction, no tested delivery systems, no surveillance satellites, no space weapons, and above all else, no particular identity. The 9/11/01 attack - that act of terrorism which ostensibly necessitated the GWOT - was perpetrated by nineteen men of mixed nationalities who were armed with nothing more than razor blades

It is a challenge, then, to square these facts with the expenditure of some \$440 billion (plus another \$120 billion for current wars) in the 2007 US Defense budget.² Surely, the GWOT justifies at least some of that investment in security. But really, does all that money go to fighting an enemy who cannot be conclusively identified, except as a network of violent, very low-tech, and yes, very determined Muslim irregulars? Asymmetric warfare, indeed.

While the GWOT dominates collective consciousness, the Pentagon’s latest (2006) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establishes Great Power conflict, most particularly with China³ (though Russia and India can also be considered potential rivals), as the main focus of its preparation for future wars, and implicitly of its prosecution of current wars. If money talks, the QDR and the 2007 Defense budget together can be taken at face value, and then the intent of the GWOT starts to resemble a prism, refracting the light on conflict to make it appear coherent in the eyes of a presumed beholder, whose emotions have been skillfully blackmailed through the icon of the 9/11 attack. The intention is to mesmerize and delude, to contort any and all conflicts within a central fear-mongered rubric that cannot be substantiated by facts. Now, the GWOT appears to be a cudgel and a cover story for persuading people to accept and support wars around the world that have much less to do with Islamist terrorism than they do with Great Power objectives.

How many wars are there? What are they about? If the GWOT charade is followed, there are presumed to be some unknown number of wars grinding away, mostly unreported, both within a central Middle East theater and off in the far-flung periphery. Somehow, they all conform to the conjurer’s spell and fall into place within a constellation of events that have terrorism, not Great Power games, as their common denominator. But the presumption is questionable at best, and the true face of conflict is at odds with the illusion. Of the current identifiable shooting wars, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, few if any of them have terrorism at their root. Some can be classified as “civil wars,” where popular insurgent elements are attempting to seize state control. But the majority of current violent conflicts around the world are wars of national liberation, and their diverse protagonists can best be categorized as nations of the Fourth World.

Fourth World Wars

The Fourth World is the constellation of indigenous peoples and nations in conflict with states. It was first conceptualized during the 1970s⁴ – at a time when the wars of First World decolonization were widely perceived to be in their last chapters. The Fourth World concept has its roots in a revolutionary tradition that dates back at least to the 1770s, but its phase in the 1970s had begun in 1945 – at the end of World War II and the subsequent independence of new states in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Oceania and the Caribbean, states which largely became constituent members of the so-called Third World. Fourth Worldists of the 1970s argued that, while the phase of decolonization might have been in transition, the momentum had by no means been spent, and that there remained many chapters of liberation struggles yet to be written.

Fourth World wars have often been hijacked and cynically exploited as the fodder of Great Power conflict. During the 1970s, for instance, the phase in which decolonization occurred was framed by the Cold War context. Within that context, many national liberation struggles were fostered and manipulated, but they were almost always misperceived as simply proxy wars between the capitalist First World and the socialist/communist Second World. Declarations of independence from alien rule were always more important than East-West rivalry. As a consequence of decolonization, from the end of World War II in 1945, until the (presumed) end of the Cold War in 1991, scores of new states achieved independence. The membership of the United Nations (which was built by and for Great Powers) more than tripled, climbing from 51 to 159, mostly as the result of liberation movements that broke down European imperial states, notably Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.

Then, in the early 1990s, decolonization came to the Second World, within a context then framed as George H.W. Bush's "New World Order" (also known as "the post-Cold War period" - when China largely replaced the Soviet Union as the primary object of US military preparations). Second World decolonization appeared as a net gain for the First World, although the state system increased in complexity and decreased in coherence, to the net detriment of all Great Powers. From 1990 to 2001 (the year marking initiation of the present context), the population of states represented at the UN increased to 189, mostly as the result of fragmentation of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia. UN membership then grew to 191, following the admissions of East Timor and Switzerland, in 2002.

In other words, coincident with Great Power conflicts, the process of imperial disintegration and proliferation of new states defines a major trend of world history for the past few centuries. Empires have been falling apart for a long time. No reason to think it's over yet. The advance of a nascent world empire, in the name of Globalization, has not yet proven its capacity to overcome the systemic fragmentation that defines the prevailing trend.

Since 2001, within the current context of the GWOT, Fourth World independence movements have continued a phase marked by the disintegration of multi-national post-colonial states, and conflicts are now intensifying in significant locations - places of strategic importance for Great Power relationships. And just as previous contextual chapters (like the Cold War) have confused the understanding of decolonization, so too the GWOT now overlaps with and obscures the fundamental nature of indigenous liberation movements, while simultaneously obscuring Great Power dynamics. Under GWOT cover, the stage is set for Great Power conflict in many Fourth World theaters, and also for a tsunami of independence movements.

The Joker

The GWOT context of current Fourth World wars cannot be reduced to simple terms, because it is intentionally ambiguous, multilayered, covert, and misleading, and it is being administered by people who apparently believe their propaganda is credible. The pattern is revealed best when understood in terms of Great Power conflicts, as opposed to terrorism. Even then, it is a study of endless contradictions - the roots of which lie at home, in American Indian policy.

Historically, American Indian nations have always been the subjects of United States foreign policy, which was originally administered by the War Department. Indian nations have been parties to international treaties with the United States (and other countries), and to this day are referred to as “sovereign” nations that enjoy “self-determination” and have government-to-government relations with the federal state. Many Indian nations still are associated with traditional territories, in the form of colonized reservations, and they have nominally autonomous administrative institutions (“tribal governments”) that are unique, differentiating them from all other ethnic groups and minorities in the United States. But their place in American society is highly compromised, especially in their explicit treatment as “internal colonies”⁵ now administered by the Interior Department (while misrepresented by the State Department),⁶ and in a very inconsistent pattern that shares little among the experiences of other indigenous peoples of the United States - particularly those in Hawaii and Alaska, who have neither treaties nor reservations nor government-to-government relations. And grossly outnumbered by about 99 to 1, within a generally oblivious population that is ordered by an ethos of integration and individual equality in a so-called democracy, American Indian nations are forever caught in a twilight zone which can be characterized only in terms of ambiguity. Now you see them; now you don't.

The model of American Indian policy is manifest outwardly in a foreign policy that is equally ambiguous in its recognition of indigenous nations within other states. The best analogy for this ambiguity is the Joker card, which has meaning and value assigned by the one who holds and plays it. The policy is characterized by duplicity. Sometimes indigenous nations in other countries are useful to US interests, and sometimes not. Usually, the United States stands by the principle of territorial integrity, which is a universal right of all states, codified in international law. The exceptions to the rule are therefore most interesting, but such exceptions often are conducted in covert “special operations” of the CIA or outsourced to unofficial foreign policy agents, greatly increasing the challenge of perception from without. History reveals the pattern.⁷

In 1925, within a former context involving Great Power conflict, the United States played the Joker, when it provided military support for the Kuna Indians, in their rebellion against the government of Panama.⁸ In the 1980s, within the Cold War context, the United States recognized Miskito Indians in their war of self-defense against the Nicaraguan government (and enlisted them in the CIA's illegal Contra War against the Sandinista regime).⁹ Meantime, it denied recognition to the East Timorese, in their war of self-defense against the Indonesian government. Then the Joker's value was reversed, as policy moved to reintegrate the Miskitos in Nicaragua (within a post-Sandinista regime), while it was forced to accept the de-facto independent statehood of East Timor, in a United Nations intervention. Within the New World Order context (in the early 1990s), the policy recognized the indigenous national identity of Eritrea, but only after having denied that identity for decades, and then again, it was due to de-facto statehood achieved despite US support for an Ethiopian empire. Meantime (in 1992), the US Joker sold out Iraqi Kurds to Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, after having supported their rebellion in the Gulf War of 1991, and then reversed again, to protect them from Saddam until 2003, in the now-forgotten “Northern No-Fly Zone.”¹⁰ In today's GWOT context, US policy is to support Kurdish

autonomy in Iraq (and perhaps Syria and Iran, as well), while denying it in Turkey. In the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, today, the US State Department stands full-square against recognizing the right of secession as equivalent to the right of self-determination, but on the other hand, secession can be accepted on a “case-by-case basis,” clearly depending on its expedience in Great Power relations.¹¹

Certainly, other states (including Great Power states) can also play the Joker card as a foreign policy instrument, when it serves their interests. And they can participate in the GWOT charade, as well. But most states play the Joker very rarely and only close to home, and mostly where useful indigenous nations are located directly across their own borders in neighboring countries - as opposed to finding situations all around the world and in many other countries, in a discernable pattern repeated through different contexts. And for most states, there is an understanding that playing the Joker is not always effective. In the hands of incompetents, it can backfire and provoke a mutual response which threatens their own territorial integrity – the right to which all states claim equally. Most states, but especially large multi-national states that are little more than local empires, are vulnerable to the same weapon the Joker represents – that is, territorial disintegration. Most states also perceive that the system is presently becoming over-populated, to the point of incoherence, which threatens them equally. Most states view secessionism as an absolute anathema, and generally refuse to sanction Fourth World liberation struggles.

On the other hand, there are several thousand identifiable indigenous peoples and nations to account for, and it is unrealistic to think that none of them will ever achieve independence, from this point on. Their most common experience is being colonized, and little has changed since the departure of foreign imperialists from Europe or wherever. Local imperialists are often more onerous than former overseas rulers ever were. So, the original revolutionary impulse - to be liberated from alien control - continues its forward march. Meantime, most Fourth World self-determination movements have historically sought external recognition and validation, as well as financial and military support, from whoever would provide it, whether that party was the United States, any other state, or other revolutionary movements, including Islamic movements.

Categories for Investigation

[***Emboldened Italics*** indicate recent, unresolved, current, or predicted warfare (within 2006). Enumeration indicates war tabulation.]

Definition of War

The definition of “war” is somewhat open-ended here, given that it must include presidential authorization of massive, indiscriminate retaliation for singular terrorist attacks perpetrated by small groups of individuals, as well as endless military occupations, diverse kinds of covert action, low-intensity violence, severe repression, outsourcing to private contractors, collateral killings of innocents, and search-and-destroy missions against unidentifiable combatants, as well as 30-minute-long exchanges of nuclear warheads. Here, data are taken and interpreted from global surveys of “armed conflict” and “self-determination movements” compiled in the *Peace and Conflict 2005* publication produced by the Minorities at Risk Project, and the Armed Conflict and Intervention Project¹² (both based at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, at the University of Maryland), and from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO),¹³ and also from other similar data sources on current violence, as noted.

Minorities and Ethnic Groups

It is necessary to clearly identify actors, in order to reveal the convergence of the GWOT, Fourth World wars, and Great Power objectives. Most everywhere, indigenous peoples and nations are conflated with minorities, ethnic groups, and terrorists. In the United States, which is a 99-percent immigrant society, minorities and ethnic groups can best be conceptualized as *aggregates of individuals* who share certain attributes like race, culture, language, religion, and national origin. Such minorities and ethnic groups generally do *not* share attributes that correspond to traditional territories and historical self-governing institutions.

Sometimes, indigenous peoples behave and operate as ethnic groups. Sometimes, ethnic groups develop nationalist identities and ideologies, and metamorphose into indigenous peoples and nations. Without denying that indigenous peoples might indeed constitute numeric minorities, or that they might share common experiences like discrimination (e.g. compare Native Americans and African Americans), the focus must be on identifying situations in which self-determination movements are understood to reflect a national experience of colonized, oppressive conditions within defined territories.

Civil wars

Likewise, Fourth World wars are often misperceived as “civil wars” (with which they sometimes do coincide), just as their protagonists are frequently misunderstood as simple puppets of external elements (although sometimes those elements are clearly at work). Civil wars have been assigned many different definitions, by various observers and theorists. Here, *state control* is the objective of civil wars - which come in two types, sometimes coinciding with each other and/or with Fourth World wars, and sometimes occurring as GWOT and/or Great Power theaters.

Type I Civil Wars are waged by and against insurgencies organized by *ideology* (Islamist Taliban in *Afghanistan* [1], Islamist Salafists in *Algeria* [2], Marxists in *Colombia* [3], Maoist Naxalites in *India* [4], Maoist anti-monarchists in *Nepal* [5], Communists in the *Philippines* [6], and democrats in *Myanmar* [7]).

Type II Civil Wars are common in multi-national post-colonial states, especially in Africa, where all the players may in fact be indigenous, but ideologies are somewhat irrelevant, and the insurgents appear as “*communal contenders*”¹⁴ who attempt to seize state control from another ethnically-defined nation (Sunni versus Shiite in *Iraq* [1], Hutu versus Tutsi in *Burundi* [2], non-Katangan versus Katangan in the *DRC* [3], northerner versus southerner, or Muslim versus Christian in *Ivory Coast* [4] and *Chad* [5], and clan versus clan in *Somalia* [6] - apart from *Somaliland*, which is a Fourth World nation

Total Civil Wars in 2006: 13

Irredentist Wars

Another category distinct from both civil and Fourth World wars (though they may in fact coincide) is “irredentist” - where international boundaries have divided ethnically-defined peoples or nations in some irrational way. These wars may result in reestablished boundaries, but they do not generally result in fragmentation that liberates and adds another independent actor to the system. Irredentist movements can be found today especially in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Africa, and eastern Europe, but presently, the most important shooting war to report is in

Kashmir - which has significant convergence with the GWOT, Great Power objectives, and Fourth World conflicts.

Fourth World Wars

The Fourth World wars of interest here are not characterized by the social integration movements of discriminated minorities. Neither are they characterized by attempts to seize state control through civil insurgency, on basis of either ideology or ethnic identity. Nor are they driven by irredentism, with a given people attempting to leave one state and join another neighboring state. Rather, Fourth World wars are about liberation and self-determination within historically defined territories.¹⁵ “Secession” is not always an accurate term of reference, since it implies a history of union based on choice, rather than imperialist imposition. And disintegration of an existing state and formation of a new one is not always an essential requisite, since lesser forms of devolved “autonomy” are often the objectives of Fourth World conflict. Sometimes, these wars are very one-sided, as states attack indigenous peoples who mobilize non-violent self-determination movements. Sometimes, the wars become genocidal. (Tabulation below.)

Other Categories

Another useful way to categorize cases would be to identify existing multi-national states that are on the verge of “*failure*,” given the (questionable) presumption that any disintegration of state control reflects weakness and dysfunction, rather than wisdom and strength. Still another category would be in *prediction* of which Fourth World conflicts are likely to result in the *formation of new states*, and which are likely to spiral downward in black holes of *repression and genocide*. Yet another cut would enumerate cases that are *hot spots*, *slow cookers*, and *time-bombs* and also those cases like Eritrea and East Timor, which have apparently been *resolved* (especially through independence). All such categories are useful, but the first organizing principle here will be *location* – which, in Great Power conflict (as in real estate), is everything.

Great Power Objectives

Location must be qualified in Great Power geopolitical games. For the purposes at hand, qualifiers include: traditional power elements, military force configurations, overland transit routes, strategic sea-lanes and chokepoints, strategic resources (primarily, energy resources and critical metallic minerals), compliant populations, and other force multipliers and dividers.

Connecting the Dots

Space limitation precludes depth analysis of cited cases. Web-links are provided for reference and further review. The cases are not necessarily possible to validate irrefutably in terms of actual GWOT analysis, since critical facts are likely classified, not to be released for decades (if ever), and conclusions are left to be inferred, conforming to the open-ended GWOT platform.¹⁶

The GWOT battle plan calls for non-specific, pre-emptive, offensive attacks (“We are not going to play defense; we are taking the war to the enemy, so we don’t have to fight at home...”) within “The Long War” against non-specific “terrorists” in “many countries,” which will unfold indefinitely into the future, perhaps for generations. Other states, including Great Powers, have their own versions of the GWOT, within one grand charade. In fact, the charade has a rather

universal appeal to many states, which use it to brand all their internal enemies as “terrorists” and thereby to justify violence and repression against them, no matter what they might actually be fighting for. The purpose here is to identify the most significant GWOT theaters as dots on the map, wherever they can be found, and then to identify any underlayment of Fourth World wars, and finally to connect any pattern of Great Power objectives perceivable in these places.

Identifying Great Power objectives is, like GWOT analysis, largely inferential, because real information is so classified.¹⁷ The inference process starts with available guiding documents, like the succession of QDRs and Defense budgets, which typically orient investigation along 15-to-20 year planning horizons for “preparation to confront perceived future threats.”

The net result of these preparations, since the days of the Cold War, has proven to be a veritable weaponry juggernaut, with a life of its own, which does not and is not likely to change dramatically, due to sudden, isolated terrorist attacks out of the blue. Aircraft carriers, submarines, missile defense systems, nuclear warheads and space weapons are all intended for use against Great Power rivals, not irregular insurgents armed with AK-47s, suicide vests, razor blades, and sticks and stones – no matter how clever and vicious they may be. Once an order for a given weapons system is placed, it will likely be delivered. If the intended purpose of that system becomes subject to review, due to changing conditions, then a new justification for it might be necessary, and if such justification is not already available, then it can be fabricated.

This has always been the nature of arms races, even one-sided races against imagined future enemies. They do not stop, until they get to war. They are runaway trains. The juggernaut creates the very environment and conditions that the weaponry is supposed to resolve. Here, we follow guiding documents to theaters in which all that expensive hardware gets deployed, in the process of taking, holding and controlling strategic space - which extends to outer space.

The GWOT officially starts on 9/11/01, though it could be argued that the war had been continuous since 1991,¹⁸ and that 9/11 simply marks a change in context. The enemy of the day before 9/11 was clearly China, and it could be argued that China was still the enemy afterwards, which is why it remains the focus of QDRs and military budgets today.¹⁹ So 9/11 changed little in the background of events, while changing much in the focus of foreground events.

Admittedly, the 9/11 attack has proven to be a contextual turning point in Great Power relations. It provided a pretext for launching the GWOT (which was, strangely enough, al-Qaeda’s clear objective, too), which meant unleashing a long-planned US military intervention in the Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere - filling a power vacuum that was left after Russia lost much of its former influence, due to the Soviet collapse in the 1990s. It was a “unipolar moment.”²⁰

More than simply a question of controlling the flow of oil, the intervention made it possible to constrain the movement of any potential regional or global rivals, namely Russia and China (and maybe India). The GWOT has meant taking American military forces and bases right up to the borders of all three states, something which was never possible during the Cold War or even in the New World Order contexts, including the short-lived Gulf War of 1991. Above all else, it has prevented China from gaining access to the oil fields of Iraq,²¹ which was one thing that Saddam Hussein actually might have controlled - and was not going to be permitted. Since the GWOT began, China has had to go elsewhere for oil, and is doing so in Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria (and elsewhere) - which all are GWOT and Fourth World war theaters.²²

Israel

The GWOT center of political gravity remains **Israel**, as it must be, due to the central focus of Islamist consciousness. Without Islamism, there is no GWOT, and without the GWOT, there are only bare-boned Great Power interests. Israel is a critical actor in Great Power dynamics, serving as a regional forward base and auxiliary force for the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, able to help control passage to and from the Suez Canal and Red Sea, which is of special importance for Russia, whose Black Sea Fleet could be bottled up in a time of crisis.

Israel's security is determined in great part by the conditions it imposes on *Palestinians* [1], who have fought for liberation (in a Fourth World war) since 1948. After having denied Palestine's independence for all this time, the United States and Israel have now finally arrived at the understanding that a "two-state solution" is the only way forward. Thus, the US has been forced by circumstance to play the Joker, with the implicit decision to allow another seat in the United Nations (whose membership will grow to 192). But the liberation process (which cannot be called secession) will likely remain violent, due to multiple fundamental contradictions,²³ and war may continue indefinitely, even after Palestinian statehood is achieved.

Afghanistan and Central Asia

In the first official GWOT operation, in 2001, the United States and its allies overthrew the Islamist Taliban regime in **Afghanistan**. The Taliban project was and remains dominated by ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans). In the GWOT effort, indigenous Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north (the Northern Alliance), and Hazaras in the center of the country were mobilized, intensifying pre-existing Type II Civil War and Fourth World wars which dated from the early 1990s, after Soviet occupation forces were withdrawn. In constructing the new Karzai regime as a showcase exercise in "popular democracy," the United States has actually reestablished Pashtun domination, which implies the reversal and withdrawal of prior US support for Fourth World organizations.

As Taliban insurgents emerge anew from their redoubts and engage in Type I Civil War, new violence and political repression can be anticipated in areas populated by *Tajiks*, *Uzbeks*, and *Hazaras*. But war is reported currently in southern regions inhabited by indigenous *Baluchis* [2].²⁴ The violence largely occurs in the cross-fire of Pashtun forces representing opposing ideologies (Taliban versus Karzai), as Baluchis either take sides in the GWOT or return to a liberation struggle that has been active since the British departed, in 1947.

Although the GWOT agenda of retribution for the 9/11 attack seems obvious, the Afghanistan operation has been perhaps primarily a Great Power struggle - over the land-locked energy resources of Central Asia, and the US determination, in 2001, that they should not be controlled by neighboring China and/or Russia.²⁵ It is common knowledge that huge oil and gas deposits are located in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and the big problem is transit to global markets. At the time of occupation, the United States favored land routes that required building pipelines through western Afghanistan, south through Pakistan (that is, through indigenous Baluchistan) to the Indian Ocean. All other routes would have gone through Iran, Russia or China, unless they were to cross the Caspian Sea.²⁶ Plans have changed, since then.²⁷

These pipelines were not feasible without substantial control of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and also the countries to the north, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the US has built major military bases since 2001. Both China and Russia understand these bases not for their ostensible

purpose (GWOT operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia), but rather for their Great Power implications.²⁸ The bases would never have been built without mutual cooperation in the GWOT charade, but four years later, the point has been lost. Now, the United States is being evicted from Uzbekistan and having its rent increased in Kyrgyzstan, creating a new vacuum waiting to be filled.²⁹ The long American thrust into Central Asia has not gone according to expectations, but a foot-hold still exists in Afghanistan, and it can probably be maintained, at least as long as the GWOT is credible. That credibility is fading fast.

Iraq and Turkey

As of this writing, **Iraq** appears to have descended into a general Type II Civil War,³⁰ with Sunni and Shiite elements struggling to control the state, despite (or as consequence of) the US occupation. Kurdish *Peshmerga* fighters have figured prominently in this war, mostly in operations against Sunni insurgents, Baathists and suspected jihadis. Meanwhile, Kurds living in northern Iraq have enjoyed relative peace and tranquility, since the US occupation began in 2003, though in fact since the “Northern No-Fly Zone” was established in the mid 1990s. These days of peace are likely numbered, and renewed warfare can be anticipated, not only in Iraqi Kurdistan, but also Turkish Kurdistan, and perhaps Iranian and Syrian Kurdistan, as well.³¹ The problem with indigenous Kurdish autonomy or independence in Iraq is that it sets an example for other Kurds; and the problem with the United States playing the Joker, in recognizing and defending Iraqi Kurds, is in the duplicity and reversal of its meaning outside Iraq’s boundaries.

Turkey has a long history of brutal, if not genocidal, repression of Kurds³² (commonly called “terrorists”), who comprise about a fifth of the total population, concentrated in the southeast. Turkey also has a serious Islamist movement to contend with (making it a GWOT theater), and meantime, it is a major Great Power ally, due to its shorelines on both the Mediterranean and Black seas, its control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles chokepoints (that is, controlling Russia’s only year-round access to open ocean), its military cooperation with Israel, its transit route for oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea, and the US military bases which it allows in its territory.

During the New World Order context, when the United States was protecting Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s forces, in the Northern No-Fly Zone, Turkey was permitted to make repeated military incursions into Iraq, attacking Turkish Kurds who took refuge there, as well as Iraqi Kurds who sheltered them. No reason to think that the United States will restrain Turkey from mounting a major offensive into Iraq, when (not if) “autonomy fever” spreads again across the border.³³ As for its commitment to the Kurds, the US track record speaks for itself. The *Kurds* [3] have been betrayed and sold out on three major occasions in the past (1923, 1975 and 1992), after getting US aid and assistance in their quest for independence. No reason to think it won’t happen again.

The Balkans

It could be argued that the Balkan Wars of the 1990s were prelude to the GWOT, or that they occurred as an extension of a GWOT that actually began with the Gulf War of 1991, which may in fact have begun with the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, which began with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and so on.³⁴ After all, the whole premise of the GWOT alludes to a “Long War.” It could also be argued that the Balkan Wars of the 1990s were never totally resolved by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and that the same general set of actors remains in place for another showdown. Despite the wave of state fragmentation and formation of the 1990s, another round of Fourth World wars is looming and will likely be played out in the near future.

At present, mineral-rich **Kosovo** [4]³⁵ is a Fourth World time-bomb, and **Serbia-Montenegro** is about to disintegrate violently, within 2006. Just as in the last round, Russia may stand with its Orthodox Slavic kinfolk who control Serbia, and if the United States does not support Kosovo, then Iran will likely exercise Islamist influence again among its Muslim ethnic-Albanian Kosovar allies, and if Iran doesn't, then al-Qaeda will. The conflict will go misunderstood as a GWOT theater, when in fact, its roots are to be found in wars fought centuries ago.

During the 1990s, the United States was slow to get on the right side of history, attempting to obstruct or prevent the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, to the net effect of actually exacerbating destruction that might have been avoided. This time around, Kosovo wants its status resolved by the end of 2006, and its independence is already a fact (bringing United Nations membership up to 193). Unless Iranian influence is actually desired in the picture, it would be relatively easy to just move ahead, having conceded the point.

However, given this scenario, after Kosovo's statehood it can be predicted that **Montenegro** will split with **Serbia**, bringing UN membership to 194. Orthodox **Montenegro** will then be faced with a Fourth World independence movement in its Muslim **Sanjak**³⁶ province. Meanwhile, Orthodox **Macedonia** will be faced with a Muslim **Albanian**³⁷ irredentist movement. Orthodox **Serbs** in **Kosovo**, **Bosnia** and **Croatia** are likely to be drawn into action.³⁸ **Serbia** is likely to react violently to all of these developments. This will likely have the result of drawing Russia's hand.³⁹ And this time, Russia is not in a moment of weakness comparable to the last round.

The Caucasus

Russia's overall strategic position has been in decline since the late 1980s. Presently, there are new deployments of US forces and bases in Romania and Bulgaria - placing new constraints on Russia's freedom of movement through the warm-water Black Sea and then the Turkish Straits (which is of special importance for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Ukraine). Russia faces further US deployments in Central Asia and Georgia, and increasing American influence in oil-rich Azerbaijan, which is now the source of a new largely-British (BP) pipeline that flows away from Russian control, through Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean.⁴⁰ Then, there is an increasingly assertive America-friendly Ukraine, separating Russia from irredentist allies in Moldova. And Ukraine is threatening to disrupt the flow of oil, gas, and critical minerals like titanium, and to limit Russia's Black Sea access to a very short coastline, between Ukraine and Abkhazia. Apart from that coastline, the Black Sea shores are occupied by hostile neighbors.

Abkhazia⁴¹ is a Fourth World nation which has been asserting its independence from **Georgia** (not Russia), since the Soviet fragmentation of 1991. Away from the Black Sea coast, Abkhazia's northern boundary cuts through the Caucasus mountain range, which is the home of many other Fourth World nations, which are Muslim and have been so for centuries, long before al-Qaeda existed. One such nation is **South Ossetia**, which is, like Abkhazia, also asserting independence from Georgia, and playing host to Russian troops stationed there to defend it from Georgia - whose external support now comes primarily from the United States. South Ossetia is home to some notorious Islamist elements, whose refuge is the infamous Pankisi Gorge.

Meantime, on the north side of the Caucasus, the Fourth World nation of **Chechnya** [5]⁴² has been locked in a blood-soaked struggle for independence from Russia, since the Soviet fragmentation of 1991. Chechnya's war has long been associated with the GWOT, especially in Russian claims of al-Qaeda's involvement. But the United States is curiously ambiguous about Chechnya, which indicates its Joker potential. On the one hand, Chechnya provides evidence for

the main cover story - that the GWOT is a common struggle uniting Russia with the United States and other states. On the other hand, oil-rich Chechnya serves the interests of those who were never satisfied with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and are still holding out for further weakening Russia, even if that implies Machiavellian cooperation with international Islamic terrorists. It is useful to vilify Russia for its pattern of human rights abuses in Chechnya, realizing that destabilizing its energy colony is a means toward a greater end.

For those who would play the Joker as covert or overt American policy, Chechnya also has the potential to inspire similar self-determination movements, especially among other Muslim nations controlled by Russia in the Caucasus. These movements threaten Russia's oil and gas pipelines which run west along the northern Caucasus plain towards Ukraine, from where they run across most of Europe - making Russia the preeminent source of European energy and the world's second most important energy exporter, after Saudi Arabia.

Since 1991, the Chechen conflict has had serious and violent repercussions in *Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Circassia,* and *Kabardino-Balkaria* (the multiple fronts are tabulated here as one continuous theater [6]).⁴³ Kabardino-Balkaria is of extra importance for Russia, due to its deposits of some one-half of the world's reserves of tungsten and molybdenum⁴⁴ - which are strategic metals with important military applications. Meantime, other Muslim nations within Russia but away from the Caucasus - including *Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Chuvashia,* and *Mari El*⁴⁵ - have all openly opposed Russia's policy in Chechnya and are themselves likely to push for self-determination, if the Chechen war is not resolved soon and in a process not based on military force and repression.

Russia's problems with Fourth World nations are largely of its own making, rather than the result of "terrorist" infiltration or American subversion. In fact, Russia plays the same game of ambiguity towards indigenous nations as does the United States in its Indian policy. In every one of its constitutions since 1921, Russia (and formerly, the Soviet Union) has guaranteed to the indigenous peoples enclosed within that they are understood as nations, whose participation in the Russian Federation reflects a union of choice, rather than imperial domination. Every one of those constitutions contains explicit language about "autonomy" and "self-determination," up to and including the "right to secession."⁴⁶ But Russia has rarely proven true to its constitutions, and so has had to deal with the consequences of its duplicity - like the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the decolonizing process that continues at present, especially in Chechnya.

Russia might use nuclear weapons before it lets go of Chechnya, and meantime, it is not about to leave Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Georgia's control. Perhaps Russia will accept the independence of Kosovo, in exchange for the independence (and possible absorption) of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁴⁷ And the United States is unlikely to go to war over Georgia's dismemberment, though the public betrayal will be an embarrassment. Abkhazia and South Ossetia probably will become integrated in the Russian Federation, and the wars in Chechnya and North Caucasus will continue indefinitely at low intensity. And as a net result, Russia will increase its relative Great Power strength, having played its own Joker in Georgia.

Southwest Asia: Iran and Pakistan

Iran and Pakistan co-exist as neighbors, simultaneously united and divided by multiple factors. They occupy different sides of the GWOT - Iran branded as one of the two remaining points of the formerly triangular "axis of evil" (now that Iraq has been occupied), and Pakistan identified as an official GWOT ally of the United States. They both are Muslim societies, governed by

repressive dictatorships masquerading as democracies: Iran is run by Shiite Islamists, and Pakistan by secular Sunni military autocrats. Iran is dominated by Persians, Pakistan by Punjabis. Pakistan is India's nuclear-armed enemy; Iran is India's technological and energy partner and a nuclear-weapons aspirant. Pakistan is the recipient and purveyor of Chinese nuclear technology; Iran is the recipient of Russian *and* Chinese nuclear technology, as well as their political support in confronting the West, and now is a major source of China's oil imports. And both states have serious problems with Fourth World nations, especially with Baluchis (a.k.a. Baloch, Balochis), who straddle their common border and occupy extensive territory on both sides.

As an officially designated "state sponsor of international terrorism," **Iran** can expect to see the Joker played against it. But does the GWOT explain the Joker? Or is the Joker better explained by Iran's current attempt to acquire nuclear technology? What other factors might be in the mix? In early 2006, Iran and China announced an oil development deal worth \$100 billion,⁴⁸ and it was reported on the same day that the US State Department sought special funding to support Iranian "opposition groups."⁴⁹ This non-specific appellation is probably adequate to explain some of the recent violence along Iran's southwestern border with Iraq, in the oil-rich Khuzestan Province, which is occupied by the indigenous *Ahwaz* [7],⁵⁰ who are ethnic Arabs. It might also explain increased repression of *Kurds* [8],⁵¹ along the northwestern border with Iraq and Turkey, and of the *Baluchis* [9],⁵² who occupy the southeastern border region adjacent to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Sistan-Baluchestan province includes the strategic coastline along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman, near the Strait of Hormuz – where there is constant and congested traffic of oil tankers, freighters, and warships (especially American warships based at Diego Garcia and Dubai). It should be evident that any attempt to weaken the Iranian state through territorial disintegration also attempts to weaken Iran's allies, namely China, Russia and India.

Fourth World nations in **Pakistan** appear to be mirror images of those in Iran. Instead of being designated as "victims" by the United States, as they are in Iran, the *Baluchis* [10] are under attack in Pakistan (and by US-led forces in southern Afghanistan), suspected of harboring or supporting al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists.⁵³ [N.B. Baluchi conflict is enumerated for a third time here, accounting for three separate theaters.] Baluchistan is Pakistan's energy (gas and oil) colony, its nuclear weapons testing ground, and its territory along the strategic coast of the Arabian Sea, which includes the port city of Gwadar, where there is a major naval base. Pakistan and China together are about to build a land bridge from Gwadar to China, circumventing the problems attached to ocean shipping.⁵⁴ Obviously, Pakistan has some conflicting allegiances.

But as an official GWOT ally, Pakistan enjoys American military and political support, as it also attacks numerous tribes of indigenous *Pashtuns* [11], who inhabit the mountainous North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA - which includes North and South Waziristan), along the border of Afghanistan, in a continuing mission to search out and destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents.⁵⁵ Pashtuns have never accepted Punjabi domination in the Pakistani experiment, ever since independence from India in 1947, and for them, the Taliban are considered ideological authorities. They want to live under tribal and Shari'a law and order, not Punjabi military dictatorship. They do not want to rule the world.

Fourth World struggles also continue in the regions Pakistan calls the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir. The violence coincides with the irredentist war of Muslim Kashmiris who want liberation from Hindu India and unification with Muslim Pakistan, and it involves Muslim and Pakistani military repression of indigenous Buddhist *Ladhakis* [12]⁵⁶ and Hindu *Pandits* [13].⁵⁷ And in addition, Pakistan is increasingly violent in its treatment of indigenous Hindu *Sindhis*

[14],⁵⁸ near the southeast border with India. There are no clear American Jokers in Pakistan, at least this year. But there just might be a few Indian Jokers.

South Asia

India's position in Great Power relations has shifted since the days of the Cold War, when it alternated between roles as a major Soviet ally and as leader of the Third World “Non-Aligned Movement.” India is presently the object of a triangular courtship – being offered competing favors (especially in the form of nuclear and military hardware and outsourced high-tech jobs) by Russia and the United States, while warily attempting to contain, without being contained by China, with whom its uncertain border remains unstable. India's geography makes it the keystone of a power arc stretching across southern Asia, and gives it the potential for exercising some control of Indian Ocean sea-lanes – through which Chinese (and Japanese and Korean) energy supplies must pass. Whoever wins the Indian courtship gains an advantage, therefore, in relation to China.⁵⁹ If India has a Great Power rival, it is China,⁶⁰ and that rivalry is then translated to the more momentous nuclear standoff with Pakistan (China's ally).

Although it possesses a large military force with advanced weaponry (including nuclear missiles), the Indian state has never yet been strong enough to build its way out of endemic poverty, nor to stamp out the incessant Type I Civil War of Maoist *Naxalites*,⁶¹ nor the various rebellions of indigenous *Adivasis* [15]⁶² (“Scheduled Tribes”) throughout the country (especially in zones slated for hydroelectric, mining, and large-scale development projects), nor the Fourth World wars that have been active hot spots since independence from Great Britain, in 1947.

Clearly, the most important of India's internal conflicts is in *Kashmir*, enumerated above as an irredentist war, which coincides with Fourth World (*Ladakhi* and *Pandit*) struggles. Kashmir validates India's place in the GWOT, given that indigenous Muslim Kashmiri liberation fighters are allegedly supported by both al-Qaeda and the Pakistani government. Kashmir is widely understood as a flash-point with Pakistan, given its repeated history as a battlefield and its ongoing potential to ignite a nuclear exchange that would have global repercussions. Meantime, Islamist militants and terrorists are certainly active within India's huge Muslim population, but as elsewhere, they have no military capabilities to speak of, and compared to Pakistan and China, they explain very little about India's military and nuclear arms race.

Equally destructive as Kashmir have been the wars of northeast India, which are all Fourth World self-determination struggles that may appear conjoined but in fact are a spectrum of distinct peoples and battlefronts. The *Naga* [16]⁶³ war is in ceasefire mode, at this time of writing, but it is a time-bomb that can be predicted to explode again at any moment, and will likely do so within the year. On the other hand, warfare is current in *Tripura* [17],⁶⁴ *Mizoram* [18],⁶⁵ *Manipur* [19],⁶⁶ and *Assam* [20]⁶⁷ (which has a second distinct struggle in its *Bodoland* [21] district).⁶⁸

If there are Jokers played in these wars, it is possible they come in the form of Christian missionaries, especially Baptists,⁶⁹ who have no particular love for the imperial Hindu state and its repression of their indigenous proselytes. Also, chances are good the Joker involves Chinese state influence - which is related to Pakistan, through which China would like to build that land bridge to bypass the problems associated with ocean transit. Also, China might be interested in a tit-for-tat exchange, due to India's long-term asylum provided to the Dalai Lama, and therefore its implicit involvement in Tibet.

Locked in Hindu India's armpit, Muslim **Bangladesh** presents another theater for both GWOT and Great Power conflicts. There is an active Islamist movement in the country, and it occasionally attacks the Muslim government, as well as various other points of social tension. But more important is the tension with India over expansion of the Muslim Bengali population beyond the country's borders into India's state of Assam, where they have been involved as antagonists in the ongoing war of liberation (cited above). India is building a border wall and fence to keep Bengalis out. China is giving Bangladesh military assistance and other aid.⁷⁰

Bengali population encroachment is also the central issue in the ongoing Buddhist *Jumma / Chakhma* [22] liberation struggle, which has been active in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT), since Bangladesh won independence from Pakistan, in 1971.⁷¹ Military occupation of the region continues today, eight years since a peace agreement was supposed to have put an end to open warfare. Military occupation qualifies as war for the United States, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Chittagong conflict is presently contained by military occupation and severe repression - and so, it qualifies as a one-sided war of the state against indigenous nations.⁷²

Off the coast of India's southern cone, **Sri Lanka** continues as the battlefield of one of the longest running and bloodiest of all current Fourth World wars. Since the devastation of much of their territory by the tsunami of December 2004, indigenous Hindu *Tamils* [23] have apparently paused in their war of liberation from Buddhist Sinhalese rule. But none of the pre-tsunami contradictions have been resolved, and warfare is likely to resume in the near future. Deposits of titanium ores along the northeast coast serve to guarantee at least one focus of conflict.

Stability in Sri Lanka is of common concern among Great Powers, due to its location along major sea-lanes. But it is ironic that Great Powers rarely associate Sri Lanka with the GWOT (despite the Sinhalese government's insistence), since the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were among the earliest of all insurgent organizations to perfect the use of suicide bombers. While the Sri Lankan government blames India for its problem with Tamils, China gives Sri Lanka military and economic assistance.⁷³

Myanmar (Burma) also continues as the location of intractable Fourth World wars, and it may have the highest concentration of such conflicts anywhere on the planet. Apart from its Type I Civil War against and repression of the popular democracy movement, the military regime is waging war against indigenous *Chin* [24], *Kachin* [25], *Karen* [26], *Karenni* [27], *Mon* [28], *Shan* [29] and *Wa* [30] peoples,⁷⁴ in their respective territories, and also against *Naga* [31] refugees from India.⁷⁵ If these peoples qualify as "terrorists," it is only in defamations by the government, as they are not mentioned otherwise in the GWOT. On the other hand, they are clearly the fodder of Great Power struggle, given that China is the main patron of Myanmar's government. The patronage is related to increasing Chinese (and Western) oil, gas, mining, and timber interests in the country. The US can be expected now to press for "regime change" in Myanmar, after having ignored the situation there for decades. It would not be surprising to find the Joker played in behalf of any or all of the indigenous nations, in this context.

Southeast Asia

Until the tsunami of December 2004, the conflict in *Aceh*,⁷⁶ at the north end of Sumatra, was one of the bloodiest Fourth World wars commonly misunderstood as a GWOT theater. The indigenous Acehnese had been fighting for independence from **Indonesia**, since its liberation from the Dutch empire in 1950, and they were aiming to follow **East Timor**'s successful (though terribly violent) path to statehood, which was finalized through United Nations membership in

2002. The tsunami put an apparent end to the fighting, by bringing in a huge international relief effort, an autonomy agreement with the government, and disarmament of Aceh's main insurgent organization. The war had been associated with the GWOT, inasmuch as the Acehnese rejected the secularist agenda of the Indonesian experiment and demanded Islamic social order under Shari'a Law. But the cause of war was Indonesian empire, not al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiya.

Too soon to know whether the Aceh war is really over, it is worth noting that it was always a Great Power theater. Partly, this was due to the wealth of Sumatra's oil and gas resources, a mainstay of Indonesia's export economy. But more important is Sumatra's location as the western shore of the Strait of Malacca, through which some 50 percent of world shipping must pass, including most of the oil from the Arabian Gulf imported by China, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. For Great Powers, the Strait of Malacca is considered one of the world's most important strategic chokepoints, where an enemy's supply lines might most easily be throttled. It is therefore little wonder that the United States permitted Indonesia's military to attack the Aceh liberation movement for so long (in the name of the GWOT, since 2001), until the tsunami.

At the other (eastern) extreme of the vast Indonesian empire, in the Irian Jaya province on the western half of New Guinea, the indigenous Melanesian peoples of *West Papua* [32]⁷⁷ continue their own war for independence. Having neither direct GWOT nor Great Power involvement, the insurgents are seriously outgunned and underpowered against the Indonesian armed forces. Conditions are best characterized in terms of military occupation and severe repression.⁷⁸

Across the Strait of Malacca from Sumatra, on the neck of the Malay Peninsula, **Thailand** is at war with *Muslim Malays* [33] who inhabit the southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, Songkhla, and Narathiwat, and seek independence from Buddhist Thai control.⁷⁹ The Muslim insurgency has been associated with the GWOT and al-Qaeda affiliates, such as Jemaah Islamiya, but it is clearly a Fourth World war that has roots in the aftermath of European decolonization of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Burma, and the irrational demarcation of Thailand's southern borders to include Muslims who might have been more peacefully ruled by Malaysia. Regardless of its GWOT associations, the conflict is a Great Power theater, for the same reason that Aceh is – that is, being located on opposite sides of the strategic Strait of Malacca. In addition, there are important tin and tungsten resources within the indigenous territories, and these contribute to explaining the US support given to the Thai government.

Vietnam also occupies a strategic position - on the western shores of the South China Sea, with major shipping lanes to and from China and other East Asian states off its coast. There have been improvements in relations between Vietnam and the United States, since the days of the "American War," over three decades ago, but the government is still ruled by communists, and that is the most important of several major impasses in the relationship. The Cold War may still be alive, but there are no serious allegations that Vietnam is a GWOT theater. However, it clearly remains a place of interest for Great Powers, due to its strategic location, and the particular location of the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay – which the United States would like to control again.⁸⁰ Similarly, proximity to the Spratly and Paracel Islands (which are claimed by seven countries, including China, and are reportedly rich in oil) magnifies the importance of its location. And this in turn magnifies the importance of its Fourth World conflicts. Since the closing days of violence with the United States, and then Cambodia, and then China, Vietnam has been at war with indigenous largely-Christian *Montagnards* [34]⁸¹ who have occupied the highlands for millennia and are now being squeezed out by the ever-encroaching ethnic Vietnamese population. Similarly, ethnic Cambodian *Khmer Krom* [35]⁸² are enduring warlike repression in the south of

Vietnam. And the same conditions must be noted for the *Hmong* [36],⁸³ in conflict with the communist government of neighboring **Laos**.

On the other (eastern) side of the South China Sea, the **Philippines** continues to be the location of another Fourth World war that has its roots in ages past, most especially since independence from the United States (and Japan) at the end of World War II. The state has always been a largely Christian project, and its control of largely-Muslim Mindanao and other southern islands has been the source of conflict since long before al-Qaeda's existence. Today, there is a ceasefire with the *Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)* in Mindanao, but war continues with small splinter organizations of the *Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)*, including Abu Sayyaf, on both Mindanao and certain minor islands of the Sulu Archipelago (especially Basilan and tiny Jolo), and across strategic waterways to the nearby Muslim Malaysian province of Sabah, on the island of Borneo.

The *Moro* [37] liberation struggle is commonly associated with al-Qaeda and the GWOT, but it must be understood broadly as a Great Power theater focused on shipping lanes through and near the South China Sea. In this case, the local theater of the Sulu Archipelago involves movement through the Tapaan Passage, between the Sulu and Celebes seas. The United States was evicted from former bases in the Philippines (Clark Air Force Base, and the Subic Bay Naval Base), but now has returned to a highly strategic position that constrains Chinese movement in the region.⁸⁴

Also of note in the Philippines is the continuous repression of indigenous *Igorot* peoples on the north island of Luzon.⁸⁵ The Igorots are not associated with the GWOT or Great Power relations, but their struggles do reflect the relative strength and weakness of the state - which is also beset with an intractable low-intensity Type I Civil War waged by the New People's Army.⁸⁶

China

China may or may not intend, today, to become a Great Power rival of the United States, tomorrow. But current US development of weapons with which to fight China, tomorrow, according to the 15-20 year planning horizons identified in today's QDRs and Defense budgets, will likely generate that rivalry and impel it towards crisis, all intentions notwithstanding. China is, of course, developing its own weapons, but the expenditures amount to only about one-thirteenth of the American project,⁸⁷ and capabilities today are relatively minimal, and they are not likely to change dramatically in relative proportion, tomorrow. In a fight, China would probably not be able to defend its vital shipping lanes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, and would be easily defeated at chokepoints in the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Hormuz, not to mention lesser points like the Tapaan Passage (cited above).⁸⁸ And there is no real chance that China will ever be able to mount an offensive in the Western Hemisphere. Chinese global hegemony, like an Islamic caliphate, is only a hallucination – albeit a useful one.

Today's greatest point of tension is, no doubt, *Taiwan* – which is not an indigenous Fourth World nation,⁸⁹ but rather a breakaway island province ruled by adversaries of the mainland Communist regime. *[Editor's Note: There are nine Fourth World nations that are the original occupants of the island. They are the Ami (131,845 pop.), Atayal (81,800 pop.) Bunun (37,922 pop.), Paiwan (62,110 pop.), Puyuma (8,792 pop.), Rukai (8,670 pop.), Saisiyat (3,939 pop.), Tsou (6,192 pop.) and Yami (4,044 pop.). Since 1945 Han Chinese have occupied the Island of Taiwan virtually eliminating the original nations' visibility in the world. Since the 1990s the Kuomintang (KMT) government has instituted constitutional changes recognizing these nine nations as the original peoples of Taiwan. Despite this legal change, confrontations between the Han government and*

the Taiwanese nations continue.] Taiwan's potential for total independence and statehood is measured in the balance between China's clear intention to prevent fragmentation by military force, and the ambiguity of the United States – which may or may not want to play the Joker, depending on expedience. There have been strong voices in the United States that have advocated Taiwan's independence, since 1949. Taiwan's own impetuosity may force the United States to play its hand prematurely, and a major international crisis would ensue immediately, not in 20 years.

There are several other places where the Joker might be played, most notably in **Tibet**, **Inner Mongolia**, and the **Uyghur Autonomous Region** [38] (Xinjiang Province) - which is today the locus of China's most important Fourth World war and is associated in the GWOT.⁹⁰ Indigenous Muslim Uyghurs, in rebellion against Chinese colonialism, are living mostly in conditions of military occupation and severe repression.⁹¹ However, Uyghur combatants were training at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, at the time of the US occupation in 2001, and some were captured and imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay by American forces, who had no idea what kind of struggle the Uyghurs represented. The combatants have served to provide the United States and China an apparent common enemy in the GWOT, since both countries are targets for Islamist jihad.

But American interest in Uyghur liberation is comparable to interest in the Chechen war with Russia: the policy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the United States maintains a "One China" policy, and it officially opposes liberation movements of Taiwan, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians, and other Fourth World nations. On the other hand, it is useful to have a weapon with which to accuse China of human rights abuses, and to point out that Uyghur political leaders today are likely to be imprisoned and executed for "splittism," especially since China enacted an Anti-Secession Law, in 2005. The ambiguity reflects understanding that Uyghur territory is of vital importance for China as an energy and minerals colony, a nuclear weapons testing area, and as the route of major oil pipelines from neighboring Kazakhstan.

As it is with Muslim Uyghurs, so it is with Buddhist **Tibetans**,⁹² who are not associated with the GWOT. During the 1950s and beyond, the CIA sponsored and supported a Tibetan war for independence from China. Then, in the 1970s, the United States sold the Tibetans out, due to Cold War developments of Sino-Soviet rivalry and Richard Nixon's "opening" of normal relations with the Communist government.⁹³ Tibet, however, remains a potentially useful pawn for the United States, which is why the Dalai Lama is occasionally entertained at the White House – to demonstrate the inherent ambiguity of the official "One China" policy.⁹⁴

China, like Russia and the United States, is largely responsible for its own problems with Fourth World peoples. As with Russia and the United States, the Chinese state and constitution are constructed around explicit language about "autonomy" and "self-determination" of indigenous nations.⁹⁵ As with Russia and the United States, the contradictions between ideology and practice have been instrumental in generating the liberation movements of Fourth World peoples whose experience is to be colonized. It may be convenient to blame external actors for playing Jokers, but duplicity serves to create its own reward, in the form of rebellion. At the least, therefore, it is clear that China's claim to a place in the GWOT is tenuous, self-serving, and refutable.

Horn of Africa

In 2002, the United States quietly opened a major theater of GWOT operations, establishing the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),⁹⁶ with its base in **Djibouti** – a former French colony located at the southern end of the Red Sea. This location is also identifiable as the

Bab el-Mandeb Strait - another of the world's most important strategic chokepoints, from where it is possible to control shipping between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The chokepoint has major implications: Russia's Black Sea Fleet, for example, would have a fourth major obstacle (besides the Bosphorus, Dardanelles, and Suez) between the Indian Ocean (and by extension, the Arabian Gulf) and its base in Ukraine. Oil tankers loading at Port Sudan, on the Red Sea, would have another obstacle (besides the Malacca Strait) on their way to China.

The CJTF-HOA mission is ostensibly to fight terrorism in nine countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Some of these countries have indeed been highlighted by singular terrorist strikes, perpetrated by individuals, including the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack of 2000 on the USS Cole, in Yemen, and chaos has been continuous in Somalia since 1991. Most all of the regional violence, however, can be best understood in terms of Fourth World conflict, rather than Islamist jihad. And in these terms, the purpose of the Task Force is reduced to implicit Great Power objectives.

In **Somalia**, the southern part of the country is beset with Type II Civil War, which pits various clans (some of them Islamist) against one another, attempting to control the state from the capital city of Mogadishu. The northwestern part of the country is a different story. **Somaliland** (the former British colony) broke free from the south, in 1991, and after passage through several violent episodes, has existed in relative peace and tranquility since then. Somaliland can be understood today as a Fourth World nation, dominated by Muslim Somali Isaaqs, who are not Islamist. The nation has achieved de-facto independence from the south - comparable to the situation of Kosovo in relation to Serbia-Montenegro (cited above).⁹⁷

Liberation is not a foregone conclusion, however, because whichever party wins control of the south will undoubtedly attempt to control the north, and if that happens, war is very predictable. The biggest present obstacle to statehood (which would bring UN membership to 195) has been the resistance posed by many African states and the African Union, which all fear that this "secession" (an inaccurate term of reference) will set off a series of similar events elsewhere. There is some substance behind this fear. Africa has many dominoes waiting to fall. The United States, on the other hand, appears ambiguous. Somaliland's stability is beneficial for US control of the Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, while providing an outlet to seaports for landlocked Ethiopia - which is a US ally in the GWOT, and the most powerful military force in the region.

Ethiopia has, for decades, attempted to crush the liberation movements of several Fourth World nations, including the **Oromo** [39],⁹⁸ **Sidama** [40],⁹⁹ **Ogaden Somali** [41],¹⁰⁰ and **Anuak** [42]¹⁰¹ - who occupy western Gambella, on the border of Sudan (where Chinese oil companies are exploring). Of these, the Oromo and Ogadeni struggles are by far the most significant, in terms of the GWOT and the magnitude of the challenge they present to the Ethiopian imperial state. Some Oromos are Muslims, as are virtually all Ogadenis, but they are all being treated as terrorists, whether or not they are motivated by Islamism. Severe repression characterizes their general condition, although both Oromos and Ogadenis have proven their ability to organize military attacks against government forces.¹⁰²

The CJTF-HOA supports the state,¹⁰³ given its pivotal position on the Horn and the fact that it is landlocked and dependent for access to the sea upon Somaliland, which is both stable and adjacent to Djibouti, where the Task Force is based. Since 2004, the Task Force has run a training base in Ethiopia, where it supports the military in its anti-terrorist operations (against Fourth World liberation movements). No Jokers in Ethiopia.

The question of genocide in the western region of *Darfur* [43] dominates media reports from **Sudan**,¹⁰⁴ in early 2006, but most coverage explains neither the Fourth World war nor Great Power dimensions of the massive violence. The indigenous actors include the black Muslim Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples, who are fighting for autonomy or total liberation.¹⁰⁵ The state is ruled by Islamist Arabs, whose intent is to drive non-Arabs from Darfur.

Sudan came under US military attack, following the 1998 terrorist bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and since then has stood constantly accused of sponsoring terrorism. The government was at war, from 1956 to 2003, with indigenous nations of the south and center, namely the largely Christian Bantu *Dinka*, *Nuer* and *Nuba* peoples. These remain organized as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A), which has received covert and overt US support and other international aid for many bloody years.

Under a threat of sanctions and further military attack, the Sudanese government entered a ceasefire and autonomy agreement with the SPLM/A, in 2005, and now there is a scheduled referendum on total independence due to take place in 2008.¹⁰⁶ The SPLM/A is a part of Sudan's government, under terms of the 2005 agreement, but that is no guarantee that the referendum will fail. The US Joker could mean that Sudan will indeed disintegrate, and if it does, Darfur may join the south (which is now called "New Sudan") as another independent fragment. These events may develop sooner, and more violently, depending on the way things unfold with the coming intervention of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Darfur, or following the anticipated statehood of Somaliland. (The addition of two more states would bring UN membership to 197.)

The Great Power dimension of Sudan's Fourth World wars and GWOT association can be understood as corollary to the intense petroleum development undertaken by China, India, and the West, mostly in southern and eastern Sudan, before 2001, and now in Darfur. China built the pipeline that runs from the southland north to the Red Sea, and now imports 50 percent of Sudan's output.¹⁰⁷ And on a 15-20 year horizon, China's potential as a rising power is directly related to its oil supplies.¹⁰⁸ So, Sudan's position is similar to Iran's: it is China's economic and political ally, covered as a state sponsor of international Islamic terrorism. To the degree that China depends for oil on Sudan's Islamist regime, the Joker becomes ever more attractive as an alternative US policy instrument, to disrupt that dependency and to contain China's power potential, and to do so in the name of human rights and self-determination – in contrast to the treatment of Oromos and Ogadenis, next-door in Ethiopia.

The Darfur conflict has spilled across the western border of Sudan into **Chad**, and particularly into the overlapping homelands of *Zaghawa*, *Masalit*, and other (mostly Muslim) indigenous peoples of the region. In Chad, the conflict does not appear as a Fourth World liberation struggle, but rather as a resumption of the Type II Civil War that characterized the country for decades. The endemic rivalry among communal contenders was supposed to have been contained, after the World Bank financed construction of the new (as of 2003) oil pipeline that runs from southwestern Chad, across Cameroon, to the Atlantic Ocean. Royalties from oil exports were supposed to have been directed into development of Chad's impoverished society and infrastructure, but due to corruption and violence, the revenue has been appropriated by the military regime. Now, with the added complication of thousands of refugees from Sudan, conflict is again intensifying between the state and various insurgent elements.¹⁰⁹

Chad is not often directly associated with the GWOT, though it is dominated by Muslims, like most of northern and western Africa. But it is a Great Power theater, due to its oil resources and China's interests in developing them.¹¹⁰ China recently agreed to an oil development project, and

the war in Darfur spilled over into Chad. Call it coincidence. Since the southwestern pipeline is a Western (Exxon/ Chevron) project that originates in territories populated largely by indigenous Christian Saras, one might predict that Chad will follow Sudan as a falling domino, and that a southern entity will fragment from the north, in an effort framed by denial of oil to China.

In another theater of the CJTF-HOA mission, **Tanzania** has also been associated with the GWOT, mostly because of the 1998 terrorist bombing of the US embassy, in Dar es Salaam. But tensions had existed for decades between the government and the Muslim Shirazis who populate the island of **Zanzibar** [45],¹¹¹ which lies in the Indian Ocean, just offshore from Dar es Salaam. Were it not for the inclusion of Tanzania in the CJTF-HOA mission, the conflict might appear as just one more point of confrontation between Muslims and Christians. The Task Force brings Great Power objectives into relief, and in this case, Dar es Salaam appears as the ocean port and head of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (TaZaRa) - which was built by China, during the 1970s.

The TaZaRa's purpose was always related to extraction of minerals from the center of the continent. Although the bulk of the mineral wealth is represented by copper, which is mined in **Zambia** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**, the more important metal is cobalt, which has important military applications and is therefore considered "strategic and critical." There are relatively few sources of (military grade) cobalt anywhere on earth, and the United States has been involved previously in political and military operations focused on the DRC, specifically in the Katanga Province, where certain cobalt mines are located.¹¹² It may be a long way from Katanga to Zanzibar, but that is the route cobalt follows, and it explains in some part the CJTF-HOA deployment. China imports 90 percent of its cobalt from the DRC.¹¹³ Apart from the cobalt and copper, in the DRC, there is also substantial wealth in ores of columbium (a.k.a. niobium) and tantalum (together known as "col-tan" in the mining trade), both of which are also considered "strategic and critical" and are indispensable in many military applications, as well as throughout the electronics industries.

Other Theaters in Africa

Morocco is a critical actor in African Great Power games, due to its strategic location on the Strait of Gibraltar (controlling passage between the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea), and there is an active Islamist movement, which makes the Muslim country a GWOT theater - like Turkey, Bangladesh, and Algeria. The country also is an important Fourth World war theater, due to its very unresolved problem with the **Sahrawis** of Western Sahara, which Morocco colonized in 1975. The monarchy has continually refused to hold an independence referendum, despite the terms of the American-crafted "Baker Plan," which guaranteed the process.¹¹⁴ There is a good chance that war will resume, if the referendum does not take place soon. But Morocco is a GWOT ally and a Great Power theater. So no Joker, this year.

In comparison, **Nigeria** is also a GWOT and Great Power theater, and has been similarly beset with Fourth World wars, especially in the southeast part of the country, which is populated mainly by black Christian indigenous peoples (**Igbo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Itsekiri, et al.**) [tabulated here as one continuous theater - 46],¹¹⁵ whose liberation movements date from the time of Nigeria's independence from Britain. Since then, southeast Nigeria has been taken over by oil development, which has financed the state's domination by Muslims (Hausa and Fulani) of the north, who have historically ruled through military force, since the British departed, in 1960. Inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims has recently flared, coincident with acts of war against government forces and oil companies in the southeast. Strangely enough, the recent wave of violence follows on the heels of a new major investment by China in Nigerian oil

development¹¹⁶ - which follows on the heels of China's new oil deals and the subsequent violence in Chad (cited above), which follows on similar events in Sudan and Iran.

Could yet another coincidence fall into place? After investing in Nigeria, in early 2006, China's ministers moved on to **Senegal**, to discuss development in the oil patch located in the southern Casamance Province - which has been a Fourth World war theater, also for decades, since independence days of 1960. Like the governments of Iran, Sudan, and Chad, the government of Senegal is dominated by Muslims, and the indigenous (*Diola*) [47] people of Casamance are mostly Christians. When Christian indigenous peoples fight for liberation from Muslim states, is it still the GWOT? Almost exactly coincident with the Chinese oil deal, violence broke out again in Casamance, where there was supposed to have been a ceasefire and resolution of war.¹¹⁷

And more. China is aggressively pursuing oil development in **Angola**¹¹⁸ (which has imposed a military occupation in the breakaway oil-rich *Cabinda* province [48]¹¹⁹), and in **Algeria** (which still represses indigenous *Berbers* [49]¹²⁰), and elsewhere in Africa, where China generally does not make respect for human rights a condition on its economic involvement,¹²¹ and where Fourth World conflicts are intensifying.

Conclusion: The Unipolar Moment Reconsidered

This survey of world violence is not comprehensive. While it accounts for most of the current shooting wars observed in 2006, and for most identifiable theaters of the GWOT, it hardly begins to enumerate all known cases of Fourth World independence movements or Great Power theaters. The trend that is most obvious speaks for itself: Of some 63 identifiable shooting wars in 2006, 49 of them can be categorized as Fourth World liberation struggles. This trend conforms to a pattern revealed in other similar war surveys. In 1987, during the Cold War context, Nietschmann found 86 of 120 wars in the same category.¹²² And in 2001, on the eve of the GWOT (as it turned out), this author counted 52 out of 83 wars, also in the same category.¹²³ There is little doubt that Fourth World war continues to dominate all other types of armed conflict and global violence. The most easily inferred explanation is that the process of decolonization simply has not been concluded, and that liberation ideology continues, all around the world.

The evidence revealed in this survey has further implications, and they concern the pattern in which Fourth World wars continue to be hijacked as the fodder of Great Power games. In 2006, this pattern is at least as evident in the GWOT as it was during the Cold War. While it is important here to identify the underlayment of Fourth World wars, it is equally important now to call the Great Power game.

The game in its present form starts in 1991. That was the original "unipolar moment," when the United States faced a big choice: whether to attempt global military hegemony - to initiate a permanent Pax Americana - or to accept a multipolar configuration of world power. The debate from those early New World Order years was never conducted or resolved in public. Instead, the impact of QDRs and Defense budgets that were laid out, about 15 years ago, is left to be inferred, today. Given the time horizons that are typical, we are now witness to the plans acted upon back then. The GWOT has done little to change much, except for the context and cover story.

End the charade, and here's the game: China is the enemy (the QDR says so),¹²⁴ especially if in alliance with Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, and other states identified in this

essay. In 15-to-20 years, if China does acquire the kind of power projected by QDRs today, there will indeed be a moment of major confrontation for the next generation to contend with, and all the weapons being built today for that moment will be deployed. That means, if China is to be prevented from acquiring power, tomorrow, there are things that must happen, today. Strategic chokepoints and sea-lanes and oil resources and metal ore deposits. Take control of as much as possible, today, starting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.

As for all those “terrorists?” They never had the capabilities to be more than a big deadly nuisance, but they did provide a good cover story – for as long as it lasted.

And for the Fourth World? The pending independence and statehood of Palestine, Kosovo, Montenegro and Somaliland should serve as bellwethers of the approaching tsunami.

¹ e.g. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/index.php>; <http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp>; <http://www.terrorism.com/>; <http://terrorism.about.com/od/terroristorganizations/>

² <http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html>

³ Klare, Michael T. 18 April 2006. “Containing China.” *TomDispatch.com*. <http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?emx=x&pid=78021>; <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/>; Donnelly, Thomas. 14 March 2006. “The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*. http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.24047/pub_detail.asp 1 February 2006. “Kill the QDR.” http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.23805/pub_detail.asp

⁴ Manuel, George, and Michael Posluns. 1974. *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality*. NY: Free Press.

⁵ Philp, Kenneth R. 1977. *John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform: 1920-1945*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

⁶ *Fourth World Bulletin*. 1998. “Further Motion by State Department to Railroad Indigenous Rights,” and “Stop Making Sense: State’s Distortion of US Indigenous Policy.” <http://home.earthlink.net/~autonmsaim/id20.html>; <http://home.earthlink.net/~autonmsaim/id21.html>

⁷ Sills, Marc A. 1992. “Post-Cold War Secessionism and the Recognition of New States in US Foreign Policy.” *Journal of Public and International Affairs*. Vol.3, 155-65.

⁸ Howe, James. 1986. “Native Rebellion and US Intervention in Central America: The Implications of the Kuna Case for the Miskito.” *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 10, no.1: 59-65.

⁹ Nietschmann, Bernard. 1989. *The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States*. NY: Freedom House.

¹⁰ For reference on many cases of the Joker in US foreign policy during the Cold War, see: Prados, John. 1986. *Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II*. NY: William Morrow; McGhee, Ralph 1983. *Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA*. NY: Sheridan Square Publications; Stockwell, John. 1978. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. NY: WW Norton.

¹¹ Sills, Marc A. 1992. op. cit.

¹² “Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2005.” <http://www.members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm>; Minorities at Risk Project. “Peace and Conflict 2005.” <http://www.cidem.umd.edu/>

¹³ <http://www.unpo.org/>

¹⁴ Minorities at Risk Project. 2001. University of Maryland.

¹⁵ *World War 4 Report*. 5 November 2004. “Is This the Fourth World War?” <http://www.ww4report.com/ww4>

¹⁶cf. Saunders, Douglas. 6 Sept. 2003. "The Fourth World War." *Common Dreams Newsletter*.
<http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0906-05.htm>

¹⁷ Currently, previously declassified information is being reclassified by the USG.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/politics/03archives.html?th&emc=th>

¹⁸ Baker, Peter. 16 March 2006. "Bush Restates Terror Strategy in New Document: 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive War Reaffirmed." *The Washington Post*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/15/AR2006031502297.html>. "Thomas Donnelly, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who has written on the 2002 strategy, said the 2003 invasion of Iraq in the strict sense is not an example of preemptive war, because it was preceded by 12 years of low-grade conflict and was essentially the completion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War."

¹⁹ Gertz, Bill. 20 April 2006. "More muscle, with eye on China." *The Washington Times*.
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060420-121646-9379r.htm>;
Donnelly, Thomas. 6 March 2006. "Two out of three ain't enough." *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*. http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.24001/pub_detail.asp

²⁰ Quaint reference, often attributed to Charles Krauthammer, to describe the out-set of the Post-Cold War period.

²¹ Shichor, Yitzhak. 3 January 2006. "China's Kurdish Policy."
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3571&article_id=2370616

²² Jamail, Dahr. 14 March 2006. "Iraq: Permanent US Colony." *Truthout.org*.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/031306A.shtml

²³ e.g.: Gorenberg, Gershom. 10 March 2006. "Israel's Tragedy Foretold." *New York Times*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/opinion/10gorenberg.html>

²⁴ http://www.balochvoice.com/index_a.html

²⁵ *Stratfor.com*. 18 September 2002. "A New Day Dawns in the Caspian."
http://stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=206267

²⁶ *Stratfor.com*. 5 October 2001. "Taliban's Fall Won't Lead to Afghan Pipelines."
http://stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=200906

²⁷ Blank, Stephen. 1 February 2006. "China's New Moves in the Central Asian Energy Sweepstakes."
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3605&article_id=2370732

²⁸ <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp121105.shtml>

²⁹ <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120505.shtml>

³⁰ Dreyfuss, Richard. 16 March 2006. "Civil War is Here." *Truthout.org*.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/031606F.shtml

³¹ *World War 4 Report*. 27 August 2005. "PKK Ceasefire in Turkey: New Attacks in Iran."
<http://www.ww4report.com/node/990>; 18 August 2005. "More Kurdish Unrest in Syria, Iran."
<http://www.ww4report.com/node/950>; <http://www.pdki.org/>; Worth, Robert. 17 March 2006. "Kurds Destroy Shrine in Rage at Leadership." *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/middleeast/17kurds.html>.

³² *International Herald Tribune*. "Briefly: Turkey pours troops into restless region." 22 April 2006.
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/21/news/briefs.php>; <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/07/turkey10261.htm>;
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/turkey0305/>.

³³ <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030706.shtml>

-
- ³⁴ Scahill, Jeremy. 13 March 2006. "Rest Easy, Bill Clinton: Sloba Can't Talk Anymore." *Counterpunch.org*. <http://www.counterpunch.org/scahill03132006.html>
- ³⁵ *UNPO*. 13 March 2006. "Kosova: New PM Insists on Independence." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=32&par=3963
- ³⁶ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=45>
- ³⁷ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=07>
- ³⁸ cf. *Stratfor.com*. 22 Feb. 2006. "Kosovo and the Implications of Independence." http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=262534
- ³⁹ *UNPO*. 15 March 2006. "Kosova: Russia and China 'Pledge not to block New Kosova.'" http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=32&par=3963
- ⁴⁰ <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030306.shtml>
- ⁴¹ *UNPO*. 3 March 2006. "Abkhazia: Leader Presses Independence Claim." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=03&par=3895
- ⁴² <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=14>
- ⁴³ <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369569>; also <http://www.UNPO.org>
- ⁴⁴ *Renaissance Capital Research Portal*. http://research.rencap.com/eng/government/region_detail0106.asp
- ⁴⁵ <http://www.UNPO.org>
- ⁴⁶ Connor, Walker. 1984. *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- ⁴⁷ <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/9bd37354-5c37-406c-a6dc-d03ea14274d7.html>; cf: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030306.shtml>; <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030306.shtml>
- ⁴⁸ *MSNBC*. 17 February 2006. "Reports: China, Iran near huge oil field deal." <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11404589/from/RL.2/>
- ⁴⁹ <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0217/p03s03-usfp.html>
- ⁵⁰ http://www.ahwaz.org.uk/news/2006_01_01_archive.html; <http://www.alahwaz-revolutionary-council.org/English/INDEX%20-%20Eng.htm>
- ⁵¹ *Reuters*. "Iran shells Kurd positions in Iraq." 21 April 2006. http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyid=2006-04-21T111557Z_01_GEO136585_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-IRAN-SHELLING.xml; <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/08/11/iran11619.htm>; <https://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/iran9803.htm>
- ⁵² Dareini, Ali Akbar. 17 March 2006. "Rebels in Iran Kill 21 People on Highway." *Associated Press*. http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=66&par=3221; <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=66>
- ⁵³ Gall, Carlotta. 2 April 2006. "In Remote Pakistani Province, a Civil War Festers." *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/asia/02pakistan.html>; Landay, Jonathan S., and John Walcott. 31 March 2006. "US Officials: Iraqi Insurgents Educating Afghan, Pakistani Militants." *Knight-Ridder*. <http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/14235672.htm>; Daly, John C.K. 21 March 2006. "The Baloch Insurgency and its Threat to Pakistan's Energy Sector." http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=170

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369909>;
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51499&SelectRegion=Asia&SelectCountry=PAKISTAN>
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51743&SelectRegion=Asia&SelectCountry=PAKISTAN>

⁵⁴ *Stratfor.com*. 22 Feb. 2006 “Pakistan: Eager to Develop Port for Trade Route.”
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=262562; and “Pakistan’s Measured Response to the Baloch Insurgency.” 16 Feb. 2006 http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=262342

⁵⁵ Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 23 March 2006. “Revolution in the Pakistani Mountains.” *Asia Times Online*.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HC23Df05.html

⁵⁶ *WLUML*. 24 February 2006. “Jammu and Kashmir: Muslim-Buddhist Clashes in Ladakh.”
<http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-523687>

⁵⁷ *ReliefWeb*. 9 February 2006. “India: Tens of thousands newly displaced in north-eastern and central states.” <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/DPAS-6LUGTS?OpenDocument>

⁵⁸ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=48>

⁵⁹ *Stratfor.com*. 22 Feb. 2006. “China: Facing a Multinational Maritime Morass.”
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=262278

⁶⁰ Niazi, Tarique. 15 February 2006. “Sino-Indian Rivalry for Pan-Asian Leadership.”
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3621&article_id=2370780

⁶¹ Sengupta, Somini. 13 April 2006. “In India, Maoist Guerrillas Widen People’s War.” *New York Times*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/world/asia/13maoists.html>.

⁶² e.g. *Amnesty International*. 12 January 2006. “India: Excessive use of force against adivasi protestors in Orissa.” <http://news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200032006?open&of=ENG-352>

⁶³ *UNPO*. 20 February 2006. “Nagalim: Nagaland enjoys peace dividend.”
http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=41&par=3790

⁶⁴ *South Asia Terrorist Portal*. “National Liberation Front of Tripura.”
http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/nlft.htm

⁶⁵ Chaudhary, Jyoti Lal. 5 February 2006. “Reang crisis: Accord implementation under cloud.”
<http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=116&page=18>

⁶⁶ *South Asia Terrorist Portal*. “Major Incidents of terrorist violence in Manipur: 1992-2006.”
http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/india/states/manipur/data_sheets/majorincidents.htm

⁶⁷ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/assam.htm>

⁶⁸ Upadhyay, R. 13 February 2006. “Northeast violence: an overall view.” *South Asia Analysis Group*.
<http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1700.html>

⁶⁹ *ChristianAggression.org*. “Christian Conversions and Terrorism in North-East India.” 10 March 2006.
http://www.christianaggression.org/item_display.php?type=ARTICLES&id=1141970933

⁷⁰ Niazi, Tarique. Op. cit.

⁷¹ <http://survival-international.org/news.php?id=1199>

-
- ⁷² *Cultural Survival*. 3 June 2005. "Bangladesh: Appeal to Stop New Settlements in the CHT." <http://209.200.101.189/publications/win/win-article.cfm?id=2672&highlight=chittagong>; UNPO. 15 March 2006. "Chittagong Hill Tracts: NGP protests human rights violations in the CHT." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=16&par=4014
- ⁷³ Niazi, Tarique. Op. Cit.
- ⁷⁴ <http://www.UNPO.org> for Chin, Karenni, Mon, and Shan cases.
- ⁷⁵ *World War 4 Report*. 30 January 2005. "Burma Attacks Naga Rebels." <http://www.ww4report.com/node/151>
- ⁷⁶ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=05>
- ⁷⁷ *World War 4 Report*. 25 August 2005. "Invisible Terror in West Papua." <http://www.ww4report.com/node/982>
- ⁷⁸ <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/10/indone12653.htm>
- ⁷⁹ <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369865>;
<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369896>
- ⁸⁰ *Stratfor.com*. 20 May 2004 "Vietnam's Risky Game in the South China Sea." http://stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=232149
- ⁸¹ <http://www.montagnard-foundation.org/homepage.html>
- ⁸² <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=30>
- ⁸³ *Amnesty International*. 27 January 2006. "Urgent Action: Lao People's Democratic Republic." <http://www.amnesty.ie/user/content/view/full/5128>
- ⁸⁴ *Stratfor.com*. 15 February 2004. "Philippines: Momentum for Peace Accords Builds." http://stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=228138; Quigley, Samantha. 7 March 2006. "War on Terror Victory Tops PACOM's Priorities." *Armed Forces Press Services*. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060307_4421.html
- ⁸⁵ <http://www.cpaphils.org/>
- ⁸⁶ <http://www.philippinerevolution.org/index.shtml>; Petras, James, and Robin Eastman-Abaya. 17 March 2006. "Philippines: The Killing Fields of Asia." *Counterpunch.org*. <http://www.counterpunch.org/petras03172006.html>
- ⁸⁷ Gearan, Anne. 16 March 2006. "Rice Calls on China to Explain Buildup." *Associated Press*.
- ⁸⁸ Gertz, Bill. 17 March 2006. "Pentagon 'Hedge' Strategy Targets China." *The Washington Times*. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060316-114755-3306r.htm>
- ⁸⁹ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=50>
- ⁹⁰ *Cultural Survival*. 29 March 2002. "Indigenous Uyghurs Accused of Terrorism." <http://209.200.101.189/publications/win/win-article.cfm?id=122&highlight=uyghur>
- ⁹¹ <http://www.uyghuramerican.org/index.php/uaa/>; <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=21>
- ⁹² <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=52>
- ⁹³ Prados, John. 1986. op.cit.

-
- ⁹⁴ *UNPO*. 15 March 2006. "Tibet: US backs call for Dalai Lama to visit China." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=52&par=4012
- ⁹⁵ Connor, Walker. 1984. op.cit.
- ⁹⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-hoa.htm>
- ⁹⁷ <http://www.somaliland.org>; <http://www.somalilandnet.com>; <http://www.somalilandgov.com>; etc.
- ⁹⁸ *Cultural Survival*. 8 March 2006. "Ethiopia: Oromo Liberation Front appeals for Political Solution to Violence." <http://209.200.101.189/publications/win/win-article.cfm?id=2868>
- ⁹⁹ <http://www.sidamaconcern.com/>
- ¹⁰⁰ <http://www.onlf.org/>
- ¹⁰¹ *Cultural Survival*. 18 November 2005. "Ethiopia: AJC Denounces Violence." <http://209.200.101.189/publications/win/win-article.cfm?id=2788>
- ¹⁰² <http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/>; <http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/News/defenceless.htm>; <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/12/ethiop12417.htm>; <http://gadaa.com/>
- ¹⁰³ *World War 4 Report*. "State Terror Against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia – Another Secret War for Oil?" <http://www.ww4report.com/africa/ethiopiastaterror>
- ¹⁰⁴ *Cultural Survival*. 22 February 2006 "Sudan: United States rejects evidence of genocide in Darfur."
- ¹⁰⁵ *Cultural Survival Voices*. 15 October 2004. "The Peoples of Darfur." <http://209.200.101.189/publications/csv/csv-article.cfm?id=79&highlight=darfur>
- ¹⁰⁶ http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/utfordringer/ptd_spla.html
- ¹⁰⁷ *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*. 12 January 2006. "China, Africa and Oil." <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/>
- ¹⁰⁸ Morse, David. 19 August 2005. "War of the Future: Oil Drives the Genocide in Darfur" <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0819-26.htm>; *Global Policy Forum*. Sudan. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm>
- ¹⁰⁹ Lacey, Marc. 21 April 2006. "Family Feud Complicates Revolt Over Chad's Leader." *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/world/africa/21chad.html>; *Taipei Times*. 19 January 2006. "CPC inks oil exploration deal with Chad." <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/biz/archives/2006/01/19/2003289721>
- ¹¹⁰ *CBC News*. 28 February 2006. "Chadians flee to Darfur to escape violence." <http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/02/28/chad060228.html>; *Human Rights Watch*. "Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad." <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/chad0206/index.htm>
- ¹¹¹ *UNPO*. 23 August 2005. "Zanzibar: Violence Rocks as Elections Approach." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=58&par=2893;http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=58
- ¹¹² Griswold, Dierdre, and Johnnie Stevens. Undated. "Bush,, Clinton in the Web: Behind the Assassination of Kabila." *Mines and Communities.org*. <http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Company/kabila1.htm>
- ¹¹³ *USGS*. <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2004/chmyb04.pdf>
- ¹¹⁴ *Reuters AlertNet*. 27 February 2006. "Polisario confident Western Sahara Vote will be held." <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24716482.htm>; 26 February 2006. "No solution in sight at 30-year mark for Western Sahara." <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2682197.htm>

¹¹⁵ <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=43>; <http://www.biafraland.com/>;
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6LDJUE?OpenDocument>

¹¹⁶ *MSNBC*. 9 January 2006. "China oil firm makes \$2.3B Nigeria investment: CNOOC acquires 45% stake in oil field." <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10772884/>; Zachary, G. Pascal. 14 March 2006. "Nigeria: The Next Quagmire." *Alternet.org*. <http://www.alternet.org/story/33282/>

¹¹⁷ *IRIN News*. 17 March 2006. "Senegal: Fighting Continues Along Border with Guinea-Bissau." <http://allafrica.com/stories/200603170604.html>; *Reuters AlertNet*. 12 January 2006. "Chinese minister visits Senegal to Cement Relations." <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L12193072.htm>; 3 January 2006. *IRIN News*. "Senegal: Local official dies following ambush in troubled Casamance." http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50934&SelectRegion=West_Africa

¹¹⁸ *Radio Free Asia*. 25 January 2006. "China Faulted for Africa Oil Deals." http://www.rfa.org/english/features/lelyveld/2006/01/25/china_africa/

¹¹⁹ *UNPO*. Cabinda. <http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=13>; 15 March 2006. "FLEC disputes the validity of General Sanjar's remarks." http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=13&par=4016

¹²⁰ *The Economist*. 11 July 2002. "The horrors of war aren't over yet." http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1224647

¹²¹ Walt, Vivienne. 15 February 2006. "China's appetite for African oil grows." http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/08/news/international/africa_fortune/

¹²² Nietschmann, Bernard. 1987. "The Third World War." *Cultural Survival Quarterly* Vol. 11. no.3.

¹²³ Sills, Marc A. 2001. "The Third World War Revisited: A Tribute to Bernard Nietschmann."

¹²⁴ Donnelly, Thomas. 2006. Ops. Cit.; Goodman, Peter S., and Edward Cody. 22 March 2006. "Russia Plans Gas Line to Feed China." *The Washington Post*.

The Roots Causes of Maasai Predicament

By Navaya ole Ndaskoi

1.	INTRODUCTION.....	3
2.	MAASAI.....	4
3.	LAND ALIENATION	7
4.	THE GERMANS VERSION.....	10
5.	FALSE PROMISES.....	11
6.	THE BEAUTIFUL ONES ARE NOT YET BORN	13
7.	A COMPLEX SITUATION.....	15
8.	THE NATIONAL INCOME FACTOR.....	16
9.	WILL THEY SURVIVE?	17
	REFERENCE	19

1. Introduction

On two different occasions between August 2004 and January 2005 the Maasai pastoralists of Kenya surfaced in the mass media, both print and electronic.

August 15, 2004 was exactly 100 years after the signing of the controversial agreement between the British Government and the Maasai which allowed British settlers to allocate land to themselves in Kenya at the expense of the Maasai. Claiming that the agreement had expired, the Maasai demonstrated across the Rift Valley and in the capital of Kenya, Nairobi. They also invaded privately owned ranches in Laikipia District.

In the bid to protect private property and maintain peace in the country, the Government reacted by arresting several Maasai. In the process the police, reportedly, killed a Maasai.

Secondly, a simmering conflict between Maasai pastoralists and Kikuyu farmers erupted in January 2005 in Mai Mahiu and Mandera locations. In this conflict at least 40 people lost their precious lives, dozens were seriously injured and hundreds fled their homes. Properties worth millions of dollars were destroyed (*The Standard*, February 14, 2005).

These two incidents of conflicts are principally based on landed resources, especially land and water. This paper is an attempt to describe the historical background of the conflicts and their implications to the survival of the Maasai in both Kenya and Tanzania.

Traditionally the Maasai were pastoralists raising mainly cattle but also small stock such as goats and sheep. Given their tolerant attitude towards wildlife, they lived side by side with wildlife. When Europeans came to Africa all of them were, literally, carrying guns.

A hunting spree was sustained for decades. They nearly wiped out wildlife. Later, some wise colonists advocated wildlife conservation. This proved to mean appropriation of Maasai rangelands to create national parks and game reserves (Parkipuny, 1991). Wildlife conservation was, however, *not* the only source of Maasai predicament. Large-scale settler agriculture especially in Kenya was another. Besides, British colonial Government considered the Maasai way of life as primitive and was determined to deal with it as such (Keiwua, 2002). In effect other forms of land uses were encouraged at the expense of Maasai pastoralism which was condemned as 'primitive.'

After 'independence' in both Kenya and Tanganyika¹ the Maasai dilemma surprisingly increased instead of diminishing. The Governments in the two countries retained the colonial mentality against pastoralism (Fosbrooke, 1972). The so-called 'national interest' disarmed the Maasai of their land in Tanzania (Shivji, 1998). In Kenya, politicians, the rich, and British settlers as well as wildlife conservationists chopped off large chunks of what used to be the Maasai territory (Rutten, 1992).

So much so that one often hears the question: 'Will the Maasai survive or perish?' This article answers the question focusing on the suffering of the Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania. This does not mean that others have not suffered in the two countries. To be sure, there are volumes and volumes of books unearthing countless sickening sufferings in the two countries. But the Maasai suffering has rarely been acknowledged.

¹ Tanganyika 'united' with Zanzibar to form Tanzania in April 1964.

2. Maasai

Western historians and anthropologists have, seemingly, deliberately, ignored the Maasai point of view and have written Maasai history wrongly.

This part aims to correct, in summary, the myths about the Maasai. It is for the people who wish to know the Maasai, not as 'a powerful tribe of arrogant fierce savages' or 'a curious attractive group that performs ancient war dances while dressed up in outlandish attire,' but as a people with a soul, a history, and a future in a remarkable sort of way.

European writers corrupted the word Maasai to Masai. Sadly, many of contemporary African writers; go on with this error. Do the Maasai originate from Egypt? According to historians they are coming from 'far away in the North.' But exactly where the origin of the Maasai is is something no living person today can honestly profess to know (Sokoine, 1981). The wide knowledge of the Maasai, extending far beyond the borders of East Africa is 'too often a distorted image and an unduly romanticised one' (Parkipuny, 1975).

Few tribes have attracted as much attention as the Maasai. Historians and anthropologists have written volumes and volumes about the Maasai, yet have failed to puncture the image created by more romantically inclined observers (Adams & McShane, 1992). How did the strange writing about the Maasai begin? The classic colonial *modus operandi* was to first commence by exploration of the lands to be stolen. The likes of Dr David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley came to Africa. They returned from Africa with weird stories of 'savages capering around boiling pots of human flesh.'

These were followed by missionaries who introduced Christianity to the Maasai. Two Germans, Dr. Ludwing Krapf and Rev. John Rebman members of the Church Missionary Society are believe to be the first Europeans to contact the Maasai in the late 1840s. Krapf published a book titled *Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours* in 1860 which probably contains the first written description of the Maasai. He wrote:

They live entirely on milk, butter, honey and the meat of black [sic!] cattle, goats and sheep...they are dreaded as warriors, laying all waste with fire and sword, so that the weaker tribes do not venture to resist them in the open field, but leave them in possession of their herds, and seek only to save themselves by the quickest possible flight.

Then the British Royal Geographic Society sent Joseph Thomson to East Africa. In his book Thomson described his first encounter with the Maasai in these words: 'We soon set our eyes upon the dreaded warriors that had so long been the subject of my waking dreams, and I could not but involuntarily exclaim, "What splendid fellows" as I surveyed a band of the most peculiar race of men to be found in Africa' (Thomson, 1885). Isak Dinesen was a fervent admirer of the Maasai. She writes, 'A Maasai warrior is a fine sight.' In effect Dinesen played a role in carrying the stereotype about the Maasai to the extremes. In her book titled *Out of Africa* published in 1972 she said:

Those young men have, to the utmost extent, that particular form of intelligence which we call chic; daring, and wildly fantastical as they seem, they are still unswervingly true to their own nature, and to an imminent ideal. Their style is not an assumed manner, nor an imitation of a foreign perfection; it has grown from the inside, and is an expression of the race and its history, and...weapons and finery are as much a part of their being as are a stag's antlers.

So effective has been this portrayal that many contemporary African writers still view the Maasai through this jaundiced prism. In his *No More Lies about Africa*, for example, Musamaali Nangoli joins the cult by navigating far away from the very title of his book:

For the Masai...a young boy of about sixteen coffee seasons throws himself into the bush bare-handed and kills a lion in order to become a man (Nangoli, 2002:59).

With the possible exception of the Biblical Samson a human being cannot kill a lion bare-handed. It is important however to explain briefly the Maasai social set-up.

Maasai means speakers of Maa dialects. There are several sub-sections that speak Maa (MAA, 2004). Some whose remnants still exist today are IPurko, ISalei, IKisonko, ILumbwa, ISikirari, IKaputie, ILoodokilani, ILarusa, IDamat, IMatapato, ILaitaiok, ILoitai, ISiria, IUasin Nkishu, IDalalekutuk, IKeekonyokie, IKankere, IMoitanik and many others. Some have been 'wiped out' in tribal conflicts. For example Ildikiri, Ikoli, Iloogol-ala, Ilaikiapiak and Ilosekelai sub-sections have been 'eliminated' (Kulet, 1972).

There are several clans, *injomiei*, in the Maasai society. There are two major clans of society. One is *Oodo Mong'i*, Red Cow and the other is *Orok Kiteng*, Black Cow. Within each clan, there are sub-clans, *ilpaasheta*. Sub-clans in Oodo Mong'i clan are Ilmolelian, Ilmakesen and Iltarosero while Ilaiser and Ilukumai are the sub-clans in Orok Kiteng clan. It is noteworthy that members of the same clan respected one another in a brotherly way. A man could not for example marry a woman of his clan because the community considered her his sister - a great abomination in the eyes of the Maasai.

The Maasai men are organised by a system based on age set, *olporo*. Under this system all the boys, on attaining the age of sixteen or thereabouts, are circumcised and accepted into a particular age-set, a unit possessing a single name and a sense of unity. There follows the happiest time of a Maasai man's life. The warrior is not only expected to express the best of human virtues, but also to feel that he is inferior to no one.

Romantically inclined writers talk of the 'military power of the Masai.' But that suggests an organised military machine under a single command implementing a national policy. No such 'nation wide' co-ordination existed. There is not, nor did there ever exist, a single 'chief' of the Maasai, at the apex of the pyramid (Parkipuny, 1975)².

Before the introduction of a unified national leadership system hinged on the organisational structure of western societies, Maasai, like other societies in Africa, had its own system of organisation and leadership. There were no rulers but there were leaders. For every sub-tribe each age group had a leader, *olaigwanani* plural is *ilaigwanak* 'elected' by the largest possible assembly of the members of the group. There was also a deputy leader *engopiro* - plural is *ingopir*. Such leaders were 'elected' and functioned only in and through the youth age of the group, *murano*. Besides youth leaders there were also sub-tribal leaders. Again not rulers, but spokesmen. Same with their deputies. The leadership functions of these spokesmen transcended the age group segmentation.

Neither *ilaigwanak* nor any other person had the power to enforce judgement or order. It was the weight of *public* opinion which compelled the individuals to act as required (for a fuller account of this see Kulet, 1972). In 1933, the British enlisted the medicine men,

² The British and Germans confused Oloiboni to be the Chief. He was a medicine-man and rain-maker. Though his position enjoyed prestige in the Maasai society he could not claim any political authority.

iloibonok, on the pay roll as ‘chiefs of the Masai’ hoping that at long last they had found the right agents for responsive indirect rule. But the British efforts were in vain. Though the medicine man position enjoyed prestige and influence in the society they could not claim any resemblance of tradition to wielding executive authority. In no time the Maasai came out in protest over the manipulation and insisted that the medicine men should keep out, far way from leadership (Parkipuny, 1975:64).

Contrary to the popular belief the Maasai do not live on a diet of milk and blood. True, the warriors consume these foods extensively, plus the meat eaten at the meat feasts held in special camps, *ilpuli*. The elders, women and young folk eat considerable amounts of agricultural crops, cereals, beans, bananas and others. Warriors take these foods too. But they do it secretly as food not obtained from livestock is viewed as inferior (Ibid.). The Maasai obtained these from the hill dwellers at barter markets at numerous points in the foothills where highlands and plains meet (Kivasis, 1953 & Hollis, 1905).

Maasai lived a pastoral life and traded their cattle for the fruit and grain of their agricultural neighbours. They are still condemned for maintaining ‘excessive numbers of useless cattle that deprived wildlife of water and grazing’ (Rutten, 2002:4). The Government thus reduces veterinary services to allow nature to assist in de-stocking (Mchome, 2002:106). In effect the ‘livestock industry has lost about \$ 136 million over the past 14 years’ (*The EastAfrican* January 24, 2005). It must be remembered, however, that in the eyes of Maasai pastoralists there is nothing like ‘useless cattle.’

Most of them mostly sell a fraction of their livestock. Even then its contribution to ‘the economy’ is comparatively substantial. In 2001, for example, the livestock sector earned the Government in Arusha Region TShs.16.7 billion (*Nipashe* September 29, 2001). This sum, however, does not capture the non-monetarised livestock contributions like consumption, manure and draught power. The contribution of the sector outstrips by far that of the wildlife-based tourism industry. All protected areas in the same year contributed, if much, not more than TShs.10 billion in Arusha in the same year (*Business Times* March 3, 2000). And the Government supports wildlife and tourism.

Next the paper turns to the most controversial problem facing the Maasai.

3. Land Alienation

In the name of development the Maasai have lost a huge part of their ancestral land. Alienation of Maasai land for agriculture and for the interest of wildlife conservation is one of the main blights facing the Maasai in both Kenya and Tanzania.

It is said Maasailand extends from Mkomazi through Upare to the southern foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro and runs northward between Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru, Olng'elata (Kivasis, 1953). To the West the Maasai took in the whole of Maasai Steppe extending southwards to include today known villages on the Handeni-Kondoa road, Swakini, Kijungu and Mgera. The extreme westerly limit is the West of the Serengeti (Fosbrooke, 1972). It is a large territory covering a total of 105,105 square kilometres. The Kenya/Tanzania border line cuts across Maasailand for kilometres stretching from West of Mara River to the eastern slopes of Kilimanjaro Mountain. During colonial time Maasailand was divided into four administrative Districts namely Narok and Kajiado in Kenya and Monduli and Kiteto in Tanzania (Parkipuny, 1975).

The British came and condemned the Maasai for being wanderers who must be dealt with as such, virtually, to prevent them from 'destroying the environment and wasting or under-utilising the land.' Justice Moiwo ole Keiwua notes with grave concerns:

The British who came, saw and coveted the land disrupted communal land ownership. A hasty study of the Maasai was undertaken with equally hasty conclusions made. The rights of the Maasai to own their land had been watered down to mere grazing rights...Eliot cannot in fairness call the Maasai wanderers. Between the Maasai on their land, and the British who had wandered all the way from little England, who was a wanderer? (Keiwua, 2002).

In Africa, like elsewhere, at the dawn of the 20th century the British used tricks and, more importantly, their military strength to alienate land to British settlers at expense of the local populations (Vambe, 1972). The British applied the same techniques to deprive the Maasai of their ancestral land (MAA, 2004). The problem is expressed well:

The British tricked us! After we had been weakened by civil wars and droughts, they claimed that our Great Laibon, O'lonana, had signed an agreement in 1904 with His Majesty's Commission for the East African Protectorate, leasing Kenya to the British. The Maasai would never have accepted such a lease! This would have confined us to an arid, dusty land of thousands of miles where the threat of drought...is imminent (Saibull & Carr, 1981).

He is referring to the so-called 'Anglo-Maasai Agreements' prepared by the British colonialists on August 10, 1904. That 'agreement' was signed on August 15, 1904 between the British colonial Government and the Maasai in Nairobi, the present day capital of Kenya. The Governor, Sir Donald Stewart, represented the British while Olonana ole Mbatiany 'represented' the Maasai. The 'agreement' stipulates that:

The Masai leaders 'of our own free will', decided that it is for our best interests to remove our people, flocks, and herds into definite reservations away from the railway line, and away from any land that may be thrown open to European settlement (*New York Times* August 25, 2004).

Olonana had no mandate to sign away the Maasai land. He was neither Maasai leader nor representative. He was a mere medicine man. Commenting on the 'agreements' Justice Nzamba Kitonga, former Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya, argues:

In these circumstances, you do not need a lawyer to tell you that the so called Anglo-Maasai land agreement was a gigantic fraud and has no binding effect upon the Maasai, the government of

the Republic of Kenya or any other person. And the government knows all this (*The EastAfrican* September 6, 2004).

The Maasai on their part did not, and had no reason to, abide to a null and void agreement. To the Maasai, land was theirs and not a property to be owned like a horse by individuals. Any lease was, and still is, a foreign concept to them. They thus ignored it. The British effort was therefore in vain. The British colonialists came up with yet another 'agreement' signed by the same sometimes in 1911. The Maasai reaction was immediate.

In 1912 a group of Maasai, led by Mr Murket ole Nchoko, filed a suit in the court of Mombasa seeking to nullify 'the agreement.' The Maasai basic contention was that the elders who signed the agreement had no authority to 'alienate the interest of minors and unborn children.' But the case and a subsequent appeal were dismissed as the court ruled the agreement was actually a 'treaty' between two 'states' and that the court had no jurisdiction to handle such cases. The Maasai did not give up. They planned to lodge a final appeal in London. This was nipped in the bud when the protectorate quarantined the Maasai cattle when it learned of efforts to sell cattle and raise money to file the case (*The EastAfrican* August 16, 2004). It was clear that the Maasai were losers.

The British told them to stay out, away from what used to be their land. They should stay far from the then Uganda Railway. The British equally robbed other Kenyans. Their misadventure in Nandiland is responsible for the famous Nandi Resistance 1850-97. Only when the Nandi were defeated, not easily, did the British take their land. Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Kamba and other Kenyans were also deprived of their land. That was the rule wherever the British saw attractive land in Africa. They grabbed it. Everything grows on and off the land. Without land no life. The First and Second World Wars plus their consequences weakened the British. The turmoil between imperialists was itself development by contradiction. On the other hand Africans who were in the battlefields came home with arms and more military skills, the armed struggle against British rule was just around the corner. To survive the looming war the British had to live on Commissions. In 1932 they formulated the infamous Carter Land Commission.

That Commission did not return any land to any Kenyan. Mau Mau, the militant African nationalist movement became a full-scale fight; The Mau Mau War 1952-6. It advocated violent resistance to British domination in Kenya (Maloba, 1998). It was especially associated with the ritual oaths employed by leaders of the Kikuyu Central Association to promote unity in the independence movement. In October 1952, after a campaign of sabotage and assassination attributed to Mau Mau fighters, the British Kenya Government declared a state of emergency. It began four years of military operations against Mau Mau fighters. By the end of 1956, more than 11,000 fighters had been killed in that war, along with about 100 Europeans and 2,000 African loyalists. More than 20,000 other Africans were put into detention camps, where intensive efforts were made to convert them to the political views of the colonial Government, to abandon their nationalist aspirations. Despite these actions, Mau Mau resistance spearheaded the Kenya independence movement under Jomo Kenyatta (visit onwar.com).

The British established the R.J.M. Swynnerton Commission in 1954. Swynnerton's Report on *How to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya* was aimed at the privatisation of land ownership through the displacement of Indigenous Land Tenure systems and replacing it with a system that entrenched private property rights

along the lines of the English Land Law. The Swynnerton Plan, adopted in 1954, advocated individual land tenure and export cash crop production for Africans. The landless agricultural population was thus compelled to encroach on and overcrowd Maasai land.

In the meantime the British saw clearly that they would never defeat the Mau Mau fighters. Only then did they succumb to 'dialogue' which means the Lancaster Constitution 'talks' of 1962. The war ended but the Maasai were marginalised. The leases giving British settlers the Maasai land, according to former Kajiado North MP John Keen, were premised on manipulation. This fact, Keen says, 'has always been protested by the community leaders who walked out of Lancaster Constitution talks...over the issue. The Maasai leaders always walked out of the talks to protest the dubious agreement leasing their land to British settlers' (*The Standard* August 30, 2004).

Meanwhile in the Lancaster Constitution 'talks' the British succeeded in assuring that the African leaders who took over were going to protect the British interests. These were written in the new Constitutions (Mohiddin, 1981). An agreement was reached on the white highlands, the best land that was expropriated from Africans, in which select Africans would be permitted to buy some of the land there with money lent to them from the British Government in London (Gutto, 1981:54-5). The new leaders, including Kenyatta, who were once extremely adamant about the return of these lands, had no objections (Ake, 1986). Independence in Kenya, like elsewhere in Africa, was to be no more than a gradual Africanisation of the colonial administration (Fanon, 1967).

On December 12, 1963 Kenya finally became 'independent.' Kenyatta became the first President of Kenya under Kenya African National Union, today better known as KANU. KANU ruled Kenya for nearly 40 years. Daniel T. Arap Moi assumed power following the sudden death of Kenyatta in 1978. What about the land question? It was *never* solved.

4. The Germans Version

In Tanganyika, the Germans for their part pursued a similar policy and attempted to confine the Maasai to the South and East of 'the Great North Road.' They permitted the brothers Adolf and Friedrich Siedentopf to grab land in the Ngorongoro Crater and set aside the Serengeti for sheep farming (Parkipuny, 1975). The Siedentopfs tried unsuccessfully to exterminate wildlife to give room for two farms in the Crater (Grzimek, 1960). Germans appropriated numerous farms around Mount Kilimanjaro and Meru. The Maasai sub-tribe, Ilkisonko from the plains of these mountains moved to Ngorongoro.

The Maasai had to lose mountainous areas first. This is because, naturally and for very good reasons, they prefer to live on the plains rather than in the highlands. Maasai, though sentimentally attached to the highlands, prefers life on the plains. Cattle thrive better and fatten quicker there. Humans are less liable to bronchial trouble than in the damp, misty, highlands, and because the waters are temporary, malaria usually presents little problems. It is possible that Germans found few or no Maasai on the highlands, thus justifying land grabbing as the land was supposedly idle or underused or wasted.

The 'Sanya corridor' comprised a series of German demarcated farms and ranches, such as the present day West Kilimanjaro ranch, which the British held back from re-alienation so as to allow the Maasai to the North and West of Kilimanjaro and Meru to cross over the saddle between the two mountains and utilise the grazing of the Sanya Plains and beyond. As part of boundary readjustments, which led to the notorious Meru land case, the Maasai lost this corridor and much of the Sanya Plains as well (Fosbrooke, 1972). In 1955 Lolchoro area South of Arusha town was the scene of large-scale alienation.

On the foothills of Mount Munduli where there is the comparative favourable climate, the colonialists appropriated huge lands for themselves. The notorious Monduli Coffee Estate was established in 1931 though it existed before that year. Frank Anderson, an Australian criminal, annexed for himself the land that was to become Rasha Rasha Coffee Estate. Mr. Joseph Benesta owned another massive Tarosero Coffee Estate whose remains can still be seen at the West of the present day headquarters of Monduli District.

All told, Greek and Boer settlers attempted to establish wheat and sisal plantations in either side of the present day Arusha-Dodoma Road as far as the eye can see. However these farms did not succeed. But the plains still bear the names, *Inganui*, places of wheat and *Irkatan*, places of sisal in Maa language. German settlers went as far as Lepurko and Losimingori where they established ranches. The present day Manyara ranch was established during or around that time.

When the Germans were defeated in the First World War, according to the Versailles Treaty, they had to nominally lose their territories abroad. That was how Britain came to take over Tanganyika in the early 1920s. The war-weakened British could not start massive settler plantations in Tanganyika (Shivji, 1998). It opted for the 'indirect rule' policy which consisted of a campaign to settle peasants in Maasailand (Parkipuny, 1975).

Meanwhile they established a few plantations and tried to develop those left by the Germans. Around 1926 the Oldeani coffee plantations started and led to the construction of the road from Mto-wa-Mbu, and a subsequent branch road to Mbulu which was previously approached from Mbugwe, or from the South via Dabil. The opening up of the

Oldeani also permitted Murrels, the then District Commissioner Maasailand, to put the very first road up to the Crater rim from Kampi Nyoka around 1932 (for discussion see Fosbrooke, 1972). This was followed by the intensification of wildlife carnage and further marginalisation of Maasai who were already at their lowest ebb of suffering.

In 1961 Tanganyika gained 'independence.' The new Government seemingly wanted to exceed the colonial ones by appropriating Maasai land. Nationalisation created over 400 parastatals including a number of big agricultural and ranching corporations. District development corporations were also established. These and other state organs were involved in what are called 'national projects.' Village lands were alienated to state organs like the army and prison services without consultation of the villagers (see Lane, 1996 & Shivji, 1998). This is how Oljoro National Service, Tanzania Military Academy, Makuyuni National Service, among others, acquired vast lands.

In practice, lands taken over in the name of the state or in 'public interest' very frequently ended up being used for private benefit of the state bureaucracy and leaders. Alienation of over 100,000 acres of pastoral land for the joint Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex - now a monument of bad development - in Hanang District of Arusha Region northern Tanzania stands as one of several prime examples (Lane, 1996). National Food Corporation and Tanzania Breweries established similar farms at Loliondo, Munduli Juu, and West Kilimanjaro. In short Maasai land alienation multiplied after colonialism.

To add insult to injury, small-scale cultivation opened its mouth wide enough to threaten swallowing the remaining Maasai land. The Government supports the spontaneous and organic immigration of peasants onto rangelands, citing common rights of all citizens for resources within the borders of their country, irrespective of places of origin. Massive wildlife conservation areas were also created.

5. False Promises

In Kenya, Mau Mau struggle for independence was principally based on land. The KANU candidates won the first election on a platform committed to creating, according to KANU Manifesto, 'a democratic African socialist Kenya' (cited in Mohiddin, 1981:38). No Professor in Double Standards could have divined that the same politicians almost the same time could make one of the biggest U-turns in Kenya politics. In a speed almost *like* that of light the socialists became imperialists (Babu, 1981).

The Government of Kenya inherited a monstrously oppressive colonial system. It straightaway went to recognise the colonial legal framework with a few legislative amendments here and there. What followed is most striking. Remember that the British believe that they had the heavy 'burden of civilising Africans.' The colonialists came and condemned the Maasai for being wanderers who must be dealt with as such.

By some twisted sense of logic, the British who had wandered all the way from little England, had the boldness to describe the Maasai as wanderers. This was, virtually, to prevent them from 'wasting or under-utilising the land.' They saw the Maasai way of life as 'primitive.' The new African leaders in Kenya proved to have little better understanding of pastoralism. They too considered pastoralism 'backward.'

Likewise, in an uncalled-for rally to sedentarise the Maasai, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) set out

rolling into Kenya. They funded private ranches programmes against the Maasai will (Rutten, 1992). The Maasai, for example, categorically refused the setting up of ranches in Kajiado District. They were evicted. Water was piped from the Ngong Hills to the area. Then the farms were given to 'progressive' Maasai families. Such families were of Christian or Maasai urban dwellers (Parkipuny, 1975). So new style settlers were made.

Meanwhile conservation areas, many of them in the Maasai territory, were established. The largest concentration of wildlife as well as wildlife-protected areas remaining on earth is in pastorals territories in East Africa. In Kenya alone they are Masai Mara Reserve, Amboseli National Park, Nairobi National Park, Tsavo [East & West] National Parks, Nakuru National Park and a host of private game sanctuaries.

In Laikipia District 38 settlers whose ancestors came to Kenya during colonial times hold over one million acres leaving almost nothing to well over 40,000 Maasai. In Narok and Kajiado Districts Britain tests its new military hardware. 'The British army has conducted live-fire weapons training in Kenya since 1945, when London was still the colonial ruler' (visit irinnews.org). Two complex issues arise from the British military training in Maasailand. One, it has pushed the Maasai pastoralists off from their rangelands. Two, an 'estimated 500 Maasai herders from northern Kenya have been killed or seriously injured by ammunition left on the firing range' (visit democracynow.org).

Meanwhile politicians from other Kenyan communities openly encouraged further encroachments into Maasai pasturelands (Keiwua, 2002). In the Memorandum to the Njonjo Commission on Land Law from the Communities of Ololulunga and Melelo Locations of Narok District, the communities argued that:

The Constitution of Kenya contains elaborate safeguards against violation of the right to private property. It matters not whether such private property is group owned land under the Land Act. Yet a Councillor from Mulet side, who in a public meeting called by the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley in 1999 to reconcile the Maasai and the Kipsigis, dared to say that the Kipsigis would continue to invade Maasai owned land until such time the Maasai had given birth to enough children to fill up their land (Mwenesi, undated).

In Kajiado District encroachment into Maasai land is worse. The Maasai are becoming landless. In the Memorandum of Grievances to the Commission of Inquiry into Land Laws of Kenya, the communities of Iloodoariak and Moriso Land Adjudication Sections of Kajiado District made themselves heard clearly. Mwenesi again:

We the distressed and deprived communities of Iloodoariak and Moriso were encouraged by the words of the Commission's chairman who pledged to Kenya Public that all titles acquired otherwise than in strict accordance with the legal procedures will be cancelled. We believe you Mr. Chairman. We also believe that in this pledge your Commission has set out to put right what had been put wrong by the failure on the part of those who were supposed to impartially and disinterestedly administer the law.

It was the waywardness in the non-application or observance of the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Land Adjudication Act (Cap.284) that is responsible for our being deprived of our ancestral lands... The provisions had been misused and abused by a no less a person than the then Minister for Lands and Settlement, whose wife, despite not being an ordinary resident of any of these sections, was enabled by equally unscrupulous Government officials to acquire two farms, one in each of these Land Adjudication Sections. To our mind, that was the clearest case of abuse of office. We are at a loss why this-well known-then-Minister has not been made to face the full force of the law (Mwenesi, undated).

The struggle for a fair land tenure and security of land for all proved ineffective throughout the KANU rule. Evictions, massive corruption and violence were a rule rather than an exception during the rule of ex-President Daniel Arap Moi.

6. The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born

Corruption and lawlessness forced Kenyans to a historical political action. For the first time since 'independence' KANU was defeated in the general election in 2002.

The newcomers won through the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This fragile alliance of more than 10 opposition political parties cobbled together in the last few months before the election, promised a new Constitution and to fight corruption. But the new actors are a *recycling* of old guards. Far from representing any political break from Moi and KANU, NARC is made up of top KANU leaders, many of whom jumped ship in the last few months as internal divisions wracked KANU and Moi lost his grip on power.

Mwai Kibaki, the President, himself was Moi's Vice-President from 1978 to 1988. He only stood against Moi in the elections of 1991 and 1997, when Kenya's elite agreed to hold multiparty elections under pressure from the West. One of the NARC leaders is George Saitoti, Vice-President of Moi until September 2002. Moi sacked him for not supporting his chosen candidate, son of Kenyatta. He was finance Minister in the 1990s and is implicated in scams in which hundreds of millions of dollars were looted. Whether NARC is going to deliver the new Constitution of Kenya remains to be seen.

The Maasai struggle for their land continued nevertheless. It only took the new shape in August 2004. The Maasai demonstrated in Nairobi and across the Rift Valley Province, which used to be their territory. Their message was a simple one: 'We need our land back' (*The EastAfrican* August 16, 2004). John Letai is the President of the Organisation for Indigenous Peoples of Africa (OIPA). He says, with some bitterness, that:

The Laikipia situation has been rather volatile. We have the ravaging drought killing thousands of our animals while we are seating on a gold mine. The land next to us is electrified with all the lush pasture. Elephants, zebras and all other herbivores are having a holiday in these so called settler ranches while the rightful owners whom history deprived of this gold mine are languishing in abject poverty (pers.comm September 11, 2004).

The police suppressed, by brute force, the demonstrations. An elderly Maasai, Mr Ndinai Moiyare, was reportedly shot dead by the police and many others were wounded. Then over 120 were arrested. The actual damage suffered by the Maasai in terms of lives, injuries, and loss of property during their clashed with the Kenyan police is not clear. The Government of Kenya is still sitting on the figures. Its reaction to this rather chilling matter was unfair. One gets the sense of an institution that has lost its way, departed from its mandate, became confused about what it is exactly doing and why. The confusion is captured in the words of the Minister for Lands, Amos Kimunya. He notes with pride:

There were no 99-year leases, as far as I am concerned. If there are any I would be happy to look at them. From my own list of all these places, I can see 999-year leases...I am asking the people not to attempt to invade private property (*Daily Nation* August 25, 2004).

In his kind of logic the Kenyan Constitution protects stolen property. Nzamba Kitonga, former chairman of the Law Society of Kenya, tells him to eat his heart out:

The Minister of Lands, Amos Kimunya, being the man currently at the wheel, should not make impulsive, shortsighted, makeshift policy statements. He must understand that his long-awaited

appointment with history has come...[the Government] also knows that because the agreement was illegal, it is immaterial whether it was for 99 hours, 99 days, 99 months, 99 years, 999 years or 999 centuries. He must in this new dispensation resolve the land question in Kenya once and for all (*The EastAfrican*, September 6, 2004).

It is exceedingly unlikely that politicians in Kenya will listen. They have ‘no intention of following Mr Mugabe’s example. Uprooting the ranches, government officials said, would be disastrous for the economy, which relies heavily on Western assistance and on tourism, a major source of hard currency’ (*New York Times* August 25, 2004).

The matter has caused a rift among politicians in Kenya. While the ‘leaders acknowledge the community has genuine grievances, they are quarrelling over how to address the issue’ (visit.allafrica.com). Francis ole Kaparo is the Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament. The Maasai levelled grave charges against him. The charges, most of which he strenuously denied, includes this one from a Kenyan who requested anonymity:

As far as the politicians are concerned, Ntimama, Nkaiserry, Konchella have come out in support of the Maasai. The Pastoralist Parliamentary Group has also visited...and issued a statement in support of the Maasai. The media and clergy for the first time have also supported the Maasai and urged the government to address the Maasai issue once and for all. Unfortunately Kaparo who happens to be the speaker of the national assembly and coming from the area does not see sense in all these. He has been brain washed by the...settlers.

These are just allegations. However Kaparo has never convincingly denied them. What is in records is something to this effect: ‘Yesterday, Speaker Francis ole Kaparo maintained “outsiders” who also wanted to undermine him politically were inciting disorder in Laikipia District in the name of seeking land ownership redress’ (visit.allafrica.com). Accused number one is John Keen who is the former MP for Kajiado North.

His sin? He stated: ‘It is criminal and immoral to let their [Maasai] cows die by denying them access to ancestral land taken away by colonial cheats.’ William ole Ntimama, Minister in the Office of the President of Kenya in charge of Public Service, is also ‘being accused of *inciting* his community to invade private land’ (*The EastAfrican* August 30, 2004).

The meeting called to discuss ways of settling the Maasai demand for land was held in the 10th floor conference room of Harambee House, Nairobi, on September 07, 2004. It was called by Dr Chris Murungaru, National Security Minister, to ask Maasai and Samburu leaders to pacify those of their people who had started to invade lavish settler farms in Laikipia. Murungaru chaired the meeting. William ole Ntimama attended. Other who took part in the meeting were Education Minister George Saitoti (Kajiado North), assistant Ministers Gideon Konchellah (Kilgoris), Simeon Lesirma (Samburu West), and Mwangi Kiunjuri (Laikipia East), and MPs Joseph ole Nkaiserry (Kajiado Central), G.G. Kariuki (Laikipia West) and National Assembly Speaker Francis ole Kaparo. Participants suggested that KShs 10 billion as a possible compensation figure for the land the Maasai lost in Laikipia District alone. Ntimama, it is reported, stood up straight and said:

...the battle for lost land would not end until the Maasai were given compensation...The Maasai were not demanding that they should be allowed to go back to their lost farms but instead should be compensated for their land³.

They concluded that the Maasai do indeed 'have outstanding issues that require attention' (visit. gumii.org). In the eyes of pastoralists in Kenya, 'the few commercial ranchers, regardless of their ethnic background or when they acquired the land, represents the forces of dispossession that dates back 100 years ago' (*Daily Nation* August 25, 2004).

7. A Complex Situation

What about the settlers? Many of them have no idea that they are living on a borrowed time. For example Jeremy Block, a descendant of British settlers told *Reuters*, 'They have invaded all the ranches around here, they have destroyed an awful lot of property and it is time for law and order to take control.' The thinking continues 'The police need to be harsher...There need to be more arrests. We need quicker, more forceful action' (*New York Times* August 25, 2004). Some settlers, however, beg to differ.

In a telling admission, Michael Dyer, a settler of British ancestry who own 32,000-acre Borana ranch in Laikipia, sees the problem. Dyer cleared his chest: 'Everyone knows there is a land issue here. It is causing quite a lot of distress now to the [Maasai] community...My feeling would be let's get everyone around the table and let's get some proper interpretation of the Maasai agreements, and let's start the process of reconciliation' (visit news.bbc.co.uk). But the Maasai say it is too late.

The *BBC* reports that Simon ole Kaparo, one of several Maasai front liners in the struggle, says the time for dialogue is gone and that the Maasai will not accept any deal short of the return of all their land. He argues in no uncertain terms, 'There will be no dialogue.' He added: 'We didn't have any dialogue for 100 years, why should we have one now. We can't have any dialogue now...We want our land back.'

One of the arguments put forward in defence of settlers is that the Maasai will destroy the land. There is a stark and visible contrast between the different regions of Laikipia Maasai areas are bare and brown, the grass is baked a bright yellow in the dry season and there is little sign of wildlife. The settlers' ranches are lush and vast herds of wildlife roam behind electric fences. Dr. Lotte Hughes, an East African historian at St Antony's College, Oxford explains: 'They were confined to reserves, banned from leaving them' (visit guardian.co.uk).

The Maasai demonstrated towards the British High Commission in Nairobi. They wanted to tell the British Government in London through the British High Commissioner to Kenya to take responsibility of Maasai landlessness, which springs from British colonialism. John Letai, President of OIPA, notes:

On the 13th August we held a national wide demonstration and presented memorandums to the Kenya Government and attempted to present to the British High Commission but because of the colonial mentality and arrogance he refused to meet the Nairobi team and instead referred them to a gate keeper whose only job in that embassy is to record vehicles coming in and going out. We held a second attempt on the 24th and hell broke loose. Our Governments as you know are

³ To my understanding, cattle, goats, sheep, camels and donkeys eat grasses NOT money. Thus the land redistribution agenda should not be compromised. Secondly there is no contradiction between fighting for land redistribution and seeking compensation for the same.

subjects of colonial masters and yokes of dictatorship. It let the police disperse peaceful Maasai...(pers.comm September 11, 2004).

To this day of writing the British Government said nothing concerning the conflict. The Kenyan Government too has pushed the contradictions under the carpet, from which they will surely emerge sooner or later probably in a more ferocious form.

The wildlife-based tourism business complicates further the possibility for land redistribution. For this particular reason the paper looks at how the income accrued from the sector is shared in the efforts to achieve development in both Kenya and Tanzania.

8. The National Income Factor

In Kenya and Tanzania, and throughout *underdeveloped* countries, ‘the economy’ is used to justify tempestuous decisions which hurt the poor of the world (for uncompelled illustration see Hancock, 1989). For this particular reasons the paper examines, albeit briefly, the beneficiary of the national income in the two East African countries.

The Maasai are victims of ‘development’ in general but wildlife conservation in particular. Serengeti National Park, Tarangire National Park, Lake Manyara National Park, Arusha National Park, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Maasai Mara Reserve, Amboseli National Park, Nairobi National Park, Tsavo [East and West] National Parks, Mkomazi Game Reserve, to mention a few examples, are in or adjacent to what was, and still is, the Maasai territory. What do they get out of wildlife conservation?

In the two countries, the tourism industry is based on wildlife conservation. It is considered the jet engine empowering the exchequers. The two Governments benefit financially and rhetorically from the tourism sector. It is often argued that policies must serve political, social, and cultural as well as economic ends. But the revenue earned from the tourism sector is much more of a priority for the international multimillion companies and Governments officials than the plight of rural people, especially the poor.

Land allocated to wildlife conservation is reserved for tourists and investors who are mostly foreigners. Foreign investors reap as much profit as possible. In both Kenya and Tanzania ‘much of the foreign currency that comes in through such sectors as tourism gets siphoned out’ (*The EastAfrican* February 28, 2005). In Tanzania for example, the Executive Director of the Tanzania Tourist Board, a Government body for promotion of tourism, said with admirable if astonishing frankness:

foreign investors own about 80% of the entire tourist hotels and lodges. They own nearly 90% of the air travel and about 90% of tourist hunting business and transport. About 60% of all tour operator firms (*Business Times* December 28, 2001).

Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Union William Hanna, said, ‘During the European summer the long-haul jets have been full of tourists arriving in Tanzania’ (*Utalii* August, 2001). Professor Seithy Chachage, of the University of Dar es Salaam adds: ‘...just after Christmas in 1996, two chartered planes landed in Zanzibar, straight from Italy with more than 2,000 tourists who were going to spend their time in the beaches of Zanzibar and then fly to Arusha and back home’ (Chachage, 2000:186).

At this point one may make some financial assumptions. One: assume the said 2,000 tourists visited Ngorongoro Conservation Area which is in the Arusha Region. They were accommodated in a foreign owned hotel for two days. Each tourist paid, to be lenient, a

total of US \$ 150 fees for all hotel expenses per day. The hotel owner (X) earned a total of US \$ 600,000 in two days. Let this amount be what X earned in that year.

Two: assume the said planes belong to another investor (Y). A tourist paid US \$ 2400 as air fair for the whole safari. Y earned a gross total of US \$ 4,800,000 in 1996.

British Airway and KLM are the leading airlines ferrying tourists to and fro Tanzania, not Air Tanzania. The vast majority of Tanzanians live far below the 'poverty line'; in 2001 the income was US \$ 246 per capita, that is to say 1 less than US \$ 1 per day (visit tanzania.go.tz).

Remember the average income per capita is obtained by an arithmetically equal distribution of wealth, which no Utopia is expected to achieve. Even then, an average Tanzanian would have to work for over 2,430 and 19,500 years to earn what X and Y respectively earned in just one short year. And the average life expectancy is estimated at 48 years. What is true about Tanzania is similarly the case in Kenya.

This is a parasitic stratum which strengthened tour and travel companies in the same way in which local communities are weakened. It is polarisation of wealth and poverty at two opposite extremes. It is all sheer robbery, criminal plunder of the weak by the strong. To borrow a line from Dr. Walter Rodney, 'capitalism is parading in without even a loin cloth to cover its nakedness.' In the strictly economic sense, without any political undertones, any multiplier effect not only spills outside the two countries, but spills most often into the pockets of those who do not need it; lavishly rich western investors.

9. Will They Survive?

This sounds a simple question capable of a straight answer, but in point of fact it raises several complicated issues. In this concluding part only a few issues will be examined.

Foremost natural calamities, particularly the 1890 disaster and also many other severe drought periods weakened the Maasai (Fosbrooke, 1972). Secondly, the intervention of colonial administration and subsequently the 'independent' Governments worsened their situation. Currently, an alienation from an adequate independent source of food and income is evident. (Parkipuny, 1991). All this combined hits the Maasai pastoralists hard. The net result is that they have become increasingly vulnerable to drought, subsequent food shortages and famines. They are forced in an unpleasant state of limbo.

Occasionally clashes occur. In 2004 in Tanzania for example the landed resources-based conflict between the Maasai and the Sonjo communities in Ngorongoro District left many people wounded and the vast majority being displaced in both sides. This is not an isolated case and it is definitely not the worst. In 2000, again in Tanzania, a simmering conflict between the Maasai pastoralist and peasants in the Morogoro Region erupted claiming dozens of lives, homes razed to the ground and several people wounded.

Neither is this man-made disaster confined to Tanzania alone. It is, apparently, becoming the order of the day in Kenya. The most recent example illustrates the point just made. At least 40 people had died, dozens serious injuries and hundreds have fled their homes following the clashes that broke out in Mai Mahiu and Mandera, about 60 kilometres southwest of Nairobi (*The Standard*, February 14, 2005). The bone of contention is the use of River Ewaso Kedong' whose volume of water has been reduced drastically

because of the current drought. The Maasai, who live downstream, claim their neighbours, the Kikuyu, upstream are using the river water for irrigation, thereby complicating the drought situation for them and their livestock (*The EastAfrican*, January 24, 2005). The area was 'traditionally roamed by nomadic Maasai cattle herders but settled since the 1970s by small-scale farmers from the Kikuyu community' (visit news.scotsman.com). These trends seem, unfortunately, to be escalating.

Meanwhile, extreme poverty is causing the Maasai to move into towns where they are employed to do petty jobs, which are humiliating and demeaning. The following sentence sums up the Maasai situation: the Maasai 'have undergone serious transformations and... they can no longer be idealised as a group of nomadic wanderers, as often portrayed in beautiful picture books for tourist market' (Dietz & Mohamed Salih, 1997). Stopping this downward slide, let alone reversing it, is next to impossible (Chambers, 1983:138).

Those interested in peace and stability in the region, the Governments of Kenya and Tanzania included, are advised to put in place policies which will minimise these tragedies. The most important of all being *fair* and *secure* land tenure. At the same time, the Governments should ensure a fair distribution of all resources for the benefit of all. Professor Yash Pal Ghai, Chair of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2000-4), argues that landlessness 'need to be resolved through national policies with sensitivity to the special problems and needs of particular communities' (2005).

On the other hand, the world should hold responsible all creators of the Maasai abject misery, starting particularly with British and German Governments. There is plenty of documentary evidence supporting this argument.

The British, however, are well known for their saying which goes: 'let by-gone be by-gone.' Britain had many colonies throughout the world and its adventures wherever the British wandered is more or less the same. It cannot possibly, therefore, stand the agony of compensating the world.

Here is specifically where the intervention of the 'international community' is needed. Britain and Germany must be held to account for the blight the Maasai are facing. If such a statement sounds wildly extravagant it is because of the refusal to look history into the face. Germans have been held to account for Nazi atrocities. The USA has compensated Japanese-Americans for their internment during the Second World War.

The Maasai have suffered the most abject misery following German and British colonialism. They too, like Japanese and Jews, deserve compensation. They should - and are in fact - demanding compensation and return of their land (MAA, 2004).

Back to the survival question. The answer is quite resoundingly and unequivocally, 'yes, of course, yes.' If by Maasai survival one is talking of a dynamic society in future times as opposed to a 'static' people that depend on the creators of their misery, one is optimistic. There is no reason for sinking under the load of despair.

References

- Adams, J.S. & McShane, T.O. (1996). *The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation Without Illusion*, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press (First Published in 1992).
- Ake, C. (1986) 'Kenya', in Adedeji, A. (ed.): *Indigenization of African Economies*, New York: Africana.
- Babu, A.M. (1981). *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* Dar es Salaam: TPH & London: Zed Press.
- Chachage, C.S.L. (2000). *Environment; Aid and Politics in Zanzibar*, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press (1996) Ltd.
- Chambers, R. (1983). *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*, Harlow: Longman Group Ltd.
- Dietz, A.J. & Mohamed Salih, M.A. (1997). *Pastoral Development in East Africa: Policy Review, Options and Alternatives*, second revised edition Report for I/C Consult, Zeist (for Bilance). Amsterdam & The Hague.
- Dinesen, I. (1972). *Out of Africa*, New York: Vintage Books (First published in 1937).
- Fanon, F. (1967). *The Wretched of the Earth*, London: Penguin Books.
- Fosbrooke, H.A. (1972). *Ngorongoro - The Eighth Wonder*, London: Andre Deutsch Ltd.
- Ghai, Y.P. (2005), 'Preface' in Makoloo, M.O. *Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity*, London: Minority Rights Group International.
- Grzimek, B. (1960). *Serengeti Shall Not Die*, London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd.
- Gutto, S. B. O. (1981). 'Law, Rangelands, the Peasantry, and Social Classes in Kenya', *Review of African Political Economy*, 20, pp. 41-56.
- Hancock, G. (1989). *Lords of Poverty*, London: Macmillan Ltd.
- Hollis, A.C. (1905). *The Maasai: Their Language and Folklore*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Keiwua, M. (2002). 'Maasai Land: Part 1- A History' *whoseland*, October.
- Kivasis, S.J. (1953) *Maisha ya Sameni ole Kivasis yaani Justin Lemenye*, Kampala, Dar es Salaam & Nairobi: The Eagle Press.
- Kulet, H.R. (1972). *To Become a Man* [A Novel], Nairobi: Longman Kenya Ltd.
- Lane, C. (1996). *Pastures Loss: Barabaig Economy, Resource Tenure, and the Alienation of Their Land in Tanzania*, Nairobi: Initiatives Publishers.
- MAA. (2004). *A Memorandum on the Anglo-Maasai 'Agreements': A Case of Historical & Contemporary Injustices and the Dispossession of the Maasai Land*, Presented to the Office of the President [of Kenya]; Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs; Ministry of Lands, Settlements & Housing; The Office of the Attorney General; The District Commissioners' Offices of Laikipiak, Baringo, Marsabit, Isiolo, Narok, Nakuru, Samburu and Kajiado Districts and The British High Commission - Nairobi.
- Maloba, W. O. (1998). *Mau Mau and Kenya*, Indiana: University of Indiana Press.
- Mchome, S.E. (2002). *Evictions and the Rights of People in Conservation Areas in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam: Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam.
- Mohiddin, A. (1981). *African Socialism in Two Countries*, London: Croom Helm.

- Mwenesi, S.M. (undated). *Trust Lands and Sustainable Environmental Management: Options for Constitutional Reform*, Paper presented to the monthly Seminar (2000), HAKIARDHI, Dar es Salaam.
- Nangoli, C.M.N. (2002). *No More Lies About Africa*, In the USA: A.H. Publishers.
- Parkipuny, M.S. (1991). *Pastoralism, Conservation and Development in the Greater Serengeti Region*, London: IIED.
- (1975). *Maasai Predicament Beyond Pastoralism*, Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.
- Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle-L'Ouverture & Dar es Salaam: TPH.
- Rutten, M. (2002). *Parks Beyond Parks: Genuine Community Based Wildlife Eco-tourism or Just Another Loss of Land for Maasai Pastoralists in Kenya?* London: IIED.
- (1992). *Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty - The Process of the Individualization of Landownership Among the Maasai Pastoralists of Kajiado District Kenya, 1890-1990*, Saarbrucken-Fort Lauderdale: Verlag Breitenbach Publishers.
- Saibull, S. & Carr, R. (1981). *Herd and Spear*, London: Collins & Harvill Press.
- Shivji, I.G. (2001). *A Review of CPRs: A Country Report on Tanzania*, 1st draft., Presented to the Cambridge Workshop.
- (1998). *Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania*, London: IIED, Dar es Salaam: HAKIARDHI & Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam.
- Sokoine, E.M. (1981). 'Foreword' in Saibull, S. & Carr, R. *Herd and Spear*, London: Collins & Harvill Press.
- Thomson, J. (1885). *Through Masai Land*, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.
- Vambe, L. (1972). *An Ill-Fated People*, London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

Institutional Memory as Community Safeguard

By Jay Taber

According to Slavenka Drakulic, author of The Balkan Express, war is a simple matter. No politics, no dilemmas, nothing but struggle.

Prior to this state of affairs, though—she notes--comes a process of getting used to the idea of war, making the idea a part of everyday life. “Then,” she observes, “rules can change, rules of behavior, of language, of expectations...no room for dialogue anymore, but only for opposing sides to issue warnings, threats, conditions...”

The social conflict that precedes war or political violence is replete with abnormal conduct and rhetoric. References to fears and grievances—real or imagined—proliferate. It is during these times, in particular, that other narratives function as community safeguards against organized aggression, xenophobia, vigilantes.

Barbara Gray and Pat Lauderdale, in their paper The Great Circle of Justice, http://www.cwis.org/fwj/61/great_circle_of_justice.htm refer to narratives and stories as

“basic life forces needed to establish and to preserve communities and develop a common culture of shared understandings, and deeper, more vital ethics...how humans are to live with each other...a blueprint that provides the communities’ structures (e.g., political and spiritual forms of governance, kinship relations, and societies that have specific duties and responsibilities in maintaining justice within the community).”

Through participation in narrative events, they claim, those who feel as if they are alone become connected to their community.

Gray and Lauderdale’s paper, oriented toward American Indians, applies as well to the rest of us here in Indian country; the stories we tell help to model the type of society we want to live in, who we are, and where we came from. And it is this role of storytelling, the use of history, the preservation of memory, that enables us to recognize patterns of conduct and rhetoric our communities have witnessed previously, in order for us to comprehend new threats and dangers. Replenished, renewed, and repeated, these stories build a cohesive narrative of our collective understanding—our *institutional memory*.

Memories, however, do not reside in books or aging minds alone; indeed, they require the regular nourishment of ceremonies and conferences and public gatherings where they are spoken and heard and embellished with the perspective of time and maturation and contextual change. And by making the linkages between the past and the present, our stories--with luck--allow us to create the narrative of a future that embraces both.

In his occasional paper, Tribes Institutions Markets Networks, David Ronfeldt examines the framework of societal evolution, contending that, “Civil society appears to

be the realm most affected by the rise of the network form, auguring a vast rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors around the world...a new center of meaningful citizenship.” These networks—emerging in response to broad societal conditions—embody, he notes, “a distinct cluster of values, norms, and codes of behavior” that, combined with other forms, “allows a society to function well and evolve to a higher level,” but “depends on its ability to integrate these contradictory forms through the regulatory interfaces of law and policy.”

Absent a widespread tribal support system or reliable public or private institutions (let alone markets) for the regular exercise of our new narratives incorporating our vital stories, values, and norms, it is the network form we must now rely on as “curator” of these tales. Organizations within a civil-society network, more precisely, the individuals who retain these collective memories, are then crucial to keeping them alive. The communication of our stories will then determine who we will become.

At the time of the negotiations between the six republics of Yugoslavia over their post-communist destiny, the many ethnic and religious groupings within Yugoslav society had been living side by side with and marrying each other for half a century. But their common language and culture had developed over a period of six hundred years of Slavic Balkan identity, united in opposition to external rule by both Muslim and Christian empires. By the late 1980s, they were a remarkably tolerant society.

Yet, grievances from the Second World War and the Communist era were still fresh enough to be rekindled by political manipulators determined to foment popular violence for political power. The trick was how to incite populations that had come to value harmonious relations with their neighbors and fellow countrymen, despite differences in religious practice or ethnic history.

Not surprisingly, leaders in Belgrade turned to the state-controlled radio and television to mount a campaign of fear and loathing based on imaginary and wildly-exaggerated grievances and stories of persecution. Leaders in Zagreb unwisely followed suit with an overly zealous nationalistic campaign, which in turn fed these fears, followed by Belgrade’s use of paramilitary, vigilante militias to initiate actual violence, the response to which could then be used as justification for military intervention. A classic formula.

But the disintegration of the Balkans in the 1990s, as it is so aptly described in [The Fall of Yugoslavia](#) by BBC correspondent Misha Glenny, is most noteworthy for its documentation and interviews on the scene as the tragedy unfolded. The picture Glenny portrays is one of a country confused by the change from communism to democracy, bewildered by mounting economic insecurity, and fearful of the horrors of hostilities about to be unleashed, yet still nearly incapable of imagining civil war in their largely integrated multicultural federation. Even among the Serbs, there was a very large and active opposition movement that demanded a peaceful resolution to the questions of boundaries and independence for each republic.

What is remarkable is how easy it was to plunge these socio-economically interdependent peoples into conflict and violence and, eventually, war, by introducing first stories of persecution, then thuggery, then weaponry—strategically--into enclaves of ignorance and insecurity. After that, it was merely a matter of escalation of nationalistic hyperbole, continued fabrication of atrocity, followed by commission of the real thing. Once trust is broken, the prophecies of vengeance are self-fulfilling; the voices of reasonable people can no longer be heard.

For those of us who don't own the press or radio and television, the challenge of safeguarding our communities from subversion or attack is both formidable and invigorating. It is in this constructing of networks through face-to-face interaction, in pursuit of comprehending the forces against us, that we can discover our strengths and deepest values, and, with luck, develop enduring loci of memory and understanding to guide, comfort, and console those yet to come.

In the war of ideas surrounding the philosophy of racism, both tribal and ancient national legacies—in and of themselves not necessarily malign--often merge with loyalties identified with modern states, their institutions and borders, enabling a perversion of the authentic relational aspects of “kinship” to the point of absurdity. It is in situations like the present—where the breakdown of states is so pronounced—that this nonsense becomes lethal.

As peoples and borders continue to relocate in the aftermath of the European colonial experiment and the Cold War, we have no choice but to come to terms with what Dr. Richard Griggs of the University of Capetown describes in [The Breakdown of States](http://www.cwis.org/fwdp/international/statebrk.txt) <http://www.cwis.org/fwdp/international/statebrk.txt> as the nations that endure, “beneath the boundaries of states like bedrock as ephemeral state boundaries shift like wind-blown sand over the surface.” Dealing simultaneously with our dysfunctional institutional forms, and with our misplaced loyalties and prejudices is bound to exacerbate our current global madness, but if we shoulder this burden intelligently—examining the roots and catalysts of conflict--we have half a chance to survive. Honoring the efforts of our elders while instructing our future warriors is one way to prepare.

Hans Magnus Enzensberger, in his book [Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia](#), observes that the inability to distinguish between bravery and cowardice is symptomatic of autism and the loss of conviction. He quotes Hannah Arendt who wrote about the period between the two world wars:

I suspect there has never been a shortage of hate in the world; but...[by now] it had grown to become a deciding political factor in all public affairs...This hate could not be targeted at any one person or thing. No one could be made responsible—neither the government, nor the bourgeoisie, nor the foreign powers of the time. And so it seeped into the pores of everyday life and spread out in all directions, taking on the most fantastical, unimaginable forms...Here it was everyone against everyone else, and above all against his neighbour...

What distinguishes the masses today from the mob is their selflessness, their complete disinterest in their own well-being...Selflessness not as a positive attribute, but as a lack: the feeling that you yourself are not affected by events, that you can be replaced at any time, anywhere, by someone else...This phenomenon of a radical loss of self, this cynical or bored indifference with which the masses approached their own destruction, was completely unexpected...People were beginning to lose their normal common sense and their powers of discrimination, and at the same time were suffering from a no less radical failure of the most elementary survival instinct.

Enzensberger proposes that today's protagonists have no need for rituals, and can survive without a Fuhrer. Simply put, he says, "Hatred on its own is enough." Comparing every carriage on the underground to a miniature Bosnia, he notes that not to conform is to risk death.

Speaking of ordinary people in their everyday lives today, "Aggression," he observes, "is not directed only at others, but at themselves. It is as if it were all the same to them not only whether they live or die, but whether they had ever been born, or had seen the light of day." He goes on to assert that,

However huge the genetic pool of stupidity might be, it is not big enough to explain this urge to violent self-destructiveness...The only conclusion one can draw is that this collective self-mutilation [over such things as loss of jobs or identity] is not simply a side-effect of the conflict, a risk the protagonists are prepared to run, it is what they are actually aiming to achieve.

Referring to the apparently senseless destruction we've seen take place in places like the Balkans and Somalia, what he terms *collective running amok*, Enzensberger asserts the concept of 'future' disappears: "Only the present matters. Consequences do not exist. The instinct for self-preservation, with the restraining influence it brings to bear, is knocked out of action."

The author cautiously warns that when censorship, fear, and blackmail rule, institutions retreat and normal living conditions dissolve. Resulting criminality in many regions of the world, he claims, has radically altered public standards. Writing in 1990, he somewhat prophetically (at least as far as we in the US are concerned) recognized that with the epidemic of wars, aggression and defense become indistinguishable: "More and more people are pulled into the whirlpool of fear and hate until the situation becomes quintessentially antisocial."

As a caution to fellow journalists, Enzensberger maintains, "To a certain extent, the media magnify the person who has become unreal, and give him a kind of proof of existence." As an entreaty to all humanity, he remarks, "When the moral demands made on an individual are consistently out of proportion to his scope for action, he will eventually go on strike and deny all responsibility. Here lie the seeds of brutalization, which may escalate to raging aggression."

There are, of course, many types of borders and purposes for them, as well as issues and conflicts confronting them.

I was reading recently in *Indian Country Today* about the protest of U.S. border policies at the perimeter of the Tohono O'odham Nation in Arizona, and was reminded of a dispute between Pacific Northwest tribes and US Customs on the Canadian border twenty years ago.

Back then, Lummi and Semiahmoo and other tribes—who'd gathered to fish or powwow or participate in special ceremonies for around five thousand years—were upset over having their sacred items (masks, drums, carvings, and attire) ransacked by border guards. Listening to their testimony before a Congressional fact-finding panel, I could see and hear the pain and indignity in the elders' voices describing this degrading experience on their way to what was to have been a joyful reunion with their Canadian cousins.

Now days, of course, militarism trumps all in the US, and the last thing a Department of Homeland Security/INS/Border Patrol agent is concerned with is maintaining humane, respectful relations with American Indians--especially with those whose territory and relatives span the US border. And so while I was not surprised to read accounts of Tohono O'odham being handcuffed and roughed up by federal agents when visiting between villages within Arizona--let alone across the Mexican border--I was nevertheless disturbed by how the constant harrassment, this psychological warfare embedded in the militarization of the border, has affected the Tohono O'odham.

In her own words, a Tohono grandmother said, "The deaths and the violence on O'odham lands are rooted in dishonor. Confusion and apathy are significant in the destruction and lack of respect for the O'odham way of life and the right to exist as O'odham...O'odham cannot step out of their homes to conduct social and ceremonial activities without armed U.S. Border Patrol agents tailgating their vehicles, interrogating their travel agendas, watching their activities by satellite imaging and entering private homes and properties without permission."

Recently introduced U.S. immigration legislation would require O'odham to carry U.S. passports to travel within their own territory. But, as the Tohono grandmother noted, "Many O'odham are born at home and do not have birth records to prove any citizenship. O'odham are born in their territory, which is in both U.S. and Mexico." And part of their sacred ceremonies associated with their ancestral lands is to walk the ancient trails that--similar, I imagine, to the Canadian border tribes and nations--manifest the stories and songs of their unique, bedrock heritage in the continent that has only been called America for a mere five to ten percent of the time their people have been here.

In a time when markets and sweatshop goods and labor and armaments travel so

freely, what does it say about Americans when we condone the demeaning practice of preventing the celebration of life and the mysteries of the universe?

In his 1981 book The Primal Mind, author Jamake Highwater quotes Edward F. Edinger who claims, "Western society no longer has a viable, functioning myth. It therefore has no basis to affirm life." Taking heart from what he calls *today's deeply felt and daringly facilitated humanism*, though, Highwater himself asserts the first shockwaves of a "cultural earthquake" are awakening Western humankind to the dizzying realization that it is not alone.

Looking at the post-colonial conflicts between nations and states, Highwater asserts that, "Never has the interpretation of cultures been so worldwide, or disintegration so universal." F.S.C. Northrop clarifies: *Unless we are protected by poetry...the mind of man becomes overstimulated while his spirit dies.*

Cautioning against the false isolation of individualism, Highwater proposes that "Freedom is not the right to express yourself, but the far more fundamental right to be yourself...The abiding principle of tribalism is the vision of both nature and a society which provides a place for absolutely everything and everyone." I suspect he would apply this concept today to all those excluded by the myriad geographic, legal, and psychic barriers to travel and migration as we attempt to isolate ourselves from both foreign peoples and ideas. But, as they say, timing is everything, and the irony of Euro-Americans attempting to close the door on mestizos and First Nations and other migrating peoples is not lost on our indigenous continental hosts.

What has been lost, however, is the tribal or primal consciousness of most Euro-Americans, the reclaiming of which might someday help to alleviate the perceived need of defending white supremacism as a pseudo bastion of identity for the millions whose roots were severed in earlier trans-Atlantic migrations. Addressing the UN in 1977, the *Six Nations* (Iroquois) spoke of native peoples being among the world's surviving proprietors of that kind of consciousness. "The great hope," as Epes Brown states, "is that a true and open dialogue may be established through which...each [society] may ultimately regain and reaffirm the sacred dimensions of their own respective traditions."

As Highwater concludes, in the past it has been the resources of the world of primal peoples which have given impetus to the rise of human cultures and the many social cycles that evolved. Now, from the brief rise of primal peoples, he predicts, comes a new culture that replaces the exhausted one. "That is the ultimate irony of our era," he notes. "Those who have been most utterly defeated have become most influential. Another irony...is that the most linear and material minds are not aware that history has relentlessly moved past them, putting their values in a new perspective which they cannot yet see."

Paradigm Shift: Saving Africa
Listening and Answering the Call of Nature
By Oguchi Nkwocha, MD.

In a chapter titled "The Cobra's Heart"¹ in his book, "The Shadow of the Sun"² Ryszard Kapuscinski, a Polish author, describes with incredible poignancy characteristic of the entire work, the original and main problem of Africa.

*"...Everything about the internal politics of Africa's states is intricate and entangled. This stems directly from the fact that European colonialists, dividing Africa among themselves under Bismarck's leadership during the Berlin conference, crammed the approximately ten thousand kingdoms, federations, and stateless but independent tribal associations that existed on this continent in the middle of the nineteenth century within the borders of barely forty colonies. Meantime, many of these kingdoms and tribal groups shared a long history of conflict and wars. And here, without being asked their opinion on the matter, they suddenly found themselves within one and the same colony, subject to the same (and foreign) authority, the same laws"*³

he writes.

It is an extremely rare feat to find, captured with unparalleled efficacy in just one paragraph, the root-ills of Africa as Kapuscinski has done. One would have to be unusually "entangled" with Africa, as in "being in love with Africa," to accomplish that. Ryszard Kapuscinski was, is.

Four significant issues can be boiled out of this paragraph: 1) colonialism, employing its most potent instrument, 2) "Balkanization," to achieve 3) de-"sovereignization" of the indigenous peoples of Africa, forcefully substituting a non-consenting artificial centralized 4) abstract citizenship.

Whereas Colonialism needs no explanation, "Balkanization," on the other hand, does: it is a most misused word, when and where used. Balkanization is not the natural falling apart of, or division / separation of, a working or non-working union, even by force. Balkanization is a calculated malicious, malignant and sinister weapon, whose operation is heart-achingly ruthless, goals nakedly exploitative, and results wastefully devastating in terms of human life. Balkanization is the deliberate creation by an intruder (such as a colonial power), of divisions among people of otherwise natural affinity, and between peoples with otherwise natural boundaries, in order to re-group the people into non-consenting arrangements, with the goal of causing just enough on-going friction and internecine strife to prevent the victimized from coming together to confront the intruder, yet retaining enough forced cooperation to prevent outright chaos, anarchy and paralysis, so as to achieve complete and smooth exploitation and

¹ "The Cobra's Heart" (Chapter) p.50 from the book, "The Shadow of the Sun," by Ryszard Kapuscinski. First Vintage International Edition, 2002. Vintage Books, a subsidiary of. Random House. Inc.

² "The Shadow of the Sun," by Ryszard Kapuscinski. First Vintage International Edition, 2002. Vintage Books, a subsidiary of. Random House. Inc.

³ Ibid p.50-51

dispossession of the people—all this, throttled with finesse in a manner that only the well-oiled colonial mechanism can.

All over colonized Africa, Balkanization was occurring. And, it was not just about the desecration of natural physical boundaries, but also, the breeching of psychosocial boundaries and the creation of new ones. In Nigeria—that quintessential African country—for example, peoples with distinct and major linguistic, cultural and religious “boundaries” residing in their own natural territories and domains were forced together as “one country” as created by the then colonial British administration, thereby breaching both physical and non-physical boundaries. In “Sometimes in April”⁴ a HBO (Home Box Office) drama-movie depicting the Rwanda genocide of 1994, one learns of the colonial masters actually deliberately creating a new class / subgroup from a people of the same heritage, then nurturing this subgroup into a “chosen people” class, thus drawing the envy, ire and wrath of the “passed-over” group; and thus setting the perfect stage for the atrocities and horrific blood-letting that followed much later. But in Nigeria, the British did not have to create a new and preferred class: they simply chose, stated and showed their preference for the Muslim Northern Nigeria, to whom they bequeathed the wholesale right, as a class, to rule Nigeria in perpetuity, regardless of elections and their results. These are all examples of Balkanization, the engine of colonialism, the bane of Africa.

Africa was stripped, by colonialism, of the natural sovereignties enjoyed by the indigenous peoples naturally grouped into each its own natural nationhood; thus to force approximately “ten thousand” functionally independent sociopolitical such units into about forty colonial constructs, fashioned thousands of miles and many oceans away from Africa, to be ruled with a typically colonial hand by typically colonial masters. No one asked for permission by, or the consent of, the Africans. These colonies later became most of Africa’s so-called independent countries of today. In taking away the Africans’ natural nationhoods—natural identities and natural loyalties—colonialism deliberately intended to take away their human dignity and self-respect: it succeeded in doing so.

What was substituted for the original natural order of Africa and Africans in this design? A centralized colonial government, to which Africans of distinct and naturally different nations were supposed to transfer their total allegiance and loyalties, while being heavily indoctrinated and coerced into “dropping” their “tribal” loyalties and ethnic identities, in favor of a centralized citizenship of this colonial construct. Thus was Balkanization complete and total.

Colonialism left the African continent starting about half a century ago: that is obvious and celebrated. What was not, and is still not, recognized is what colonialism left behind in Africa. No, it is not its “legacy”, like a romanticized “gift”—beneficial or malevolent—of a parting lover, or a tenacious ghost of its old self. Colonialism is gone from Africa, but it left all the colonial constructs in place, including the Balkanized Africa and the horrific Balkanization processes, results and goals: in short, Colonialism as foreign policy is gone from Africa, but the colonial “computer” program is still running in Africa’s computer. Only operators switched—from foreigners to indigene-surrogates; the operation is still in place and intact. Exploitation and dispossession of

⁴ “Sometimes in April” (2005) an HBO Drama Directed by Raoul Peck

Africa continues today unabated and sometimes, unabashed, because the program is still running. But most of the heartache now is the pained irony that it is Africa's leaders, elite and political class who are the ones operating the colonial programs today using the colonial constructs set up by departing colonial administrators.

This one condition alone is the cause of the ongoing contemporary manifestation of the original problem of Africa as caused by colonialism. It is even more serious than the original problem. One can describe the condition as that of ignorance—by those who speak for, and rule, Africa. This class does not understand that it is carrying out the same instructions and orders of the departed colonialists. It is the same instruction-set which caused odious and often reprehensible results for indigenous Africans. It is the same program-set which took without consent and with gross impunity the sovereignties, the nationhoods, the identities and the dignity of Africans. Worse still, this class of Africans is willing to plunge Africa / Africans into civil war if necessary, inter-state war if called for, and willing to torture and kill masses of fellow Africans if it comes to that, just to achieve the sustenance of erstwhile colonial masters' program. Yet, they remain ignorant of what they are actually doing: they have no idea that this is in fact what they are doing.

It should come as no surprise that Africa as is today is for the most part unruleable, mired in perpetual dysfunction. Only force, mutual blackmail and distrust keep it alive—barely, but troubled nonetheless—in its dysfunction. That is because Balkanization is so unnatural that every natural inclination and urge is to negate its operation, neutralize its effect and oppose its goal. The indigenous peoples of Africa have no choice but to challenge and reject and react against indolent Balkanization: it is as much a subconscious reaction as it is deliberate. African leaders and the ruling class, on the other hand, uninformed regarding their role, tenaciously defend Balkanization: how great is their ignorance! That is why Africa remains an unstable continent; and what a monumental waste and loss for both Africans and the world! It does not have to be so.

One would like to brag about the world (humanity) having come a long ways in the last half-a-century or so, the assumption being that we should have better problem-solving skills to complement better problem-identification regime. True or not, such is not as important as humanity making a commitment to just plain *honesty*: effective problem management starts with honesty. This is the moral compass of the paradigm shift required to rescue Africa. Honesty is natural.

In all honesty, "what is colonialism?"—a rhetorical question which is at the heart of the Africa problem. Working from honesty, it should be common sense that at any level—personal or national—one should be willing to pay the fair market price for what one needs where one finds it, a process that should take place in mutuality between the "have" and the "have-not." Even the terms of payment can be worked out to include any mediums and or means acceptable to both parties, including even barter and other exchange-arrangements. Should the identified solution to a need be found unaffordable, honesty calls for creativity, re-think and adjustment of means and ways in order to re-define the situation or failing that, to live within present realities. This should not invoke a colonial mentality-solution. The fact is that those countries of the world playing colonial roles today can truly afford to pay a fair price for what they

need from less advantaged countries. Why not? It is the honest thing to do, and it results in less conflict and carnage.

Honesty demands that today's African leaders, rulers, their supporting elite and political class admit that whatever they are doing is not working. Ever since so-called Independence of African countries, Africa as a whole and especially in parts is being plunged deeper and deeper into the abyss and darkness. It is not for lack of will or lack of trying on the part of these classes: it is just because they are spending their effort on, and defending, a malignantly flawed structure designed as such by colonialists to work against Africans. It does not take much insight to realize that all African leaders have failed; and not much insight to make the connection that it is the system—the structure—which they have been defending that is the problem. As such, their defense of the source of the problem has become a problem of its own—a bigger problem which needs to be solved, by their first admitting such oversight and next, changing their behavior.

It takes simple honesty to understand that a person's natural identity is tied to his or her family and ethnicity; natural loyalty runs basically along the same lines. Of course, a person or groups of people may act otherwise, but it is always by choice and for a clearly advantageous and or beneficial realignment. But when coercion is involved, and the foisted artificial identity is not able to replace the genuine natural relationships, in the face of mounting problems, the wise course of action is to abandon the abstract creation for the natural—the real thing, because of obvious realities.

In "connecting" all these "honesty-dots," what is implied, and what results is that:

1) the natural sovereignty of each ethnic African nation is a reality to be restored and ratified.

2) the natural nationhood of each indigenous African nation is a reality and should be restored and respected

3) the natural Independence of each indigenous African nation is a reality which ought to be restored and recognized.

4) The natural choice of loyalty and the natural identity of Africans which thus far evidently run along family and ethnic lines is a reality which ought to be the accepted standard and norm for Africa.

5) Ongoing colonialism is unnecessary because parties can negotiate today with mutuality how to pay for and satisfy needs, between the needy and the supplier; and the costs are affordable.

When connected, these dots therefore map out a terrain where terrible Balkanization is thus defeated finally—and reversed; and colonialism is terminated for good. This constitutes a paradigm shift—for Africa and for the rest for the world.

Can this new paradigm be folded into a reality-envelope of practical ideology, and or a construct of tried and tested models applicable in the world today? This question is answered definitely in the affirmative by the respected body of work presented in "Fourth World Geopolitical Reader I: International Relations and Political Geography

between Nations and States”⁵ by Drs. R.C. Ryser & R.A. Griggs (Eds.). This primer formally introduces the terms, “Nations” (indigenous and natural sociopolitical units) and (versus) “States,” the political abstraction created by the peoples of a nation for the people’s governance; the primer goes on, among other subjects, to trace the history and life of Nations and (oftentimes, their own) States, their struggles and accommodations.

Borrowing from these concepts, one begins to see the original ethnic nations and groups in Africa as each a real sovereignty endowed with its own natural “nationhood,” properly referred to as a “Nation”; while what is commonly called a “country” is actually technically a “State,” that abstraction originally created by the colonial masters to rule, to govern and to represent the peoples—without the peoples’ input or consent, and today, run by indigenous African leaders. Drs. Ryser and Griggs describe many of the important dynamics and friction (including wars); and settlements between Nations and their own States or even other States, Nations and other Nations within or outside of the same State.

In this light, the problems of Africa can be seen and modeled as the age-old problem of Nations versus States. Each individual indigenous African Nation can resolve its problems with its State in a way that is most acceptable and most practical for that Nation, and the resultant accommodation preserves the natural rights of sovereignty and nationhood for the Nation, even if such a Nation submits to the subtending State, as compared to other outcomes such as outright self determination for the Nation leading to separation and independence from the State. Nation versus Nation issues can also be similarly modeled and resolved.

(Indigenous) Nations-versus-States definition and issues have become formalized under the moniker of “Fourth World”⁶; the Center for World Indigenous Studies (CWIS)⁷ is an organization in the forefront of extensive studies, education and research in these dynamics, and also, in protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. CWIS specializes in providing consultation and conflict resolution services and access to indigenous peoples’ knowledge and ideas⁸ working with this paradigm.

Without the “Fourth World” regime as noted above, the new paradigm for Africa would seem utopian, even naïve, but mostly impractical. But now, it is clear that this paradigm for rescuing Africa is practicable, because it is based on the ideology of Nations-versus-States, and there is an active and dynamic effort in place to evaluate and resolve such conflicts, with real examples of the trajectories of Nations and States engaged in similar conflicts, all incorporated into the “Fourth World” dynamics.

Gone are the days when Africa and the world should be looking up to old colonial masters to solve the problems of Africa. It is clear that while capable of imposing their

⁵ “Fourth World Geopolitical Reader I: International Relations and Political Geography between Nations and States”⁵ Ryser, R. (1995) R.C. Ryser & R.A. Griggs (Eds.). Center for World Indigenous Studies. Olympia, WA: DayKeeper Press.

⁶ Center for World Indigenous Studies (CWIS): <http://www.cwis.org>

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

wills with effectiveness on hapless African countries with camouflaged malevolent intent often disguised in patronage, these powers and principalities have not demonstrated any willingness to truly admit and face up to the root-cause of Africa's problems, of which they are the author. There is no longer any reason to listen to patronizing talk of "destabilization of Africa" (as if Africa was stable to start with), should any meaningful solutions be sought out and considered for Africa. No, Africans are not going to kill themselves all if allowed to seek out and sort out their own relationships based on their natural ethnic nationalities as the basic sociopolitical unit; after all, Africans, for all the aggression they are accused of, have never started or caused a World War or a continental war, or a large regional war. When they have, it is always because of the direct influence of colonization. And, the concerns about troubling major population shifts should Africa restructure are overblown; controlled settlements resulting in desirable restructuring using the Nations-Vs-States models will unlikely cause such population dislocations, because dealing with such issues will, of necessity, be included in the terms of any meaningful and serious settlement.

The world has watched behemoths such as USSR restructure drastically into its constituent Nations, and most Principalities encouraged and welcomed that. Yugoslavia went through drastic restructuring, and the world supported and accepted the Nations which were redeemed out of that troubled State. Just recently, the Nation of Cataluña finally got out of the State of Spain, the last of several States within which it objectingly and protestingly found itself in the last one thousand years or so.

Finally, the argument is often presented today that most States / countries are trying to unite, not split, and the example of the European Union (EU) is often cited. This is a false argument. The basis of EU is individual sovereign and independent nations or States which will never yield their sovereignty or independence or nationhood to the Union. In any case, Europe as a continent, for the most part, is functioning well—despite wars—unlike the continent of Africa; and the reason why Europe is functioning and stable is not because of EU, but because of strongly independent individual countries and sovereignties of even various sizes. EU is an economy-driven union, not a sociopolitical union. To the contrary, large unions in the world today are falling apart, or are so vulnerable and threatened—that's the trend.

We must begin to see Africa as a continent of indigenous Nations (Fourth World member) which needs to come to grips with the States originally imposed by colonialism and presently maintained by ignorant African leaders and sustained by force over the Nations. Sometimes these States subtend the Nations, at other times, the States add to the Balkanization split and burden of the Nations and keep them so hobbled. The self-evident natural order of things is that Nations initiate, form and sustain States to the extent that people in collectivity and for common purpose form governments; and not the other way around: the Indigenous Nations of Africa must be recognized as such and must be allowed to determine their States and or what relationship they want to have with pre-existing States. The natural loyalty and identity of Africans is with their ethnic Nations: this is incontrovertible; forcing them to give this up for State-identity has been tried and is currently being practiced, but this has not worked. African leaders must wake up and understand that there is no longer an excuse for ignorance leading to, and or, the defense of oppressive colonial programs.

There are now identifiable “Fourth World” resources and mechanisms available to aid the indigenous Nations of Africa with achieving their goals vis-à-vis the States. These resources need to be supported, expanded and tapped into. There are also real models—of success; and of failures which offer redeeming lessons. Since erstwhile colonial powers can definitely afford to pay fair market prices for what they need, the ongoing use of colonial tactics and plans and mentality to procure their State needs should stop: the practice is dishonest.

Speaking of which, “honesty is the best policy”⁹, still. Honesty, in fact, is the key to solving Africa’s problems. The entire world, ex-colonial masters, African leaders, Africa’s elite and political /ruling class—all must commit to honesty and its practice. As do the common Africans. Honesty is natural: it will help us see the natural things and lead us to do the natural things using natural tools.

In summary, the paradigm shift which brings resolution to “Africa’s Problem” allows for the root-issue and the different components thereof to be addressed and solved successfully in a civilized manner. To the extent that colonialism is / was the major author and driver of that Africa’s Problem (and it undeniably was and still is), understanding the real motivation and goals of colonialism and addressing them is a forte of this new paradigm. Surprisingly, a motto as simple (but powerful) as: *“Pay the fair market price, negotiated mutually between the relevant parties, for your needs”* takes care of the primal driver for colonialism, especially now that it is quite obvious that colonial powers can afford fair payment for their needs. This is not naïve: it simply is about honesty, of which even a tiny dose goes a long way in bringing enlightened solutions. The destructive engine of Balkanization, exposed for what it is, is taken care of in several ways, in this fresh paradigm. Firstly, African leadership, rulership and even the masses have their eyes opened as to the fact that thus far, they have defended and are defending a horrific program implanted by colonialism, a program whose only goal is to spirit away Africa’s natural—and yes, even human—resources and deposit them on the shores of the colonial masters, nor matter the cost to Africa. Not only that, since that program was specifically designed to keep Africans fighting among themselves, in the first place, retaining and defending it means that there will never be stability in Africa. It is thus in Africa’s best interest to abort the support of that construct. Second, the partitions based on colonial Balkanization principle will no longer be accepted or respected, choosing instead the natural sociopolitical groupings based on natural indigenous sovereignty and nationhood as the sovereign unit. The restoration of these natural sovereignties and nationhoods also restores the dignity and right of choice and of self determination of indigenous African Nations, allowing them what was earlier taken away from them, without their consent, by colonialism, with such a denial now defended and maintained by ignorant post-colonial African leadership.

The new paradigm goes ahead to locate these issues within the natural and well-developed dynamics and framework of “Nations Versus States,” a universal human dynamics not peculiar to just Africa, but applicable to the entire world. Thus, the Africa Problem is seen for what it really is: (Indigenous African) Nations Versus States—States subtending and or foisted over them without their prior consent. Placing Africa Problem within this framework ensures the success of the paradigm, because,

⁹ Original author unknown.

clearly, there are models for solutions at various levels and with various endpoints with mutually satisfactory resolution for both the Nations and States in question. And there are resources and help available! (See Footnote # 5). This natural and human dynamics and framework has been captured by the new movement, "Fourth World."

"Fourth World" has found a visible cause within its alley: Africa. And, Africa, huge as it is, presents at least one point of entry and starting engagement: Biafra-Nigeria (a subject for another discourse). Can "Fourth World" step up at this time, and take charge? Nothing will promote the existence of "Fourth World" and its functions as "the case for Africa" will, should it formalize its involvement therein. Obviously, that is the recommendation of this author.

In conclusion, the true nature and Spirit of Africa is diversity and stark variegation: attempting to blunt that in any way shows, not wisdom but, dire small-mindedness. The Indigenous Nations of Africa, by their natural constitution, embody that natural diversity; the few man-made forced States offend such Spirit. To do the honest thing is our moral task for today, for the sake of Africa and its peoples; and yes, for the sake of even the entire world.

Submitted by:
Oguchi Nkwocha, MD.
A Biafran Citizen.
Associate Scholar, Center for World Indigenous Studies (CWIS)

February 10, 2006.
Responses and correspondences to: oguchi@mbay.net

Understanding Aymara Perspectives on Development

Amy Eisenburg, Ph.D.
© 2006 Amy Eisenburg

*(Editor's Note: Dr. Eisenburg undertook a study conducted with the Aymara Indians of the northern Chilean Andes, from November 1998 through January 1999, in an attempt to understand Aymara perspectives about Chilean state initiated development within their ancestral homeland. She designed her study as participatory action research intended to engage Aymara people directly in the assessment of their cultural and natural resources along an altitudinal gradient from the coastal city of Arica to the Altiplano, the high plateau at Lago Chungara. The following essay is excerpted from her full study that holds the title: **AYMARA PERSPECTIVES: ETHNOECOLOGICAL STUDIES IN ANDEAN COMMUNITIES OF NORTHERN CHILE***

This interdisciplinary study in Arid Lands Resource Sciences draws upon the fields of ethnoecology, American Indian studies, applied cultural anthropology, botany, agriculture, history, physical and cultural geography, and social and environmental impact assessment. Ethnographic interviews with Aymara people were conducted in sixteen Aymara villages along an altitudinal transect from sea level to 4600 meters. A systematic social and environmental impact assessment was executed along International Chilean Highway 11, which connects Arica, Chile with the highlands of Bolivia.

For Andean people, economic, spiritual and social life, are inextricably tied to land and water. The Chilean Aymara comprise a small, geographically isolated minority of Tarapaca, the northern border region, who are struggling to maintain their sustainable and traditional systems of irrigation waters distribution, agriculture and pastoralism in one of the most arid regions of the world, the Atacama Desert. Ethnoecological

dimensions of the conflict between rapid economic growth and a sensitive cultural and natural resource base are explored through participatory research methods. The recent paving of Chilean Highway 11, the diversion of Altiplano waters of the Rio Lauca to the arid coast for hydroelectricity and irrigation, and Chilean national park policies regarding Aymara communities, their natural resources and cultural properties within Parque Nacional Lauca, the International Biosphere Reserve, are examined from the perspectives of the Aymara people. The potentiality of indigenous resource management of this protected area is discussed within the context of human-land reciprocal relations.

The findings of this study, based on Aymara Indian perspectives, are designed to aid in understanding and appreciating the cosmological vision, and the needs of Andean communities in the poorest province of Chile. The Aymara showed great interest in having their perspectives and cultural concerns expressed and incorporated into historic and cultural preservation legislation.

Achieving a research conclusion is an undertaking in which an attempt is made to reveal the study in its full perspective. It is a return to an overview of the data in search of an organic form that will allow transcendence of the limitations of specifics without disregarding the systematized processes of science, and consequently the loss of scientific responsibility. The ideal analysis process permits the data to lead to its own conclusions (Collier and Collier 1986:172, 205). For effective and empowering participatory social and environmental impact assessment, which addresses the marginalization and disempowerment that often accompanies development projects, there must be a strong element of community involvement in conjunction with monitoring, in order to serve the

long-term interests and ethical concerns of the Aymara people. In the literature on social and environmental impact assessment, it is widely acknowledged that consultative impact studies can provide means of equipping communities to manage change more effectively, equitably and sustainably. Aymara communities should be involved in the scoping, designing, researching, reporting and decision-making processes regarding project development within their cultural landscape. Social and environmental impact assessment guidelines need to be implemented and enforced.

In the Andean Region of Tarapaca, the impact assessment process was not integrated into project development and regional planning, nor were Aymara communities consulted prior to project initiation and advancement. Politics and bureaucratic protectiveness resulted in their exclusion, yet principles of law, equity and scientific methodology uphold their inclusion and participation. The Chilean government, development contractors and regional planners did not acknowledge, support or respond to the impact assessment process. The unresponsiveness of developmentalist Chilean society reflects a long history of domination, differing perspectives, values and competing goals of various stakeholders. Decision-making agencies often regard social and environmental impact assessment as threatening, disruptive and as an obstacle to project development. Ultimately, when social and environmental impact assessment is properly conducted development firms and government agencies will profit economically in the long run from a more positive social environment for their work. A fundamental principle of project evaluation and management, which is not represented in the Chilean legislative framework or development management practices, is taking action to ensure

that sustainable development benefits to the Aymara communities that face disruption and disturbance are forthcoming. Inclusion of this basic tenet in the statutory framework implicated in evaluation of development proposals in the extreme north might have reduced or possibly avoided some of the negative impacts encountered by Aymara communities of Tarapaca today.

Social and environmental impact assessment can be an important instrument for protection of the rights and traditions of indigenous people in the face of rapid resource development. The foundations of social and environmental impact assessment articulate a distinct concern for human rights, justice and accountability. The challenge of tying prodevelopment policies and processes with the enhancement of indigenous rights is a critical issue currently facing Chile's developing democracy. Aymara land and resource rights, cultural heritage protection, and respect and regard for ceremonial places and practices in this study all concern the ethical question of human rights. The development of International Chilean Highway 11, the creation of Parque Nacional Lauca and the diversion of the Rio Lauca for hydroelectricity and irrigation on the arid coast have a highly politicized history. See Chapter VI Social and Environmental Impact Assessment for an in depth review of this discussion. For sound planning and development, and good governance, it is requisite that decision-makers and land managers have a clear and sophisticated understanding of development projects and the cultural and biophysical landscape in which the undertaking will become a part (Howitt and Jackson 2000:269).

Andean Region I of northern Chile is a multiethnic society, in which Aymara people are a significant culturally and economically important indigenous community. It

is therefore imperative that social and environmental impact assessment of development projects in the extreme north adopt a multicultural definition of environment, which recognizes that various cultural groups define, utilize, value and construct meaning of landscape in different ways. An Andean controlled and directed social and environmental impact assessment will offer the most accurate evaluation of affected areas considered highly significant by the Aymara people. How successful the Aymara will fare in implementing their impact mitigation, management and compensation recommendations remains to be seen.

Critical concerns of Aymara people that were identified in this study include water quality and availability, land and sacred site protection, animal safety, resource management, employment, betterment of health and hygienic facilities, education and training opportunities, tourism and respect for Aymara cultural traditions and livelihood, consultation, compensation, enhancement and support for sustainable agropastoral systems and economic improvement and assistance. It is essential that the tensions, which exist between Aymara priorities and development imperatives, be addressed symmetrically. The Andean Region of Tarapaca, rich in social, economic and cultural activity, is a complex, living landscape with a long history. Development within the Aymara cultural landscape without consultation with Aymara people affects their life experience and future aspirations. Compensation for damage and loss of resources has not been addressed by government planners and decision-makers. Aymara people clearly experience great hardship, distress and disturbance in accepting the disruption and damage of their traditional cultural and natural properties, while government agencies

have not assumed responsibility for these significant impacts. Many of the identified impacts appear to fall between statutory responsibilities of Chilean authorities.

Oftentimes, numerous economic development problems have their roots in the sectoral fragmentation of responsibility. Sustainable development necessitates that such fragmentation be overcome (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:63). Regional and local solutions are fundamental to prevent further exacerbation of negative project effects. The Aymara have the right to be compensated for the disturbance and destruction caused by highway development, water appropriation and exclusive national park policies that do not include support for traditional Aymara pastoralism or address protection for Aymara herds. The failure to address the issue of compensation has affected relationships between government agencies and Aymara communities. A common model utilized in a number of countries is for compensation to be negotiated or adjudicated.

The development of International Chilean Highway 11, the creation of Parque Nacional Lauca and the diversion of the Rio Lauca for irrigation and hydroelectricity were meant to expand economic activities such as mining, tourism, agriculture and international commerce in the Region of Tarapaca. The assumption that regional economic benefits of these development projects outweigh the social, cultural, political or economic burdens on local Andean communities is largely false. In Chile, existing colonial patterns of development have marginalized indigenous people through inappropriate planning and entrenched structural racism. It remains a difficult task of documentation and diplomacy to shift entrenched values and promote open dialogue to

implement the study's recommendations for community participation, while addressing Aymara concerns in an ongoing way to meet international practice standards for social and environmental impact assessment. Negotiated settlement arrangements and governmental commitments are key in the consultation process, which completely excluded Aymara communities of Tarapaca. However, it is not too late to include the very people and communities that are directly affected by externally imposed development projects within their cultural landscape. Effective monitoring of cultural resources involves commitment and empowerment of Aymara communities to respond to issues as they arise, while their reported concerns must be heard, considered and valued by regional authorities. The most effective way to sustain an ongoing relationship with Aymara people is through consistent feedback on the status of their cultural resources. American Indian people respond positively to being involved in impact assessment consultation and decision-making regarding their traditional resources (Stoffle 2000:215-216).

The impacts of development projects within the Aymara cultural landscape were identified, assessed and evaluated through the perceptions of the Aymara people. The findings lead us to conclude that there have been serious disruptions in the social fabric of highland Aymara communities caused by the construction of International Chilean Highway 11, the diversion and canalization of the Rio Lauca for hydroelectricity and irrigation on the coast, and the creation of Parque Nacional Lauca. There exist multiple and cumulative impacts caused by these interrelated resource development projects. Environmental transformation and unilaterally imposed policies place severe constraints

on the ability of the Aymara community to prevent, ameliorate or endure the extent and severity of impacts on their lands, resources and community life. Alteration of the biophysical and human environments of these communities are significant and adverse. There is a need for Chilean government agencies and industry to accept some measure of responsibility for the social and environmental effects of their projects. Aymara land and water rights should be legally defined and Aymara rights to a degree of internal control and protection of their territory should be set down in Chilean law. The Chilean government has shown itself unwilling to recognize the Aymara's rights to participate in determining a future that is consonant with their history and traditions. Aymara communities have the right to participate in all projects undertaken within their cultural landscape.

Participatory ethnographic assessment has the potential for contributing substantively to recognizing the systemic institutional relations and processes that must change in order to redress past injustices visited upon disadvantaged and marginalized peoples because of ill-conceived notions of culture. Placing impact assessment within a cultural framework directs analysis toward resolving conflicts concerning the distribution of burdens and benefits. The responsibility of the researcher is to ensure that assumptions and uncertainties are clearly articulated and community concerns are recognized. It is essential that Aymara perspectives become part of the information base for decision-making, mitigation, monitoring and influencing land-management legislation in their traditional landscape. Relations between Chilean government agencies and Andean people have a long history that is often recounted as bitter or adversarial. It is important

that there be respectful and constructive communication and power sharing between Aymara communities and Chilean authorities. The Aymara are highly knowledgeable about their traditional resources, and because of their proximity and intimacy with the resources, specialized knowledge and daily experiences, they are acutely aware of factors that have adverse or positive impacts on their conservation. Chilean government agency land managers in the Andes could clearly benefit from an Aymara cultural and natural resource management and monitoring plan. The desired outcome of negotiated quality consultation between the Aymara and Chilean government agencies is a stable and lasting productive partnership, which requires mutual respect, shared power and means for sustaining an ongoing long-term relationship. Such an alliance can be established through mutual trust, a common foundation of understanding and knowledge, and the conception and implementation of a cultural resource management and monitoring plan (Stoffle 2000: 212-213).

Social and environmental impact assessment, as a highly evaluative field of applied anthropology is a significant constituent of the planning process that was completely absent in the development scheme in Andean Tarapaca. Impact assessment is specifically aimed at improving the quality of communication, minimizing risk of conflict between developers, proponents and local communities, and anticipating and diminishing adverse impacts, while seeking to manage change responsibly and sustainably. Clearly, social and environmental impact assessment has the capacity to influence the policy decision-making process by encouraging affected community participation. It engenders a series of ethical relationships that emerge from the association between the investigator

and the people of the affected communities. Of single most importance is engaging and collaborating with the involved communities in order to strengthen their capacity-building efforts. The analyst must orient to the overarching concerns that are in the best interest of the communities at risk. The Code of Ethics of the International Association for Impact Assessment states that the integrity of the natural environment and the health, safety and welfare of the human community shall at all times be placed above any commitment to sectoral or private interests. It is the professional responsibility of the researcher to give something back to the participants and collaborators for their input and assistance in the study. There is an explicit need for the investigator to ensure that there be a forum process attended by all stakeholders, which has as its definitive agenda the objective of discussing the study findings. Mitigation and impact management need to be established to minimize or offset the adverse impacts, and be incorporated into a social and environmental management plan. Ongoing consultation, impact monitoring and mitigation are the surest way to continued satisfaction between all stakeholders (Goldman and Baum 2000:14-27).

This chapter includes some pertinent recommendations and delineates an approach to impact assessment that if accepted, could permit the Aymara their rightful voice in the development of their cultural and natural resources.

ARUSKIPASIPXAÑANAKASAKIPUNIRAKİSPAWA

We are human beings, hence we must communicate.

The Aymara believe in the unity of humankind and that only as one can we make this earth a good place for all of us. To make the earth a good place for all of humankind

requires understanding and appreciation for the vast varieties of language and culture that we, as people have developed through time (Hardman 1981:16). According to the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987:44, 65, 348), the strategy for sustainable development aims to promote harmony among human beings and between humanity and nature. A proposed legal principle is that all human beings have the fundamental right to an environment that will sustain their health and well-being (Figure 70). “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” It necessitates meeting the basic needs of all and extending and ensuring to all equitable opportunities to satisfy their aspirations for a better life.

REFERENCES

- Adelson, Laurie and Arthur Tracht
1983 *Aymara Weavings: Ceremonial Textiles of Colonial and 19th Century Bolivia*.
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution.
- Albo, Xavier
1996 *The Aymara Religious Experience*. *In The Indian Face of God in Latin America*
Manuel M. Marzal, Eugenio Maurer, Xavier Albo and Bartomeu Melia, eds. Pp.119-
167. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Aldunate, Carlos, Juan J. Armesto, Victoria Castro, and Carolina Villagran
1983 *Ethnobotany of Pre-Andean Community in the Andes of Northern Chile*.
Economic Botany 37(1):120-135.
- Allaby, Michael
1992 *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Botany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allison, Marvin J.

1990 Paleopathology. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp.49-61. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Anabalón, Carlos

1999 Ejército Reconoce 250 Mil Minas En Territorio Chileno. *Nacional Cronica*, 26 de Noviembre:17: 3a.

Anderson, Kenneth N., Lois E. Anderson, and Walter D. Glanze

1998 *Mosby's Medical, Nursing, & Allied Health Dictionary*. St. Louis, Missouri: Mosby Publishers.

Aronson, James

1990 Desert Plants of Use and Charm From Northern Chile. *Desert Plants* 10(2):65-85.

Arratia, Maria-Ines, and Isabel de la Maza

1997 Grounding a Long-Term Ideal: Working With the Aymara For Community Development. *In* *Nurtured By Knowledge: Learning To Do Participatory Action-Research*. Susan E. Smith, Dennis G. Willms and Nancy A. Johnson, eds. Pp.111-137. New York: Apex Press.

Aylwin, Jose

2000 Indigenous Rights – A Comparison of Canada and Chile. Electronic document. <http://www.derechoschile.com/english/featu/featu9.htm>.

Baied, Carlos A., and Jane C. Wheeler

1993 Evolution of High Andean Puna Ecosystems: Environment, Climate, and Culture Change Over the Last 12,000 Years in the Central Andes. *Mountain Research and Development* 13(2):145-156.

Barton, Sara A., Nelida Castro Williams, Ita Barja, and Federico Murillo

1990 Nutritional Characteristics of the Aymara of Northern Chile. *In* *The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment*. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 63-74. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Bastien, Joseph W.

1973 *Qollahuaya Rituals: An Ethnographic Account of the Symbolic Relations of Man and Land in an Andean Village*. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.

Bastien, Joseph W.

1978 *Mountain of the Condor: Metaphor and Ritual in an Andean Ayllu*. New York: West Publishing Company.

- Bastien, Joseph W.
1987 *Healers of the Andes: Kallawaya Herbalists and Their Medicinal Plants*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Belmonte, Eliana
1998 *Flores del Extremo Norte de Chile*. Arica, Chile: Universidad de Tarapaca, Departamento Arqueologia y Museologia San Miguel de Azapa.
- Benoit C., Ivan L.
1989 *Libro Rojo de la Flora Terrestre de Chile*. Santiago: Corporacion Nacional Forestal.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1982 *Natural Resources in an Andean Pastoral Economy: The Aymara of Parinacota*. M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1983 *Chilean Parkland Harbors Wildlife*. *Times of the Americas*, August 3:16-17.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1985a *Tierra, Trabajo y Ganaderia Indigena en La Economia Regional de Arica*. *Revista Chungara* 15:151-167.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1985b *El Desarrollo de Recursos Hidrologicos del Altiplano Ariqueño y su Impacto Sobre la Economia Ganadera de la Zona*. *Revista Chungara* 14:169-181.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1986 *Campesinos and Conservation in the Central Andes: Indigenous Herding and Conservation of the Vicuña*. *Environmental Conservation* 13(4):311-318.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1991 *Review of La Lucha por el Agua de los Aymaras del Norte de Chile*, by Jaap Lemereis. *Hispanic American Historical Review* 71 (February 1991):193.
- Bernhardson, Wayne
1997 *Chile and Easter Island*. Hawthorn, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.
- Berthelot, Jean
1986 *The Extraction of Precious Metals*. In *Anthropological History of Andean Polities*. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 69-88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bertonio, P. Ludovico
1612 Transcripcion del Vocabulario de la Lengua Aymara. La Paz, Bolivia:
Biblioteca del Pueblo Aymara.
- Binford, Michael W., and Alan L. Kolata
1996 The Natural and Human Setting. *In* Tiwanaku and Its Hinterland: Archaeology
and Paleoecology in an Andean Civilization. Alan L. Kolata, ed. Pp. 23-56.
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Borchard, Edwin M.
1920 Opinion on the Controversy Between Peru and Chile Known as the Question of
the Pacific. Washington, D.C.
- Borgel O., Reynaldo
1973 The Coastal Desert of Chile. *In* Coastal Deserts: Their Natural and Human
Environments. David H. K. Amiran, and Andrew W. Wilson, eds. Pp. 111-114.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Bourque, L. Nicole
1995 Developing People and Plants: Life-Cycle and Agricultural Festivals in the
Andes. *Ethnology* 34(1):75-88.
- Bouysson-Cassagne, Therese
1986 *Urco* and *Uma*: Aymara Concepts of Space. *In* Anthropological History of
Andean Polities. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 201-
227. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bravo, Ruben
2000 La Codeff Defiende el Parque Lauca. *Las Ultimas Noticias*, February 26:4.
- Briggs, Lucy T.
1981a Politeness in Aymara Language and Culture. *In* The Aymara Language in Its
Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language
And Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 90-113. Gainesville: University Presses of
Florida.
- Briggs, Lucy T.
1981b Aymarization: An Example of Language Change. *In* The Aymara Language in
Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara
Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 127-145. Gainesville: University
Presses of Florida.
- Briggs, Lucy T. and Nora C. England
1981 Linguistics and Foreign Aid. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and

Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 282-293. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Browman, David L.

1984 Pastoralism and Development in High Andean Arid Lands. *Journal of Arid Environments* 7:313-328.

Browman, David L.

1987 Introduction: Risk Management in Andean Arid Lands. *In Arid Land Use Strategies and Risk Management in the Andes. A Regional Anthropological Perspective.* David L. Browman, ed. Pp. 1-23. Boulder: Westview Press.

Browman, David L.

1987 Pastoralism in Highland Peru and Bolivia. *In Arid Land Use Strategies and Risk Management in the Andes. A Regional Anthropological Perspective.* David L. Browman, ed. Pp. 121-149. Boulder: Westview Press.

Brown, Paul F.

1987 Economy, Ecology and Population: Recent Changes in Peruvian Aymara Land Use Patterns. *In Arid Land Use Strategies and Risk Management in the Andes: A Regional Anthropological Perspective.* David L. Browman, ed. Pp. 99-120. Boulder: Westview Press.

Brush, Stephen B.

2000 Ethnoecology, Biodiversity, and Modernization in Andean Potato Agriculture. *In Ethnobotany: A Reader.* Paul E. Minnis, ed. Pp. 283-306. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

Buechler, Hans C. and Judith-Maria Buechler

1971 *The Bolivian Aymara.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Burdge, Rabel J.

1994 *A Conceptual Approach to Social Impact Assessment.* Wisconsin: Social Ecology Press.

Burdge, Rabel J.

1995 *A Community Guide To Social Impact Assessment.* Middleton, WI: Social Ecology Press.

Burdge, Rabel J., and Frank Vanclay

1995 *Social Impact Assessment.* *In Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.* Frank Vanclay, and Daniel Bronstein, eds. Pp. 31-65. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Castellaro G., Giorgio, Cristian Gajardo A., Victor H. Parraguez G., Roberto Rojas, and Luis Raggi S.

1998 Productividad de un Rebano de Camelidos Sudamericanos Domesticos en un Sector de la Provincia de Parinacota, Chile: I. Variacion Estacional de la Composicion Botanica, Disponibilidad de Materia Seca, Valor Pastoral y Valor Nutritivo de los Bofedales. *Agricultura Tecnica (Chile)* 58(3):191-204.

Castro, Milka, Carolina Villagran, and Mary Kalin Arroyo

1982 Estudio Etnobotanico en la Precordillera y Altiplano de Los Andes del Norte de Chile (18-19° S). *In* "El Hombre y Los Ecosistemas de Montana". *Man and the Biosphere Programme-6: El Ambiente Natural y Las Poblaciones Humanas de Los Andes del Norte Grande de Chile (Arica, Lat. 18°28'S)*. Volumen I, La Vegetacion y Los Vertebrados Inferiores de Los Pisos Altitudinales Entre Arica y El Lago Chungara. Alberto Veloso M., and Eduardo Bustos-O., eds. Pp. 133-203. Santiago: Unesco.

Castro, Milka, Alberto Veloso, and Eduardo Bustos

1984 The Chilean Altiplano: Natural Environment and Socio-Cultural Traits of the Aymara Population. *In Ecology in Practice, Part II: The Social Response*. F.Di Castri, F.W.G. Baker, and M. Hadley, eds. Pp. 212-217. Dublin: Tycooly International Publishing Limited.

Castro Lucic, Milka

1982 Socioculturales de Subsistencia en Las Comunidades Aymaras Altoandinas, en El Interior de la Provincia de Arica, Parinacota. *In* "El Hombre y Los Ecosistemas de Montana". *Man and the Biosphere Program-6: El Ambiente Natural y Las Poblaciones Humanas de Los Andes del Norte Grande de Chile (Arica, Lat. 18°28'S)*. Volumen I, La Vegetacion y Los Vertebrados Inferiores de Los Pisos Altitudinales Entre Arica y El Lago Chungara. Alberto Veloso M., and Eduardo Bustos-O., eds. Pp. 99-132. Santiago: Unesco.

Centro de Investigacion de la Realidad del Norte-CIREN

1985 Cartilla de Salud Aymara: Hierba Medicinales. Iquique, Chile: Montero Impresores S.A.

Collier, Jr., John, and Malcolm Collier

1986 *Visual Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method*. Albuquerque University of New Mexico Press.

Collins, Jane L.

1988 *Unseasonal Migrations: The Effects of Rural Labor Scarcity in Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Copana Yapita, Pedro

1981 Linguistics and Education in Rural Schools Among the Aymara. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 255-261. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo Indigena

1993 Ley Indigena. Arica, Chile: Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo Indigena.

Corporacion Nacional Forestal

1986 Plan de Manejo del Parque Nacional Lauca. Tarapaca, Chile: Ministerio de Agricultura, Corporacion Nacional Forestal.

Custred, Glynn

1981 Applied Linguistics and National Integration: Some Proposals for the Case of Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 271-281. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Daniele, Claudio, Marcelo Acerbi, and Sebastian Carenzo

1999 Biosphere Reserve Implementation: The Latin American Experience. Working Papers No. 25, Paris: Unesco (South-South Cooperation Programme).

Dennis, William Jefferson

1967 Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru Boundary Dispute and the Arbitrations by the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Devres Incorporated

1980 Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Low Volume Rural Roads-A Review of the Literature. A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 7. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.

Diaz, Biffret, Daniel Gallegos, Federico Murillo, Vivian Lunny Lenart, William H. Weidman, and Robert I. Goldsmith

1990 Disease and Disability Among the Aymara. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 101-131. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Dobyns Henry F.

1963 An Outline of Andean Epidemic History to 1720. *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 37(6):493-515.

- Dobyns, Henry F., Paul L. Doughty, and Harold D. Lasswell
1964 Peasants, Power, and Applied Social Change. London: Sage Publications.
- Dobyns, Henry F., and Paul L. Doughty
1976 Peru: A Cultural History. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dougnac R., Fernando
1975 La Legislacion Aplicable a Los Indigenas Del Norte de Chile. Norte Grande
Vol. 1(3-4):437-444.
- Dove, Michael R.
1996 Center, Periphery, and Biodiversity: A Paradox of Governance and a
Development Challenge. *In Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and
Intellectual Property Rights*. Stephen B. Brush and Doreen Stabinsky, eds. Pp. 41-
62. Washington D.C.: Island Press.
- Ellenberg, H.
1979 Man's Influence on Tropical Mountain Ecosystems in South America. *Journal of
Ecology* 67:401-416.
- Finsterbusch, Kurt
1995 In Praise of SIA-A Personal Review of the Field of Social Impact Assessment:
Feasibility, Justification, History, Methods, Issues. *Impact Assessment* 13:229-252.
- Flores, Hector E., and Tere Flores
1997 Biology and Biochemistry of Underground Plant Storage Organs. *In
Functionality of Food Phytochemicals*. Timothy Johns and John T. Romeo, eds.
Pp. 113-132. New York: Plenum Press.
- Flores-Ochoa, Jorge A.
1968 Pastoralists of the Andes: The Alpaca Herders of Paratia. Philadelphia: Institute
for the Study of Human Issues, Inc.
- Flores Ochoa, Jorge A.
1986 The Classification and Naming of South American Camelids. *In
Anthropological History of Andean Polities*. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and
Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 137-148. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Forbes, David
1870 On The Aymara Indians of Bolivia and Peru. *Journal of the Ethnological
Society of London* 2:193-305.
- Ford, Richard I.
1998 Ethnoecology Serving the Community. A Case from Zuni Pueblo, New Mexico.

In Ethnoecology: Situated Knowledge/Located Lives. Virginia D. Nazarea, ed. Pp. 71-91. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

Freudenburg, William R.

1986 Social Impact Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 12:451-478.

Gade, Daniel W.

1969 The Llama, Alpaca and Vicuña: Fact Vs. Fiction. *Journal of Geography* 58(6):339-343.

Gajardo, Rodolfo

1994 *La Vegetacion Natural de Chile: Clasificacion y Distribucion Geografica.* Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.

Gifford, Douglas

1986 Time Metaphors in Aymara and Quechua. Center for Latin American Linguistic Studies Working Paper No.16:1-7. St. Andrews: University of St. Andrews.

Gifford, Ernest M., and Adriance S. Foster

1989 *Morphology of Vascular Plants.* New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Glade, Alfonso C., and Eduardo Nunez Araya

1983 Resumen de Antecedentes de Flora y Fauna en la I Region de Tarapaca. Arica: Corporacion Nacional Forestal.

Glade, Alfonso A.

1993 Red List of Chilean Terrestrial Vertebrates. Santiago: Corporacion Nacional Forestal.

Glassner, Martin Ira

1970 The Rio Lauca: Dispute Over an International River. *Geographical Review* 60: 192-207.

Goldman, Laurence and Scott Baum

2000 Introduction. *In Social Impact Assessment. An Applied Anthropology Manual.* Laurence R. Goldman, ed. Pp. 1-31. Oxford: Berg.

Gonzalez, Gustavo

1998 Chile Nature Reserve Threatened By Mining Interests. *InterPress Service,* December 21:1-3.

Greider, Thomas and Lorraine Garkovich

1994 Landscape: The Social Construction of Nature and the Environment. *Rural Sociology* 59(1):1-24.

- Halmo, David B., Richard W. Stoffle, and Michael J. Evans
1993 Paitu Nanasuagaindu Pahonupi (*Three Sacred Valleys*): *Cultural Significance of Gosiute, Paiute, and Ute Plants*. *Human Organization* 52(2):142-150.
- Hardman, Martha J.
1981 Introductory Essay. *In The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture*. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 3-17. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
- Hardman, Martha J.
1996 The Sexist Circuits of English. *The Humanist* March/April:25-32.
- Hardman, Martha J.
1997 Humanizing Science. *The Humanist* 57(2):32-35.
- Hardman, Martha J.
2001 Aymara. *LINCOM Studies in Native American Linguistics* 35. Muenchen: LINCOM EUROPA.
- Harris, Olivia
1985 Ecological Duality and the Role of the Center: Northern Potosi. *In Andean Ecology and Civilization. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 311-335. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Healy, Kevin
1996 Ethnodevelopment of Indigenous Bolivian Communities: Emerging Paradigms. *In Tiwanaku and Its Hinterland: Archaeology and Paleoecology in an Andean Civilization*. Alan L. Kolata, ed. Pp. 241-263. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Heywood, V.H.
1985 *Flowering Plants of the World*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.
- Hickman, John
1998 *News From The End of The Earth: A Portrait of Chile*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hickman, John Marshall
1963 *The Aymara of Chinchera, Peru: Persistence and Change in a Bicultural Context*. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.
- Hough, John
1991 Social Impact Assessment: Its Role in Protected Area Planning and Management. *In Resident Peoples and National Parks: Social Dilemmas and*

Strategies in International Conservation. Patrick C. West, and Steven R. Brechin, eds. Pp. 274-283. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Howitt, Richard and Sue Jackson

2000 Social Impact Assessment and Linear Projects. *In* Social Impact Analysis. An Applied Anthropology Manual. Laurence R. Goldman, ed. Pp. 257-294. Oxford: Berg.

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas

1999 Compendio Estadístico 1999. Santiago, Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas.

Inter-American Development Bank

1998 Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 1998-1999 Report. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

International Association for Impact Assessment and Institute of Environmental Assessment

1998 Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment Best Practice. United Kingdom: International Association for Impact Assessment.

International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

1998 Biosphere Reserves – Myth or Reality? Proceedings of the Workshop on Biosphere Reserves. World Conservation Congress, Montreal 1996. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN

Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment

1994 Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Technical Memo. National Marine Fisheries Service-F/SPO-16, 29 p.

Johns, Timothy

1990 The Origins of Human Diet and Medicine: Chemical Ecology. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Johns, Timothy

1998 Plant Constituents and the Nutrition and Health of Indigenous Peoples. *In* Ethnoecology: Situated Knowledge/Located Lives. Virginia D. Nazarea, ed. Pp. 157-172. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Johnsson, Mick

1986 Food and Culture Among Bolivian Aymara. Symbolic Expressions of Social Relations. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology 7. Uppsala: Motala Grafiska.

Julien, Catherine J.

1985 Guano and Resource Control in Sixteenth-Century Arequipa. *In* *Andean Ecology and Civilization: An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 185-231. Japan: University of Tokyo Press.

Kalin Arroyo, Mary T., Francisco A. Squeo, Juan J. Armento, and Carolina Villagran
1988 Effects of Aridity on Plant Diversity in the Northern Chilean Andes: Results of a Natural Experiment. *Annals of the Missouri Botanical Garden* 75:55-78.

Kehoe, Alice B.

1996 Participant Observation with the Lakaya Centro de Madres. *In* *Tiwanaku and Its Hinterland: Archaeology and Paleoecology of an Andean Civilization*. Alan L. Kolata, ed. Pp. 231-239. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Keller, Robert H., and Michael F. Turek

1998 *American Indians and National Parks*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Kempf, Elizabeth

1993 *The Law of the Mother. Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Protected Areas*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

King, Steven R., Thomas J. Carlson, and Katy Moran

1996 Biological Diversity, Indigenous Knowledge, Drug Discovery, and Intellectual Property Rights. *In* *Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights*. Stephen B. Brush and Doreen Stabinsky, eds. Pp. 167-186. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Kolata, Alan L.

1993 *The Tiwanaku: Portrait of an Andean Civilization*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Kolata, Alan L.

1996a *Valley of the Spirits: A Journey into the Lost Realm of the Aymara*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Kolata, Alan L.

1996b *Tiwanaku and Its Hinterland: Archaeology and Paleoecology of an Andean Civilization*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Kott, A., R. Gaupp, and G. Wornier

1995 Miocene to Recent History of the Western Altiplano in Northern Chile Revealed by Lacustrine Sediments of the Lauca Basin (18°15'-18°40'S/69°30'-69°05'W).

Geologische Rundschau 84(4):770-780.

Kottak, Conrad Phillip

1990 Culture and "Economic Development". *American Anthropologist* 92(3):723-731.

Kubler, George

1952 The Indian Caste of Peru, 1795-1940. A Population Study Based Upon Tax Records and Census Reports. Smithsonian Institution Institute of Social Anthropology Publication 14. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

Kuznar, Lawrence A.

1991 Herd Composition in an Aymara Community of the Peruvian Altiplano: A Linear Programming Problem. *Human Ecology* 19(3):369-387.

La Barre, Weston.

1947 Potato Taxonomy Among the Aymara Indians of Bolivia. *Acta Americana* 5:83-103.

La Barre, Weston

1948 The Aymara Indians of the Lake Titicaca Plateau. *American Anthropologist* 50(1):1-250.

La Barre, Weston

1950 Aymara Folktales. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 16:40-45.

La Barre, Weston

1951 Aymara Biologicals and Other Medicines. *Journal of American Folklore* 64(252):171-178.

La Barre, Weston

1959 Materia Medica of the Aymara, Lake Titicaca Plateau, Bolivia. *Webbia* 15(1):47-94.

Leitch, William C.

1990 South America's National Parks. Seattle, Washington: The Mountaineers.

Lemereis, Jaap

1987 La Lucha Por el Agua de Los Aymaras del Norte de Chile. Iquique: Centro de Investigacion de la Realidad del Norte.

Lewellen, Ted

1978 Peasants in Transition: The Changing Economy of the Peruvian Aymara. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lynch, Thomas F.

1989 Regional Interaction, Transhumance, and Verticality: Archaeological Use of Zonal Complementarity in Peru and Northern Chile. *In* Multidisciplinary Studies in Andean Anthropology. V.J. Vitzthum, ed. Pp. 1-11. Ann Arbor: Regents of The University of Michigan.

Mabberley, David J.

1987 *The Plant Book: A Portable Dictionary of the Vascular Plants*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacPhail, Donald D., and Harold E. Jackson

1973 New Directions in the Chilean North. *In* Coastal Deserts: Their Natural and Human Environments. David H. K. Amiran, and Andrew W. Wilson, eds. Pp. 123-136. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Mamani M., Manuel

1989 Structure of the Livestock Marking Ritual in the Chilean Andes. M.A. thesis, University of Florida.

Mamani M., Manuel

1994 Antecedentes Míticos y Ecológicos del Significado del Vocablo Chungara. *Revista Chungara* 26(1):117-124.

Mamani M., Manuel

1996 El Simbolismo, La Reproducción y La Música en El Ritual: Marca y Floreo de Ganado en El Altiplano Chileno. *In* Cosmología y Música en Los Andes. Max Peter Baumann, ed. Pp. 221-245. Frankfurt: Biblioteca Iberoamericana.

Mamani, Vicenta

1993 Popular Religiosity and Evangelism in Aymara Culture. *International Review of Mission* 82(327):391-400.

Masuda, Shozo, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris

1985 *Andean Ecology and Civilization. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

McBride, George McCutchen

1921 *The Agrarian Indian Communities of Highland Bolivia*. American Geographical Society Research Series No. 5:1-27.

McFarlane, Judith

1990 Ecological Determinants of the Health of Aymara Children. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 87-100. Dordrecht, The

Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Messerli, Bruno, Martin Grosjean, Georges Bonani, Andreas Burgi, Mebus A. Geyh, Kurt Graf, Karl Ramseyer, Hugo Romero, Ueli Schotterer, Hans Schreier, and Mathias Vuille

1993 Climate Change and Natural Resource Dynamics of the Atacama Altiplano During the Last 18,000 Years: A Preliminary Synthesis. *Mountain Research and Development* 13(2):117-127.

Metraux, Alfred

1934 Contributions to Andean Folklore. *Journal de la Societe des Americanistes* 26:67-102.

Mills, Kenneth

1993 The Limits of Religious Coercion in Mid-Colonial Peru. *Past and Present* 145:85-121.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Bolivia

1962 *La Desviacion del Rio Lauca (Antecedentes y Documentos)*. La Paz: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Bolivia.

Miracle, Andrew W. Jr., and Juan de Dios Yapita Moya

1981 Time and Space in Aymara. *In The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture*. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 33-56. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Molinie-Fioravanti, Antoinette

1986 The Andean Community Today. *In Anthropological History of Andean Polities*. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 342-358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, Craig

1985 From Principles of Ecological Complementarity to the Organization and Administration of Tawantinsuyu. *In Andean Ecology and Civilization. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 477-490. Japan: University of Tokyo Press.

Mujica, Elias

1985 Altiplano-Coast Relationships in the South-Central Andes: From Indirect to Direct Complementarity. *In Andean Ecology and Civilization: An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 103-140. Japan: University of Tokyo Press.

Mulhauser, Hermann A., Nicolas Hrepic, Pedro Mladinic, Vivian Montecino, and Sergio Cabrera

1995 Water Quality and Limnological Features of a High Altitude Andean Lake, Chungara, in Northern Chile. *Revista Chilena de Historia Natural* 68:341-349.

Murra, John V.

1956 The Economic Organization of the Inca State. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago.

Murra, John V.

1965 Herds and Herders in the Inca State. *In Man, Culture and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments*. Anthony Leeds and Andrew P. Vayda, eds. Pp. 185-215. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Murra, John V.

1968 An Aymara Kingdom in 1567. *Ethnology* 15(2):116-147.

Murra, John V.

1978 Aymara Lords and Their European Agents at Potosi. *Nova Americana* 1:231-243.

Murra, John V.

1984 Andean Societies. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 13:119-141.

Murra, John V.

1985a "El Archipelago Vertical" Revisited. *In Andean Ecology and Civilization. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp.3-13. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Murra, John V.

1985b The Limits and Limitations of the "Vertical Archipelago" in the Andes. *In Andean Ecology and Civilization: An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 15-20. Tokyo: University of Tokyo.

Murra, John V.

1986 The Expansion of the Inka State: Armies, War and Rebellions. *In Anthropological History of Andean Polities*. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 49-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murra, John V., and Nathan Wachtel

1986 Introduction. *In Anthropological History of Andean Polities*. John V. Murra,

Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 1-8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

National Research Council

1989 *Lost Crops of the Incas. Little-Known Plants of the Andes With Promise For Worldwide Cultivation.* Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Nazarea, Virginia D.

1998 *Ethnoecology: Situated Knowledge/ Located Lives.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Nunez, Lautaro

1986 *The Evolution of a Valley: Population and Resources of Tarapaca Over a Millennium. In Anthropological History of Andean Polities.* John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Pp. 23-34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Onibokum, Adepoju

1975 *Socio-economic Impacts of Highways and Commuter Rail Systems on Land Use and Activity Patterns-An Annotated Bibliography.* Exchange Bibliography 815. Monticello, Illinois: Council of Planning Librarians.

Osborne, Harold

1968 *South American Mythology.* Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd.

Painter, Michael

1984 *Changing Relations of Production and Rural Underdevelopment.* Journal of Anthropological Research 40(2):271-292.

Platt, Tristan

1975 *Experiencia y Experimentacion: Los Asentamientos Andinos en las Cabeceras del Valle de Azapa.* Chungara 5:33-60.

Plummer, John S.

1966 *Another Look at Aymara Personality.* Behavior Science Notes 1(2):55-78.

Poma, Eugenio

1995 *The Gospel and the Aymara Culture.* International Review of Mission 54(335):441-445.

Purves, William K., Gordon H. Orians, and H. Craig Heller

1995 *Life: The Science of Biology.* Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates, Incorporated.

Quispe Fernandez, Bonifacia, and Tomas Huanca Laura

- 1994 The Aymaras. *In All Roads are Good: Native Voices on Life and Culture*. Terence Winch and Cheryl Wilson, eds. Pp.147-155. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press and the National Museum of the American Indian.
- Raggi, L.A., E. Jiliberto, and B. Urquieta
1994 Feeding and Foraging Behaviour of Alpaca in Northern Chile. *Journal of Arid Environments* 26:73-77.
- Rauh, W.
1985 The Peruvian-Chilean Desert. *In Hot Deserts and Arid Shrublands*. Michael Evenari, and Imanuel Noy-Meir, eds. Pp. 239-267. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
- Raven, Peter H., Ray F. Evert, and Susan E. Eichhorn
1999 *Biology of Plants*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company/Worth Publishers.
- Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia
1991 Aymara Past, Aymara Future. *Report on the Americas* 25(3):18-23.
- Rivera, Mario A.
1975 Una Hipotesis Sobre Movimientos Poblacionales Altiplanicos y Transaltiplanicos a las Costas del Norte de Chile. *Chungara* 5:7-31.
- Rivera, Mario A.
1977 Prehistoric Chronology of Northern Chile. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin.
- Rivera Diaz, Mario A.
1987 Land Use Patterns in the Azapa Valley, Northern Chile. *In Arid Land Use Strategies and Risk Management in the Andes: A Regional Perspective*. David L. Browman, ed. Pp. 225-250. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rivera, Mario A.
1991 The Prehistory of Northern Chile: A Synthesis. *Journal of World Prehistory* 5(1):1-47.
- Rosing, Ina
1995 Paraman Purina- Going for Rain. "Mute Anthropology" Versus Speaking Anthropology": Lessons From an Andean Collective Scarcity Ritual in the Quechua-Speaking Kallawayá and Aymara-Speaking Altiplano Region (Andes, Bolivia). *Anthropos* 90:69-88.
- Rothhammer, Francisco
1990 The Aymara: An Outline of Their Pre and Post-Columbian History. *In The*

Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 45-48. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Ruiz-Tagle, Sara Larrain

1989 Norte Grande: 500 Anos Despues. Santiago: Editorial La Puerta Abierta.

Saavedra, Carlos

1981 Social and Cultural Context of the Aymara in Bolivia Today. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 18-29. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida

Santiago, Upi

2000 Aymaras Contra Planes Mineros. *La Nacion*, March 19:33.

Satz Miracle, Christine

1981 Intelligence Testing and the Aymara. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 240-247. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Schaedel, Richard P.

1985 Discussion: An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity. *In* Andean Ecology and Civilization. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity. Shozo Masuda, Izumi Shimada, and Craig Morris, eds. Pp. 505-509. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Schull, William J.

1990 Introduction: The Place and the Study. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp.1-18. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Schull, William J., Blago Razmilic, Leonardo Figueroa, and Mariluz Gonzalez.

1990 Trace Metals. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 33-44. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Sharpe, Pamela J.

1981 Spanish Borrowing Into Aymara Clothing Vocabulary. *In* The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 146-174. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Silva Araya, Veronica

1998 Tradiciones y Festividades de la Localidad de Putre: Putrenos Recopilan Historias y Riquezas de su Cultura. Arica, Chile: Corporacion de Estudios y Desarrollo Norte Grande.

Spotorno, Angel E., and Alberto Veloso

1990 Flora and Fauna. *In* The Aymara: Strategies in Human Adaptation to a Rigorous Environment. William J. Schull, Francisco Rothhammer, and Sara A. Barton, eds. Pp. 19-32. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Stevens, Stan

1997 Conservation Through Cultural Survival. Indigenous People and Protected Areas. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Stobart, Henry

1996 The Llama's Flute: Musical Misunderstandings in the Andes. *Early Music* 24(3):470-482.

Stoffle, Richard W., Merle C. Jake, Michael J. Evans, and Pamela A. Bunte

1981 Establishing Native American Concerns in Social Impact Assessment. *Social Impact Assessment* 65/66:4-9.

Stoffle, Richard W., Merle Cody Jake, Pamela Bunte, and Michael J. Evans

1982 Southern Paiute Peoples SIA Responses to Energy Proposals. *In* The Social Impact Assessment of Rapid Resource Development on Native Peoples. Charles C. Geisler, Rayna Green, Daniel Usner, and Patrick West, eds. Natural Resources Sociology Research Lab Monograph #3. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Stoffle, Richard W., David B. Halmo, Michael J. Evans, and John E. Olmsted

1990 Calculating the Cultural Significance of American Indian Plants: Paiute and Shoshone Ethnobotany at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. *American Anthropologist* 92(2):416-432.

Stoffle, Richard W., and Michael J. Evans

1990 Holistic Conservation and Cultural Triage: American Indian Perspectives on Cultural Resources. *Human Organization* 49(2):91-99.

Stoffle, Richard W., David B. Halmo, and Diane E. Austin

1997 Cultural Landscapes and Traditional Cultural Properties: A Southern Paiute View of the Grand Canyon and Colorado River. *American Indian Quarterly* 21(2):229-249.

Stoffle, Richard W., Fabio Pittaluga, Tray G. Earnest, Amy Eisenberg, John Amato, and

Genevieve Dewey-Hefley

1998a *Pah hu wichi* (From Big Spring Running Down): Big Spring Ethnographic Assessment US 95 Corridor Study. Tucson: Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology.

Stoffle, Richard W., M. Nieves Zedeño, Fabio Pittaluga, Tray G. Earnest, Amy Eisenberg, John Amato, and Genevieve Dewey

1998b *Ha'tata* (The Backbone of the River): American Indian Ethnographic Studies Regarding the Hoover Dam Bypass Project. Tucson: Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology.

Stoffle, Richard W., David B. Halmó, and Michael Evans

1999 *Puchuxwavaats Uapi* (To Know About Plants): Traditional Knowledge and the Cultural Significance of Southern Paiute Plants. *Human Organization* 58(4):416-429.

Stoffle, Richard W.

2000 Cultural Heritage and Resources. *In* Social Impact Analysis. An Applied Anthropology Manual. Laurence R. Goldman, ed. Pp. 191-232. Oxford: Berg.

Teillier, Sebastian

1998 Flora y Vegetación Alto-Andina del Área de Collaguasi-Salar de Coposa, Andes del Norte de Chile. *Revista Chilena de Historia Natural* 71:313-329.

Tomasek, Robert D.

1967 The Chilean-Bolivian Lauca River Dispute and the O.A.S. *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9(1):351-366.

Tschopik, Harry, Jr.

1946 The Aymara. *In* Handbook of South American Indians: The Andean Civilizations. Julian H. Steward, ed. Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 143(2):501-573.

Tschopik, Harry, Jr.

1951 The Aymara of Chucuito, Peru: 1. Magic. *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History* 44:133-308.

Tudela, Patricio

2000 Chilenización y Cambio Ideológico Entre Los Aymaras de Arica (1883-1930) Intervención Religiosa y Secularización. Electronic document.
<http://mordor.seci.uchile.cl/facultades/csociales/antropo/rc12-13.htm>.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

1984a Action Plan for Biosphere Reserves. *Nature and Resources* 20(4):11-22.

- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
1984b Bulletin of the Man and the Biosphere Programme. Nature and Resources
20(4):23-27.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
1996 Biosphere Reserves: The Seville Strategy and the Statutory Framework of
the World Network. Paris: UNESCO.
- Vanclay, Frank, and Daniel A. Bronstein
1995 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. New York: John Wiley and
Sons.
- Van Kessel, Juan
1985 La Lucha Por el Agua de Tarapaca; La Vision Andina. Revista Chungara
14:141-155.
- Van Kessel, Juan
1992 Holocausto al Progreso. Los Aymaras de Tarapaca. La Paz: Hisbol.
- Varese, Stefano
1996 The New Environmentalist Movement of Latin American Indigenous People. *In*
Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights.
Stephen B. Brush, and Doreen Stabinsky, eds. Pp. 122-139. Washington, D.C.:
Island Press.
- Villagran, C., J.J. Armesto, and M.T. Kalin Arroyo
1981 Vegetation in a High Andean Transect Between Turi and Cerro Leon in
Northern Chile. Vegetatio 48:3-16.
- Vuille, Mathias and Michael F. Baumgartner
1993 Hydrologic Investigations in the North Chilean Altiplano Using Landsat-MSS
and-TM Data. Geocarto International (3):35-45.
- Webster, Steven
1973 Native Pastoralism in the South Andes. Ethnology 12(2):115-134.
- West, Patrick C.
1991 Introduction. *In* Resident Peoples and National Parks: Social Dilemmas and
Strategies in International Conservation. Patrick C. West and Steven R. Brechin, eds.
Pp. xvi-xxiv. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- West, Patrick C., and Steven R. Brechin
1991 Resident Peoples and National Parks: Social Dilemmas and Strategies in
International Conservation. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Westfall, Catherine

1999a Informe de Identificación de Línea Base Para La Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental Sobre El Patrimonio Arqueológico: Proyecto de Mejoramiento y Construcción de Variantes Viales de la Ruta Ch-11, Arica-Tambo Quemado, I Region. Santiago, Chile: R & Q Ingeniería Ltda.

Westfall, Catherine

1999b Caracterización de Línea de Base y Medidas de Mitigación Propuestas Para Sitios y Zonas de Riesgo Arqueológicos, Proyecto Vial Ruta Ch-11 (Km 63-150), Arica, I Region (MOP). Santiago, Chile: R & Q Ingeniería Ltda.

Westfall, Catherine

2000 Informe de Identificación de Línea Base Para la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental Sobre El Patrimonio Cultural: Proyecto de Mejoramiento y Construcción Ruta Ch-123 Parinacota-Visviri, I Region. Santiago, Chile: Para R & Q Ingeniería Ltda.

Wickens, Gerald E.

1993 Vegetation and Ethnobotany of the Atacama Desert and Adjacent Andes in Northern Chile. *Opera Botanica* 121:291-307.

Wickens, Gerald E.

1995 Llareta (*Azorella compacta*, Umbelliferae): A Review. *Economic Botany* 49(2):207-212.

Wilkinson, Cory H.

1998 Environmental Justice Impact Assessment. Key Components and Emerging Issues. *In* Environmental Methods Review: Retooling Impact Assessment for the New Century. Alan L. Porter and John J. Fittipaldi, eds. Fargo: The Press Club.

Winnie, William W. Jr.

1965 Communal Land Tenure in Chile. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 55(1):67-86.

World Commission on Environment and Development

1987 *Our Common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

World Resources Institute

1994 *World Resources: A Guide to the Global Environment*. New York: World Resources Institute.

Wright, A. C. S.

1963 "Los Bofedales"-Alkaline Cushion-Bog Peats of the Semi-Arid Chilean

Altiplano. *Pacific Viewpoint* 4(1):189-191.

Yapita, Juan de Dios

1994 *Aymara: Metodo Facil 1*. L Paz, Bolivia: Ediciones ILCA.

Yapita Moya, Juan de Dios

1981 *The Aymara Alphabet: Linguistics for Indigenous Communities*. *In The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural Context. A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture*. Martha J. Hardman, ed. Pp. 262-270. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.

Zedeño, M. Nieves, Diane Austin and Richard Stoffle

1997 *Landmark and Landscape: A Contextual Approach to the Management of American Indian Resources*. *Culture and Agriculture* 19(3):123-129.

Zimmerer, Karl S.

1998 *Disturbances and Diverse Crops in the Farm Landscapes of Highland South America*. *In Nature's Geography: New Lessons for Conservation in Developing Countries*. Karl S. Zimmerer, and Kenneth R. Young, eds. Pp. 262-286. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Research: A Nuu-chah-nulth Perspective
By Umeek: Dr. E. R. Atleo
University of Manitoba
March, 2005

Contemporary Knowledge and Research Conditions: What is....

Knowledge explosion and information overload describe our age. Yet, in spite of the awesome and miraculous powers demonstrated by a scientific age, in medicine, communications, transportation and other technologies, there are grave concerns about the emerging new world order, that it is being driven primarily by the free enterprise system. From its inception science has been touted as the savior of humankind but now, in this new world order, science may be reduced to an economic convenience – a tool of a monetary system that no government seems able to control. Although the foregoing is an overly simplified description of a much more complex world order that is dominated by free enterprise, there seems no doubt about its prevailing emergence in all the major countries of the world, the Americas, the European subcontinent, Asia, and in particular the largest country in the world – China. In my view, while science has demonstrated great technological marvels, it has had little impact in the important areas of qualitative relationships, not only between and among humans but also between humans and other life forms such as plants and animals.

Technological advances stand in sharp contrast to massive failures in attempts by all dominant cultures to advance the quality of human relationships. There is no way to over-emphasize or exaggerate the enormous irony of a world that confuses technological advances with improvements in the quality of human life as demonstrated in an ability to live in respectful relationship with one another whereby each life form is recognized as having intrinsic and sacred value. Social commentators over the past several decades have observed that: “We are able to land men on the moon but we don’t know how to adequately feed, house, and clothe many who live on the streets of every great city of the

world, nor do we know how to fairly distribute surplus foods among the hungry of the world.

Worldview as a Historical Context: What was....

The scientific worldview is based on its origin story. It is a simple story. There was a BIG BANG! Then there was evolution! And here we are! That is the story. In the prevailing view of this story taught in all mainstream universities there is no Creator and consequently no moral values, just a random sequence of events called random selection. That is why, in 1904 in the St. Louis World Fair, 59 indigenous groups were brought together as evidence to support Darwin's theory of evolution that the human species has been steadily evolving in a randomly selective process from a state of simple, instinctive, primitivism towards the more advanced, enlightened, and consequently superior human species of European origin. Of that event Cole (1984) writes:

WJ McGee's aim in the fair's anthropology section was "to satisfy the intelligent observer that there *is* a course of progress running from lower to higher humanity, and that all the physical and cultural types of man mark stages in that course." To assist in demonstrating this evolutionary model he brought to St. Louis African pygmies, Ainu from Japan, Tehuelche from Patagonia, and, among American Indians, representatives from the Cocopa, Pawnee, Dakota, Pima, and Pomo groups. (p. 201)

Although many academics of European origin now deny this embarrassing myth the scientific origin story together with the randomly selective process of its subsequent evolutionary process upon which it is based remains a firm belief system. As one scientist confided to me, "There's lots of evidence to support the scientific worldview." Herein may be the confusion.

In the practical affairs of everyday life technological advances are the only evidence of the authenticity of the scientific worldview. Important dimensions of human existence, of human nature, such as love, kindness, compassion, forgiveness, joy, patience, goodness, spiritual insight and discernment and wisdom do not come under the scientific purview of investigation. Consequently, the advances of science in the 20th century have led to a greater capability of the human to destroy both other humans as well as other life forms,

such as plants and animals. The 1st World War was known as the war to end all wars. Each subsequent war has been well documented in hopes of ending human conflict. Monuments and special days are set aside in hopes of the same. Even in cases of individual outrage there is an immediate demand that something be done so that similar outrages don't happen again. Yet, human inhumanity to human continues unabated. Wars and individual outrages continue in spite of all efforts to the contrary. Is science helpless in the face of these massive human failures to end inhumanity to human? Are there no other alternatives to the hope of remedy placed in science?

Knowledge and Research: What is possible....

What may not be adequately understood by both Aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities is that all pre-contact Aboriginals had their own legitimate means of acquiring knowledge to ensure their continuity. This assertion implies an alternative worldview to the scientific one. For illustrative purposes I will provide a Nuu-chah-nulth worldview perspective. In the examination of my Nuu-chah-nulth cultural heritage I asked myself the question: How did my ancestors know about hahuupa or teachings; Did they create these teachings out of their own heads or did they learn these teachings from somewhere else? Over time I came to realize that my ancestors had two primary sources of information, origin stories and nature, and one primary method of investigation to acquire knowledge, oosumich, or as it is known in English, vision quest. The first source are the origin stories about how Son of Raven captured the light, thereby indicating the natural intimacy in the relationship between 'heaven and earth'; how Aulthmaquus stole children, and how Aint-tin-mit, Son of Mucus, in cooperation with a Chief's wife, a hakum, rescued the children and restored them back to community; and many more kinds of such stories, each of which help to illuminate the original design of creation and so provide an orientation for life management purposes.

The second source of information, nature, is identical to the scientific source of information except that the Nuu-chah-nulth assumed that not only is the earth related to the spiritual dimension but that the earth is completely dependent for its creation,

sustenance, and life on the spiritual dimension. On this point Black Elk observed to John G. Neihardt in their book: Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux

:

Crazy Horse's father was my father's cousin, and there were no chiefs in our family before Crazy Horse; but there were holy men; and he became a chief because of the power he got in a vision when he was a boy. When I was a man, my father told me something about that vision. Of course he did not know all of it; but he said that Crazy Horse dreamed and went into the world where there is nothing but the spirits of all things. **That is the real world that is behind this one, and everything we see here is something like a shadow from that world.** (p. 85)

If Black Elk's statement about the 'real' world were an isolated incident there would be reason to discount it. However, as I have observed elsewhere, spiritual experiences among the Nuu-chah-nulth, as I assume among all Aboriginal communities of the past, were everyday occurrences for every family. Just as the scientific community recognizes authentic methodological processes to knowledge acquisition so too did the Nuu-chah-nulth recognize an authentic methodological process to knowledge acquisition called oosumich, or vision quest. Oosumich was considered as necessary for survival and daily living as schooling and homework today are considered necessary for survival and daily living. The following is a thumbnail sketch of the Nuu-chah-nulth knowledge acquisition process, its replication process and its means of testing and validation process.

Numerous cases can be cited, and have been in various publications by ethnobotanists, ethnohistorians and anthropologists of every description, of medical knowledge and how this knowledge has been acquired by simply observing nature or through an oosumich process. In nature, sickly animals can be observed eating specific plants and this is one simple way that Aboriginals determined some kinds of medicine. However, one cannot assume that this observation of nature is like a detached scientific observation where the observer is uninvolved or where the observer assumes to be superior to the animal. In the Nuu-chah-nulth worldview each animal is like a person and therefore is eligible to be a teacher of other persons described as humans in western culture.

In my book *Tsawalk* I describe a contemporary spiritual experience that Andrew Ahenakew, an Anglican priest, had with a bear. Although this incident did not take place in the context of an oosumich it nevertheless illustrates an important principle of oosumich, which is an effective means of communication and transfer of knowledge or power from the spiritual to the physical realm.

I went to bed, I don't know what time, but I think it must have been about 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock, somewhere around that time. I saw something coming from the river way, from the north. When I looked again I was sitting on the bed. I knew I was sitting on the bed but I guess I was sleeping. That motel seemed to have no walls. This creature came right towards me. He stopped about six feet from me, maybe a little closer, and he looked at me and smiled. A beautiful creature, a creature of God. And he spoke to me (p. 120).

The creature said, "I have been sent here by the higher power. I'm sent to come and instruct you to make medicine, which will be yours. If I tell you what to do and you listen." I thought to myself, how can I listen, when I'm a clergyman, to this creature?

The bear could read his thoughts and told him that even though he did not believe now, he would believe later and would do this big thing. The bear smiled, showing teeth four to five inches long, and continued: "I'm sent here to come and teach you how to make medicine. I'm willing to give my body to be killed so that you can take me and use me for medicine." (Hodgson, Janet & Kothare, Jay, 1990p. 121)

It is critical to note here that this manner of acquiring knowledge is not the only form of oosumich. Here the spiritual world appears to take the initiative in the transfer of medical knowledge. Origin stories teach that the primary requirement for effective communication with the spiritual realm is humility. Andrew Ahenakew evidently met that requirement just as Son of Raven eventually met the same requirement after Wren advised that Son of Raven transform into an insignificant leaf. Andrew Ahenakew received medical knowledge to effectively heal certain kinds of cancer and Son of Raven brought light into the world, both kinds of resources came from the same source, the spiritual realm, the Creator.

Nuu-chah-nulth knowledge, sometimes referred to as 'protected knowledge', was democratically available to each family. That is, each family had its own oosumich practice and consequently each family had its own set of hahuupa or teachings. This knowledge system stands in sharp contrast to the scientific knowledge system in that scientific knowledge is available only to scientists. Where any Nuu-chah-nulth could

check or test any assertion of truth proclaimed by someone else by doing oosumich for that truth - scientific truth cannot be tested by the lay person. It must be accepted by faith in the same way that illiterate people of the middle ages accepted the word of literate priests who could read.

If Nuu-chah-nulth and other Aboriginal teachings could be compiled and classified they form a body of life management knowledge whose practice in traditional times astonished the first Europeans. As Sagard, a Recollet missionary observed:

[T]hose of their Nation...offer reciprocal Hospitality, and help each other so much that they provide for the needs of all so that there is no poor beggar at all in their towns, bourgs and villages, as I said elsewhere, so that they found it very bad hearing that there were in France a great number of needy and beggars, and thought that it was due to a lack of charity, and blamed us greatly saying that if we had some intelligence we would set some order in the matter, the remedies being simple. (cited in Jaenen, 1988, p. 121)

Although the account above is about the Montagnais specifically, other historical accounts of many other Aboriginal communities corroborate Sagard's observation. It does not mean that wars and conflicts were unknown or that individual outrages did not happen in pre-contact America. What it does imply is that in spite of the continuous struggle to manage powerful forces in reality that are often contradictory, good and evil, generosity and greed, creativity and destruction, war and peace, inflated egoism and humility, strong and weak, Aboriginal societies found ways to balance and harmonize these polarized and contrary forces. For this purpose, the Nuu-chah-nulth developed the sacred Tloo-qua-nah ceremony. It is a community ceremony to remind people of the necessity to keep in remembrance the polarized nature of reality. Consequently, when strong outside forces kidnap children from a family, that family is ceremonially chastised. "You must have forgotten the teachings of our grandparents" they are told. Significantly, the children are rescued through the collective prayers and collective action of the community.

It is no accident that the Tloo-qua-nah ceremony is an exact parallel to the origin story of Aulthmaquus who stole children from my community of Ahous and Aint-tin-mit, Son of Mucus, Son of heaven and Son of a Nuu-chah-nulth Chief, who came from heaven and

rescued the children. This origin story reflects human experience down to the present day. When parents are not vigilant they lose their children to strong outside, hostile, and often destructive forces. The children stolen from Ahous were found by Aint-tin-mit to have gum over their eyes. Metaphorically, these children became blind to their own identity, they became blind to their own culture, blind to where they came from, and all they could see and experience were their present circumstances of imprisonment. Today this blindness can be compared to the drug culture where children are lost to parents, to culture, to language, and to community.

Sagard's observation of "reciprocal hospitality" among the Montagnais was not an isolated case of generosity. For the Nuu-chah-nulth reciprocal hospitality or generosity was such a strong cultural theme that it is to be considered a law. It is in fact associated with life. The act of giving was thought and believed to be necessary to life and consequently its absence was considered to be equivalent to death. If, after much admonishment, a person still refused to contribute and give a share to others, that person could be banished from community, a condition equivalent to death. The status of generosity as a law of life derived directly from teachings found in origin stories as well as direct experiences of the Nuu-chah-nulth people. Out of millions of stories that could be told, and for now, in the absence of contemporary formal research, these stories must be considered anecdotal, my aunt tells the story of how they gave the last of their salmon to visiting relatives. Before this salmon had been completely consumed there came a knock on the door. When the door was opened there stood a fisherman with an offer of more salmon that was gratefully received. In other cultures where generosity is not considered necessary to life nor considered to be a law then it is very unlikely that anyone would give the last of their salmon to visitors. However, generosity in the Nuu-chah-nulth culture has been successfully practiced for millennia and the law has never been known to fail. It is a law that is empirically counter intuitive. Logic demands that before the last salmon is served to guests that replacement of this salmon must first be assured. That would be sound household planning and management. Ordinarily that is what happens, people do plan for guests, but sometimes the best plans cannot anticipate all possible circumstances.

Not all incidents of giving result in such an immediate return or fulfillment of the law of generosity but many Nuu-chah-nulth continue to this day to practice that ancient law whenever they receive any visitors.

Although there are fundamental differences between the Nuu-chah-nulth knowledge system and the scientific knowledge system there are also important similarities. First, the similarities are found in the structure and process of knowledge acquisition. Science utilizes theory while the Nuu-chah-nulth utilizes stories. These are parallel in meaning because both theory and story propose (are propositions about) the nature of reality. Scientific theories are tested for veracity through scientific methodologies where variables are examined in relation to one another to establish whether a theory or proposition is true. Origin stories are tested for veracity through oosumich to see if there is a special relationship between the spiritual and physical dimensions of reality. The truths contained in origin stories have been verified by oosumich over millennia. Ceremonially, hinkeets songs, dances, regalia, names, chants, prayer songs, oral histories, and formal declarations at great feast halls were the means to report, affirm, and confirm the outcomes, the findings, of oosumich in the same way that papers, journals, books, and conferences are the means to report scientific findings.

Second, the fundamental difference between the scientific knowledge system and the Nuu-chah-nulth knowledge system is worldview. To adequately describe this difference would take another book. Suffice to say for now that this difference in worldview is based upon assumptions by science that reality is primarily empirical while the Nuu-chah-nulth assume that reality is both empirical and spiritual. Moreover, it is assumed that the empirical is completely dependent upon the spiritual dimension for its existence. These differing assumptions constrain a different knowledge acquisition process. The oosumich methodology employs both the mind and the spirit/soul while the scientific method depends solely upon the mind to acquire knowledge. The critical variable in the person who does an oosumich is humility while, for the most part, the critical variable in the scientist who conducts an experiment is detachment or neutrality. There are other

differences as well, such as one is oral and the other is literate, one assumes order in reality and the other discovers order, one assumes that what is not seen is more substantial than what is seen while the other assumes that the only reality is what is seen and testable by empirical means.

Conclusion

Scientific research has unquestionable power towards technological advances but has proven powerless in advancing the quality of relationships as found in the policies and practices of the major governments throughout the world. Not only are there continuous conflicts between and among nations but the policies and practices of the governments of every major power on the earth have so degraded the environment as to imperil the wellbeing of future civilizations. Yet, in spite of massive failures by the governments of major powers on the earth to advance the quality of human relationships there are no shortage of answers to human problems. The liberals are as certain as the conservatives who are as certain as the socialists who are not outdone in the area of certainty by a host of movements, environmental in its many manifestations, Oriental in its many manifestations, Native spirituality in its many manifestations, and of course, academics who may begin their response by stating: “If only...this or that were done or not done...then all problems would disappear.” In my view, science cannot be the savior of humankind because its strength lies in technological development while its weakness is in its inability to advance the quality of human relationships between nations, cultures, genders and ethnic groups.

Fortunately, what appears to be a weakness in the scientific knowledge system appears to be a strength in the Nuuchahnulth system, and by extension, to the traditional pre-contact Aboriginal knowledge systems of the world. Aboriginal knowledge systems focused upon quality, or respectful, relationships between life forms. When Ahous went to war with Ohstoos about 200 years ago it was because Ohstoos did not want to share their abundance of salmon with Ahous who were poor in salmon at the time. While it can be said that Ahous was victorious in war over Ohstoos I say that the war was a failure of

Ahous and Ohstoos to fulfill the law of generosity. Indeed, the absence of generosity led to the death of most of the people of Ohstoos and many of the people of Ahous. This war lasted a little more than a decade and this time is negligible in the context of millennia when for most of that time these Nuu-chah-nulth peoples managed to balance and harmonize the forces of reality such that there was relative peace. Successful management of reality is difficult at the best of times, as each of us may testify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the inability of science to advance the quality of human relationships it can be greatly enhanced through cooperation with Aboriginal knowledge acquisition systems. This is where an Aboriginal theory will be useful. The theory of Tsawalk can be found in my book: *Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview*. In the epilogue I make these comments.

The first peoples' struggles to reorient themselves according to creation's original design, as recounted in origin stories, parallel the current struggles of indigenous peoples to orient themselves according to the contradictions of the postmodern world, which espouses pluralism but cannot find a balance and harmony between multiple, competing interests. The theory of Tsawalk offers an alternative stance from which to view contemporary problem solving because it assumes the unity of creation irrespective of any of contemporary society's contradictions. (p. 133)

First Nations cultures were founded upon origin stories that provided reliable information about the nature of reality and the place of quus (Nuu-chah-nulth people) in it. For most of the past 500 years of colonization quus did not have a place in contemporary society. At worst quus were considered an inferior human species and at best they were considered beings of a lower social cast, similar to serfs and the lowest classes of the middle ages in Europe. I will now use a personal experience to illustrate what I think is necessary to take place in the relationship between quus and the larger society, between quus and scientist/academics. In 1993 the government of BC struck a scientific panel that included three Nuu-chah-nulth elders and one Nuu-chah-nulth academic, myself. The Panel's mandate was to find solutions to the environmental issues in the forest practices of Clayoquot Sound. First, and critically important to the success of the process of problem solving, the scientists asked us how we, the Nuu-chah-nulth, did our problem solving. The reason for this unusual gesture is that two other high powered committees had already been struck and failed.

Second, and this is the main point, in our discussion with the scientists, we, the Nuuchah-nulth said the same things from the beginning to the end. At first the scientists rejected our terminology. We talked of balance and harmony. We talked about how everything is connected and related. We talked about the health of the forests and waters. Gradually the scientists changed their views and eventually, at the end, accepted all of the words that we used from the very beginning. Our knowledge system is anchored in millennia of experience while scientific knowledge is anchored in a few hundred years of experience.

Third, the successful work of the Scientific Panel demonstrated that it is possible for scientists and Aboriginals to work together. It is a two way process. Scientists do not have all the answers. They cannot. Their methodologies forbid it. Neither do Aboriginal knowledge systems have all the answers. They have no means at present to make technological advances. Aboriginal knowledge systems however, with their strength in the quality of human relationships necessary for successful and difficult decision making processes, can make a nice complement to the scientific process.

Bibliography

Annett, Kevin D.

- 2001 Hidden From History: The Canadian Holocaust: The Untold Story of the Genocide of Aboriginal Peoples by Church and State in Canada. . Kevin_annett@hotmail.com: The Truth Commission into Genocide in Canada, 2001.

Arima, E.Y.

- 1982 The West Coast People: The Nootka of Vancouver Island and Cape Flattery. Victoria, B.C.: British Columbia Provincial Museum.

Atleo, E. Richard

- 2004 Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview. Vancouver BC: UBC Press.

Barrow, John D.

- 1990(1991 reprint) Theories of Everything: The Quest For Ultimate Explanation. London: Vintage.

Barzun, Jacques

- 2000 From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Berry, Thomas

- 1988 The Dream of the Earth. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

Bunnell, Fred, & Atleo, Richard

- 1995 The Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound: First Nations' Perspectives Relating to Forest Practices Standards in Clayoquot Sound. Victoria, BC: Cortex Consultants Inc.

Capra, Fritjof (Third Edition)

- 1991 The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Great Britain, Glasgow: Caledonian International Book Manufacturing Ltd.

Clutesi, George

- 1969 Potlatch. Sidney, BC, Canada: Gray's Publishing Ltd.

Cole, Douglas

- 1983 Captured Heritage: The Scramble for Northwest Coast Artifacts. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Denis, Claude

- 1997 We are Not You: First Nations and Canadian Modernity. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.

Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw:

- 1987-1990 The Spirit in the Land. Statements of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs in the Supreme Court of British Columbia., Gabriola, BC:

Hardwick, F. C. (Ed.)

1973 The Helping Hand: The Debt of Alexander Mackenzie and Simon Fraser to Canadian Indians. Vancouver B.C.: Tautalus Research Limited.

Hodgson, Janet & Kothare, Jay

1990 Vision Quest: Native Spirituality and the Church in Canada. Toronto: Anglican Book Centre.

Jaenen, C. J.

1987 “Amerindian views of French culture in the seventeenth century.” In Fisher, R. & Coates, K. (Eds.). *Out of the Backgroun: Readings on Canadian Native History*, 102-133. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitma Ltd.

Neihardt, John G.

1972 Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux. London: University of Nebraska Press.

Sam, Stanley

1992 Indian Doctor Stories. Unpublished manuscript

Saul, John Ralston

1993 Voltaire's Bastards: The dictatorship of Reason in the West. Toronto: Penguin Books.

1997 Reflections of a Siamese Twin: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century. Toronto: Penguin Books.

If our Elites tell us that the principal forces moving throughout the west are such things as global trade, the money-markets and competition, and that these are beyond anyone’s control, well then, the citizen is left in an awkward position. With the ideological stroke of inevitability, we are deprived of the community powers which, particularly over the last two centuries, have permitted us to put an increasingly decent social structure in place. What does this do to the citizens’ self-esteem, this return to a single absolute religion in which the forces which determine our future are as out of reach as those of an all-knowing deity? What powers does it leave us, except those old mediaeval crutches—emotion and superstition? (p. 435)

Community knowledge and conservation of indigenous biodiversity: Exploration of hidden wisdom of Monpa tribe

Ranjay K. Singh¹ Dheeraj Singh² and Amish K. Sureja³

¹Assistant Professor, Dept. of Extension Education and Rural Sociology, ²Assistant Professor, Dept. of Pomology, ³Assistant Professor Dept. of Vegetable Science, College of Horticulture and Forestry, Central Agricultural University, Pasighat-791102, Arunachal Pradesh, India.
E-mail: ranjay_jbp@rediffmail.com

Community knowledge is the essence of social capital of the poor people and plays significant role in conservation of biodiversity. Local culture, spirit, social and ethical norms possessed by local people has often been determining factors for sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity.. In the present paper, an effort has been made to explore the dynamics of using *Paisang* (*Quercus rex*, Oak tree) and *Roinangsing* and *Lenthongsing* (pine tree spp. *Pinus wallichiana* and *Pinus roxburghii*) leaves in different crops by the Monpa tribe of Arunachal Pradesh. To achieve this objective, Monpa tribe dominating villages from Dirang Development Block, West Kameng District of Arunachal Pradesh, Northeast India have been selected purposively. After establishing the rapport building with key communicators and wisemen of selected villages, focus group discussions and personal interviews were conducted with selected respondents (men and women) of respective villages to explore the community practices associated with *Paisang* and pine tree and its conservation. Study indicates that Monpa tribe is having their location specific life-long experience and indigenous strategy for sustainable biodiversity (*Paisang* and pine tree) use and management at community level. This has been built up through regular practice and observations of local practices related with use of dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine trees. Women folk play a significant role in collecting and using the dry leaves of these local trees. Maize is a staple food crop in which use of dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine tree is predominant. In other crops like barley, wheat, beans, buck wheat, finger millet, coriander, bottle gourd, cucumber, soybean, pumpkin, bitter gourd, spinach, field pea, mustard species, garlic, onion and chilli the dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine trees are also applied as mulch and source of organic matter. The use of dry leaves of these trees helps the farmers to increase the soil fertility, control soil erosion and conserve soil moisture, thereby helpful in diversifying the local cropping systems and reducing the risk. Based on the types of crops, soil and topography, amount of use of dry leaves varies considerably. With the change in the social and cultural systems, government policy and infestation of *Loranthus*, the use and conservation of trees have been adversely affected.

Keywords: Community Knowledge, Biodiversity, Monpa Tribe, *Paisang*, Oak, *Roinangsing* and *Lenthongsing*.

Conservation of biodiversity and other natural resources over a long period of time has been possible because of the cultural, spiritual and other social institutions that have guided the relationship of local communities with resources^{1, 2}. The community knowledge holds potential for preserving not only biodiversity and ecological function but also cultural diversity^{3, 4, 5}. Even in a context where deforestation is high, there are forests, streams, old trees and lakes which have been conserved by the people extremely well. It is not just resources but also the knowledge about these resources which have been conserved through practice and innovations¹. Community knowledge is the essence of social capital of the poor and the source of their survival strategies. It is rooted in tradition, contemporary in nature and is constantly evolving as individual and community responses to the challenges posed by their environment⁶. Biodiversity provides a foundation for ecologically sustainable development and food security. The unknown potential of unexploited genes, species and ecosystem is of inestimable but certainly high value^{7, 8}. The cultural value of biological diversity conservation for present and future generations is another reason for conserving today. It is important to build on indigenous knowledge on which resource-poor farmers including tribes have conserved many crops and ethno-botanical species based on years of informal experimentation and understanding of a particular production system and ecosystem^{9,10,11}. Rapid changes in the way of life of local communities and consequent loss of community knowledge coupled with the increasing awareness that indigenous knowledge/community knowledge can play an important role in enhancing development, have led developmental workers in both governmental and non-governmental organizations to collect and incorporate these resources in process of sustainable development¹². Looking to the importance of natural resources, the present study has been carried out in a project

funded by the National Innovation Foundation (NIF), Ahmedabad, Gujarat to learn and document the indigenous knowledge/community practices associated with agriculture and natural resources.

Methodology

The study area is situated at 8000 feet above msl and comes under the rainfed agro-ecosystem of Eastern Himalayan region. In this temperate region, beside the agriculture farmers rear pig, poultry, yak and some cattle to meet the needs of food security. Most of the farmers have small in land holding size and grow cereals, pulses, vegetables and fruits as a source of sustainable livelihood. The agricultural lands are almost undulating with light textured shallow black to brown in colour. Settled cultivation is more popular with some extent *Jhum* cultivation done for finger millet and rainfed paddy. Besides, paddy, maize, barley, wheat, finger millet and fox millet are the major crops which are grown by Monpa tribe to meet their day to day needs of ethnic foods and beverages. To achieve the objectives of study, Monpa tribe dominating villages viz. Leacch, Dirang Basti, Yang Basti, Cchug Basti, and Rama Camp Basti of Dirang Development Block, West Kameng District of Arunachal Pradesh, North-east India have been selected purposively. Both conventional and participatory methods have been adopted complementarily to document community knowledge. Looking to the nature of study, participant observations complemented by anthropological approach have been used to explore the information. In the first step rapport building was established with the village *Goan Burha*^a, primary school teachers, extension workers and village priests. After this, 5 outstanding wisemen having wide knowledge of natural resources from selected villages were selected purposively for conducting the focus group discussions to reach at the consensus result of community practices associated with *Paisang* tree (*Quercus rex*, Oak tree) and using pattern of local biodiversity. With an intent

to have equal representation of community knowledge from each gender¹², sixty (30 men and 30 women) respondents, 6 from each village (3 men and 3 women), each having more than 50 years of age have been selected randomly for conducting the personal interviews. A well-tested schedule has been designed with the set of open-ended questions to explore the indigenous practices associated with the use of *Paisang* tree.

Results and Discussion

Community Knowledge and Natural Resource Management

The observations revealed that local farmers are quite aware about the importance of biodiversity and natural resource management^{13, 14, 5}. The Monpa tribe has developed their location specific indigenous strategy for sustainable biodiversity conservation and overall natural resource management at community level. They follow many practices for conserving the indigenous forest trees and thereby agro-biodiversity. Maize is a staple food crop, managed, produced and conserved with the natural dynamics of indigenous species of *Paisang* (*Quercus rex*, Oak tree) and *Roinangsing* and *Lenthongsing* (pine species, *Pinus wallichiana* and *Pinus roxburghii*). *Paisang* is a deciduous woody perennial tree found in the sloppy hilly terrains. The leaf fall in this tree starts from last week of January and continues up to last week of February. This is the peak period when women folk make the group called *Mila* to collect and carry the dry leaves of *Paisang* from community based groves/forest (Figure1) and private land. A complete indigenous package based on utilization of dry leaves of *Roinangsing* and *Lenthongsing* (*Pinus wallichiana* and *Pinus roxburghii*) and *Paisang* helps the farmers to sustain the agro-ecosystem and get stable organic production.

The local varieties of maize are grown in the last week of April to first week of May. Local people are more dependent on the indigenous *Panchang* made by the Monk of *Gonpa* (Buddhist temple) or Tibetan astrologist for various religious and agricultural activities. Since this agro-ecosystem comes under undulating land with blackish to reddish brown soil of light texture, so to improve the productivity of maize and save the energy, time, labour, money and ultimately conserve the natural resources, farmers are dependent on their own indigenous practices. In the first step, dry leaves of *Paisang* (Figure 2 and 3) and pine tree are collected either from community forest or private land by women folk. The dry leaves are kept either in shade in behind the foothill against the direction of wind to avoid direct sunlight on leaves and save from speedy wind, respectively. In sloppy areas having light textured soil, pine leaves are preferred as mulch and source of organic matter because oil of leaves helps in binding the soil particles, thereby keeping the soil intact, preventing soil erosion and protecting the leaves from speedy wind. Interestingly, the rate of weed suppression (allelopathic effect), improvement of soil fertility and total biomass from the local varieties of maize, rajmabeen, soybean and cucumber is 30 to 40 % more in the land where *Paisang* leaves are applied compared to the fields where such practice is not followed.

Historical Context of *Paisang* Tree Use

There is an interesting history of use of leaves of *Paisang* tree. From the anthropological inquiry, it has been found that during ancient time, the poor people of Monpa tribe do not having *Paisang* tree use to go to the village *Zamindar* (landlord) for dry leaves for using in agricultural crops. For this, they had to give one bottle (bamboo made) of *Rakshi* (fine quality of local beer prepared from indigenous barley or maize). It shows the importance of *Paisang* tree.

Use of *Paisang* and Pine Leaves for Indigenous Agro-biodiversity Conservation

A special kind of relativity between use of dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine and conservation of indigenous agrobiodiversity could be observed among Monpa tribe. It is interesting to learn from them that, they have developed the location specific indigenous practices for conserving the indigenous crop varieties which are grown by only using the dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine. The seeds of local variety of maize are spread in the fallow land and then ploughed using the bullock drawn local plough. Then the collected dry leaves are spread uniformly over the soil primarily by the women folk. There are three indigenous varieties of maize namely *Fenthina* (dwarf variety, duration 3 months), *Thinasheru* (tall variety, duration 5 months) and *Baklangboo* [medium tall variety sown in festival *Lohsar* (January to February), duration 4 months]. These indigenous varieties are location specific in nature and grown under varying micro-farming situations by applying the dry leaves of *Paisang*. *Fenthina* is grown in most fertile soils near kitchen gardens, *Thinasheru* is grown in main agricultural land where soil is black to brown and land is undulating while *Balangboo* is cultivated in gentle slope and shifting land. Less quantity of dry leaves of *paisang* are used in black soil than in light textured and undulating lands.

The selection of crop species and types of cropping (mostly mixed) is decided by whole community of village based on amount of *Paisang* tree leaves to avoid the crop loss and sustain the crop productivity. If maize is grown after using the dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine as natural mulch, then there is a better opportunity to increase the productivity of crops by diversifying the cropping systems. When ample quantity of dry leaves of *Paisang* is available as organic manure, then the indigenous varieties of black gram, soybean and rajmabeen are incorporated as mixed crop. *Paisang* and pine leaves are also a integral part in

the sole cropping of local wheat, barley (*Bong*, with or without awns), *Phaphda teeta* (buck wheat), *Phaphda meetha* (buckwheat), finger millet (*mandua*), Indian bean (*Lablab purpureus*), rajmabean (*Phaseolus vulgaris*), millet (*Bundagmo*, *Panicum psilopodium* var. *psilopodium*, *Panicum psilopodium* var. *coloratum*), coriander (*Ush*), bottle gourd (*Lau*), cucumber (*Manthong*), soybean (*Lee*), pumpkin (*Broomsa peela* & *Broomsa saphed*, *Cucurbita moschata*), bitter gourd (*Kaibandu*), indigenous spinach (*Taktak*), field pea, mustard species (*Lai Saag*, *Leme* and *Penche*, *Brassica* spp), garlic (*Lamm*), *Mann bada* (*Allium* spp.), *Mann Chhota* (*Allium* spp.), onion (*Chong*) and chilli (*Solu*). The local varieties conserved by local people using dry leaves of *Paisang* are compatible to the customs, culture, socio-economic conditions, and biophysical parameters, spirit, food habits and ethnic values of Monpa tribe.

To conserve the *Paisang*, pine trees and local crops, a famous festival *Chheskaran* is celebrated during the month of March with the spirit to protect them from insect pests and evils. With the passage of time, some changes have been seen in the pattern of use of *Paisang* leaves. About 20 years back, semi decomposed leaves of *Paisang* tree were used in the standing crop of maize and other crops to increase the fertility, control soil erosion, conserve soil moisture and suppress the weed intensity. The women folk collect the dry leaves of *Paisang* from private and community forest and store in the agricultural fields in a specially made bamboo structure. The leaves were piled tightly and were left till the onset of rains. With the rains, decomposition starts in dry leaves. When the reddish solution is secreted from the bottom of stored leaves, it indicates that leaves are partially decomposed and are ready to apply in maize and other local crops. Now a day the dry leaves are directly collected and used (as mulching material cum organic matter just after sowing of maize seeds) without partial fermentation.

For the effort of informal *in-situ* indigenous agrobiodiversity conservation, the Monpa tribe is ethically rightful to get the reward and honour. The agroecosystem is rainfed and most of the farmers are economically poor. Besides these factors the biophysical condition of this area does not allow them to apply the inorganic fertilizers, thereby making them dependent on the dry leaves of *Paisang* and pine.

Attitudes and Values in Support of *Paisang* Tree

During the study of exploring the dynamics of community knowledge associated with *Paisang* tree and its conservation, most of the Monpa tribe felt that the *Paisang* conserved on the village community land should remain. This land should not be allowed to convert in to orchards of temperate fruits e.g. apple, kiwi fruit, peach, plum, etc. This shows that Monpa tribe attaches more importance to protection and preservation of *Paisang* tree than the commercial benefit obtained from temperate fruits. Majority (70%) of the surveyed respondents felt the present size of their private *Pasiang* tree land should be expanded by an average of 5 acres to meet the need. Only 20 per cent of the respondents opined that the present size of their *Paisang* tree land is adequate. This indicates that a majority of Monpa tribe are interested in either expanding or preserving their *Paisang* tree land.

Impacts of Socio-ecological Changes on *Paisang* Tree Conservation over the Period

There is growing evidence that the changes in governance and over exploitation of *Paisang* tree had a negative impact on the environmental and socio-economic sustainability. These impacts can be characterized in terms of size, sustainability and soil fertility of crops. During early period local people were totally dependent on the leaves of *Paisang* and pine. But with the passage of time, rate of using the leaves of these trees have decreased

considerably among the newer generation. Therefore, a measurable degree of cultural diversity has been lost from the Monpa tribe⁵. Some of the commercial growers of fruit crops have converted their private *Paisang* land into apple orchards, resulting in loss of ecological and cultural benefits. Some of the influential people of the locality have encroached upon community land of *Paisang* tree and cut many trees. The fragmentation of land holdings also makes a community vulnerable to losing control over the portion of community *Pasiang* forest that is distant from villages. The *Paisang* tree is the backbone of local people's culture. Thus, the loss of this resource system may eventually precipitate a decline in the Monpa tribe's cultural diversity. But the small and marginal farmers still conserves the *Paisang* trees, thereby maintaining the local biodiversity. Some of the government policies and other factors have made local people to lose faith in their traditional way of using and conserving the *Paisang* tree.

Changes in the pattern of forest utilization including the *Paisang* tree use have aggravated the depletion of forest resources. The use of *Paisang* as timber and the increasing rate of loss of Monpa tradition among new generation have served to catalyze the pace of degradation of *Paisang* tree. The Monpa people living near towns or degraded forest are less observant of the restrictions on plant use usually imposed by the community institutions and their tradition.

Indigenous Institution and Sustaining the Natural Resources

Looking to the importance of *Paisang* tree the community institution called *Chhopa* have developed some local norms and rules to sustain its population and avoid conflict. The private and community *Paisang* tree lands are demarcated separately using stones. This helps to avoid any conflict between the owners while accessing the leaves. If someone is collecting leaves beyond the demarcated areas assigned or overexploiting the *paisang* tree,

then he/she is imposed fine by *Chhopa* headed by *Gaon Burha* (chief of the village selected by villagers based on age and experience). In this process, the *Gaon-Burha* files a case before the *Chhopa* and guilty person is called for giving explanations. If he is found guilty, a fine of Rs. 2,000 to 20,000 is imposed. In earlier days the fine was imposed in terms of yak, cow, pigs and sheep. The size and age of animals given as fine is decided according to the nature, productivity and age of the cut *Paisang* tree. If the fined person is not able to bear it, then fine is given by his close relatives. The *Chhopa* reserves the right to reduce the fine depending on economic status of the guilty person. The collected money from the imposed fine is used by the community in various most urgent needs like social welfare, managing natural resources like plantation in community land, hillside and roadside to avoid landslides. Everybody honours the decision made by the *Chhopa*. But with the passage of time some changes have taken place in this local institution and influential persons are out of control from this indigenous institution.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Community knowledge plays an important role in food security, resource management and environmental and biodiversity conservation. The study and research concerning indigenous knowledge/community knowledge need not be restricted to medicinal plants or other forest resources that are potentially profitable to the developed world^{15,16}. Instead, research should also focus on other ecological implications and insights that are enshrined in local forest trees use traditions. Such research would also prevent the misuse and abuse of forest resources, as the untimely and injudicious use of even leaves could spell ecological disaster^{17,18}. The knowledge holding community needs to ensure that their knowledge systems and practices are supported and recorded and that they are not locked out of the research agenda by the major institutions.

During last 5 years the infestation of stem parasite *Loranthus* on the *Paisang* tree (Figure 4) has increased dramatically in the Monpa inhabited area and forests of West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh, thus posing a threat to *Paisang* population. The Forest Department should formulate policies and devise control measures together with local officials and village leaders in a participatory mode for controlling the *Loranthus* population. Scientists need to keep an open eye for opportunities to learn from local people, especially given that financial resources and the scientific toolbox are often inadequate in addressing the complex natural and human interactions¹⁹. Indigenous knowledge/community knowledge is the area where there is need to cultivate a bottom-up approach to development building upon the resources and strength of indigenous people, their experiences and diversified knowledge systems^{20,21,22}. Self help groups of the local farmers can be formed and need based training should be imparted to them for controlling *Loranthus*.

Acknowledgement

The authors express their gratitude to the wisemen Shri Tashi Norbu, Mrs Pem Dolma, Shri Lobsang and Jambe Tsering for their kind cooperation in rapport building process and in providing firsthand information for this study. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by National Innovation Foundation, Ahmedabad, Gujarat to carryout this study.

References

1. Gupta Anil K, *Sustainability through biodiversity: Designing crucible of culture, creativity and conscience*. Paper presented in International Conference Biodiversity and Conservation, Copenhagen, November 8, 1991, 8-10.

2. Chandrakanth M G, Bhatt M G & Accavva M S, Socioeconomic changes and sacred groves in South India: Protecting a community-based resource management institution, *Natural Resources Forum*, 28 (2004) 102-111.
3. Gadgil M & Chandran S, Sacred groves, Indigenous vision, peoples of Indian attitudes to the environment, *India International Centre Quarterly, Spring-Summer* (1992) 183-187.
4. Pandey D N, Ethnoforestry: Local knowledge for sustainable forestry and livelihood security, *Asia Forest Network and Himanshu*, (1998) 5-10.
5. Singh Ranjay K, Conserving diversity and culture- Pem Dolma. *Honey Bee*, 15 (3) (2004) 12-13.
6. Prakash S, Nurturing traditional knowledge systems for development, *IK Notes NO. 61*, The World Bank, Washington D C, (2003) 1-4.
7. Bower J D, Genetic Resources Worldwide, *TIBTECH*, 7, (1989) 111-116.
8. Saxena S V, Ghosh C S, Sinha S, Jain N & Gupta A K, Cost of conservation of agrobiodiversity, working paper No. 2002-05-03 (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, (2002) 2-7.
9. Warren D M & Rajasekaran B, *Utilizing and Integrating Indigenous Knowledge Systems for Agricultural and Rural Development: Training Manual and Guide for Extension Workers*, Technology and Social Change Program, (Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa), (1991)10-15.
10. Singh R K, *Performance of soybean production technology assessed by resource-rich and resource-poor farmers in different micro-farming situations of Chhindwara district of Madhya Pradesh*, Ph.D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, 2002.
11. Gupta A K, Sinha R, Koradia D, Patel R, Parmar M, Rohit P, Patel H, Patel K, Chand V S, James T J, Chandan A, Patel M, Prakash T N & Vivekanandan P, Mobilizing grassroots

Accepted for publication in *Indian Journal of Traditional Knowledge, March Issue, 2006*

technological innovations and traditional knowledge, values and institutions: Articulating social and ethical capital, *Futures*, 35 (2003) 975–987.

12. Maundu P M, Methodology for collecting and sharing indigenous knowledge: A case study. *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor*, 3 (2) (1995) 3-5.
13. Singh Ranjay K, Nathiben: A dynamic old lady, well made centurions, *Honeybee News Letter*, 13 (4) (2003) 1 & 9.
14. Singh Ranjay K, Agro-biodiversity and food security in risk-prone agro-ecosystems: An appraisal of tribals' wisdom, *Abstract, International Symposium on Alternative Approach to Enhancing Small-Scale Livelihoods and Natural Resources Management in Marginal Areas-Experience in Manson Asia*, held at United Nations University, UN House, Tokyo, Japan, (October 29-30, 2003), 10.
15. Balee W, The culture of Amazonian Forests, in: *Resource Management in Amazonia: Indigenous and Folk Strategies, Advances in Economic Botany* edited by Posey D A and Balee W (The New York Botanical Garden, Bronx, New York), 1989, 1-21.
16. Berkes F, Role and significance of 'Tradition' in indigenous knowledge, *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor*, 7 (1) (1999) 19.
17. Cashman K, Indigenous knowledge and international agricultural research: Where do we go from here?, in: *Indigenous Knowledge Systems: Implications for Agriculture and International Development*, edited by Warren D M, Slikkerveer L Jan and Titilola S O, (Technology and Social Change Program, Iowa State University, Ames), 11, 1989, 10-20.
18. Ramnath M, Tropical deciduous forest and the Adivasi: Indigenous tradition as response to leaf fall in Bastar, India, *Natural Resources Forum*, 27 (2003) 304-309.

19. Mele Paul Van & Chien Ho Van, Farmers, biodiversity and plant protection: Developing a learning environment for sustainable tree cropping systems, *International J Agricultural Sustainability*, 2 (1) (2004) 67-76.
20. Dasmann R F, The importance of cultural and biological diversity, in: *Biodiversity: Culture, Conservation and Ecodevelopment*, edited by Oldfield M L and Alcorn J B (Westview Press, Boulder), 1991, 7-15.
21. Gadgil M, Conserving India's biodiversity: The societal context, *Evolutionary Trends in Plants*, 5 (1991) 3-8.
22. World Bank, Indigenous knowledge for development: A framework for action, Knowledge and Learning Centre, Africa Region, World Bank. <http://www.worldbank.org/html/afr/ik/index/htm>, (1998) 1-4.



Fig 1: *Paisang* groves conserved and managed by *Monpa* community



Fig 2: The leaves of *Paisang* tree in green stage



Fig 3: Dry leaves of *paisang* tree stored in barley field to be applied in maize crop



Fig 4: A *paisang* tree infested by stem parasite *Loranthus*

Power and Scale from Tribal Societies to Mass Societies

Book Review by Laura Killian

The Scale of Power

A Global History Approach

John H. Bodley

M.E. Sharpe, NY

Pp. 297 (2003)

The relationship between the size of a society and the degree to which power is concentrated in the hands of a few members of that society is the broad subject of John Bodley's important and stimulating book *The Scale of Power* published by M.E. Sharpe. As with Bodley's earlier works *Anthropology and Contemporary Human Problems* (1985) and *Victims of Progress* (4th Edition 1999) the Washington State University's Edward R. Meyer Distinguished Professor of Anthropology applies careful scholarship, an acute understanding of contemporary affairs and an intimate knowledge of Fourth World peoples to draw a dark picture of social power in society while offering a hopeful prospect for the future of generous and creative societies learning from the experience of Fourth World nations.

Bodley's looks through the lens of history, sociology, cultural anthropology, archaeology and bio-cultural evolutionary theory at the evolution of human societies and their tendency to accumulate power and wealth in the hands a few to help explain why environmental and social problems arise. He points out that most of the "current problems faced by humanity today, war, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental deterioration are all problems of scale and power." Bodley shows how individuals, not social classes, have been the agents of social change. He uses "simple mathematical power laws and log graphs to demonstrate that societal growth disproportionately

concentrates social power as scale increases”. The scale of a society directly correlates to the tendency to concentrate power and wealth and this is examined by looking at three major cultural transformations from tribal societies to kingdoms, or imperial societies, and kingdoms to commercial states with a measure he calls the ‘imperia.’ Scale determines how big empires (or as Bodley applies the plural form *imperia*) can become, or how much absolute power is available to the top ranks. The scale theory offers an evaluation about why extreme poverty exists alongside extreme amounts of concentrated wealth.

In a small scale Fourth World or tribal society, problems of inequalities are balanced out at the household level, using kin-based redistribution practices. Communities are small enough for everyone to know each other, with those who lead directly in touch with all who follow them. If a leader in a tribal society is out of line and starts to show signs of corruption, explains Bodley, people in the tribe simply stop listening to that person. They look for new leaders who support the functioning and survival of each other, the society and of the culture. These societies are generally organized around the “law of generosity” as Nuu-cha nulth Professor, Richard Atleo, affirms in his book, *Tsawalk* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 2004) , and leaders exhibit generosity or they do not lead. Modern tribal societies exhibit the law of generosity, but more populous societies lose this important quality. As populations over the last two thousand years changed, grew and people began to create kingdoms, city-states, states, empires and the modern state system life for the individual homestead changed dramatically. This resulted according to Bodley when “population growth

changes the face-to-face domestic community into an impersonal society, because people cannot effectively remember and relate personally to more than 500 individuals.”

The cultural transformation Bodley calls the imperial society added new dimensions.

Royal families began controlling the majority of the population, and day-to-day life changed dramatically for everyone living in these settlements as Bodley suggests.

From the perspective of scale theory it is significant that even as rulers expanded their imperia, the absolute number in the top leadership remained relatively constant. There was always one emperor at the very top who also headed a personal dynasty, and there were seldom more than 500 noblemen...the 50 million people in the Roman Empire were governed by the emperor and a few hundred senators and top bureaucrats.

A crucial point in achieving this power, explains Bodley, is the ability of the imperia to gain even further scale effects by creating dynasties that transmit and accumulate power *transgenerationally*. Royal families were able to concentrate social power by “co-opting the humanization process” by developing political institutions,” taxation, militarization and urbanization. Here can be seen the difference between a domestic-scale and a political-scale culture, or as Ferdinand Tonnies put it, the concepts of *Gemeinschaft*, a community composed of a real, organic, face-to-face community integrated by shared sentiments of personal familiarity and kinship and *Gesellschaft*, a society that is artificial, imaginary, impersonal, public society and too large to sustain the interpersonal human qualities.

Bodley discusses the development of commercial power as an important cultural transformation in the world. Here he describes a global scale culture of industrialization, commodification, capitalism, externalization, corporatization, elitization, supralocalization, and financialization resulting in polarized societies where corporations,

the military and political elites have formed institutions for the creation of public policy. These elites “were able to implement two massive cultural reorganizations in rapid succession that produced a truly global commercial system within a few decades, progressivist and neoliberal.” Popular thought leaders suggested that these systems would benefit all of humanity, however, they were unable to deal with unforeseen consequences of such systems. By concentrating social power, Bodley suggests, the humanization and politicization processes had been set up to produce and maintain for-profit business enterprises; a stark contrast to tribal societies where processes were set up to produce and maintain the culture through sharing and no interpersonal exploitation.

Bodley’s narrative turns to the modern context when he writes that when the scale of human society increases to the point at which the US (300 million) is at currently, at least five things are likely to happen: Per capita economic productivity and consumption increases but the product becomes more inequitably distributed. This is painfully apparent with new economic studies in the United States revealing that less than 1 percent of the US population controls more than 45% of the countries wealth. Democracy declines because decision-making becomes more cumbersome, more concentrated and institutions and technologies become more specialized, more complex, more costly, and more vulnerable. The pace of change and instability increases while all types of social power become more concentrated.

One of Bodley’s most important insights is that this current system did not happen due to a natural, evolving process by rather “it did so because a few individual designers were successfully able to impose their will on billions of other people. The modern world system was created by a relative handful of individuals (who succeeded) because

utopian capitalists were able to command overwhelmingly persuasive personal imperia.” As a result of this success, growth occurred, scale increased and social power became even more concentrated in states all over the world.

Looking at a community versus a society, Bodley is able to show how this illusion of progress is being pushed by the few who would benefit. No longer does the society exist to support the people, but to support the expanding, economic and political growth of a small amount of wealthy families and corporations. Bodley shows the risk that “further increasing the scale of global commerce to further maximize economic growth will merely continue the power-concentrating trends of the past and is unlikely to solve the human problems of poverty, social disorder, and environmental deterioration” (Bodley, 262). Not all people, however, see global, economic progress as worth the expenses. There has emerged a counter imperia movement where it is understood that bigger is not better, where a more human, smaller scale society is a realistic alternative to infinite growth. Bodley notes that there is an optimal scale for humans to live at and when societies “grow beyond the social optimum, the society begins to experience negative problems of vulnerability, or criticality, when sudden collapse might occur” (Bodley, 238).

The Power of Scale is an important book to students of the Fourth World and for those who want to understand contemporary geopolitical conflicts involving states and Fourth World nations. Bodley’s book shows an historical perspective on why with an increase in the scale of a population, there will be a concentration of wealth and power among a very small portion of the total population and such concentrations do not bode well for human society. Bodley’s book offers a quality analysis for anyone wishing to

learn how wealth and power inequalities have become what they are today and offers practical options of where we can go from here through various paradigm shifts that move away from continued, global, economic growth towards sustainable forms at the local, human level.